gnu: cpio: Update to 2.13 [fixes CVE-2015-1197, CVE-2019-14866].

* gnu/packages/cpio.scm (cpio): Update to 2.13.
Remove "cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch".
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it.

3 files changed, 2 insertions, 53 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index ec3974a8aa..2513b4003c 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -760,7 +760,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
   %D%/packages/patches/coda-use-system-libs.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/combinatorial-blas-awpm.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/combinatorial-blas-io-fix.patch		\
-  %D%/packages/patches/cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/cpufrequtils-fix-aclocal.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/crawl-upgrade-saves.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/crda-optional-gcrypt.patch		\
diff --git a/gnu/packages/cpio.scm b/gnu/packages/cpio.scm
index 77a0c82d2e..58b2f45937 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/cpio.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/cpio.scm
@@ -28,15 +28,14 @@
 (define-public cpio
   (package
     (name "cpio")
-    (version "2.12")
+    (version "2.13")
     (source (origin
              (method url-fetch)
              (uri (string-append "mirror://gnu/cpio/cpio-"
                                  version ".tar.bz2"))
              (sha256
               (base32
-               "0vi9q475h1rki53100zml75vxsykzyhrn70hidy41s5c2rc8r6bh"))
-             (patches (search-patches "cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch"))))
+               "0vbgnhkawdllgnkdn6zn1f56fczwk0518krakz2qbwhxmv2vvdga"))))
     (build-system gnu-build-system)
     (home-page "https://www.gnu.org/software/cpio/")
     (synopsis "Manage cpio and tar file archives")
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f1e068fb45..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2016-2037 (out of bounds write in process_copy_in()).
-
-Copied from upstream mailing list:
-https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-cpio/2016-01/msg00005.html
-
----
-
- Other calls to cpio_safer_name_suffix seem to be safe.
- .
- * src/copyin.c (process_copy_in):  Make sure that file_hdr.c_name
- has at least two bytes allocated.
- * src/util.c (cpio_safer_name_suffix): Document that use of this
- function requires to be careful.
-Author: Pavel Raiskup <praiskup@redhat.com>
-
----
- src/copyin.c | 2 ++
- src/util.c   | 5 ++++-
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-Index: cpio-2.11+dfsg/src/copyin.c
-===================================================================
---- cpio-2.11+dfsg.orig/src/copyin.c
-+++ cpio-2.11+dfsg/src/copyin.c
-@@ -1433,6 +1433,8 @@ process_copy_in ()
- 	  break;
- 	}
- 
-+      if (file_hdr.c_namesize <= 1)
-+        file_hdr.c_name = xrealloc(file_hdr.c_name, 2);
-       cpio_safer_name_suffix (file_hdr.c_name, false, !no_abs_paths_flag,
- 			      false);
-       
-Index: cpio-2.11+dfsg/src/util.c
-===================================================================
---- cpio-2.11+dfsg.orig/src/util.c
-+++ cpio-2.11+dfsg/src/util.c
-@@ -1374,7 +1374,10 @@ set_file_times (int fd,
- }
- 
- /* Do we have to ignore absolute paths, and if so, does the filename
--   have an absolute path?  */
-+   have an absolute path?
-+   Before calling this function make sure that the allocated NAME buffer has
-+   capacity at least 2 bytes to allow us to store the "." string inside.  */
-+
- void
- cpio_safer_name_suffix (char *name, bool link_target, bool absolute_names,
- 			bool strip_leading_dots)