gnu: qemu: Update to 2.10.2.

* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15119.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15268.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.
* gnu/packages/virtualization.scm (qemu): Update to 2.10.2.
[source](patches): Remove obsolete.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 58 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d427317be9..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-15118:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15118
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1516922
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183
-
-From 51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 15:07:22 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: CVE-2017-15118 Stack smash on large export name
-
-Introduced in commit f37708f6b8 (2.10).  The NBD spec says a client
-can request export names up to 4096 bytes in length, even though
-they should not expect success on names longer than 256.  However,
-qemu hard-codes the limit of 256, and fails to filter out a client
-that probes for a longer name; the result is a stack smash that can
-potentially give an attacker arbitrary control over the qemu
-process.
-
-The smash can be easily demonstrated with this client:
-$ qemu-io f raw nbd://localhost:10809/$(printf %3000d 1 | tr ' ' a)
-
-If the qemu NBD server binary (whether the standalone qemu-nbd, or
-the builtin server of QMP nbd-server-start) was compiled with
--fstack-protector-strong, the ability to exploit the stack smash
-into arbitrary execution is a lot more difficult (but still
-theoretically possible to a determined attacker, perhaps in
-combination with other CVEs).  Still, crashing a running qemu (and
-losing the VM) is bad enough, even if the attacker did not obtain
-full execution control.
-
-CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
----
- nbd/server.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
-index a81801e3bc..92c0fdd03b 100644
---- a/nbd/server.c
-+++ b/nbd/server.c
-@@ -386,6 +386,10 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_handle_info(NBDClient *client, uint32_t length,
-         msg = "name length is incorrect";
-         goto invalid;
-     }
-+    if (namelen >= sizeof(name)) {
-+        msg = "name too long for qemu";
-+        goto invalid;
-+    }
-     if (nbd_read(client->ioc, name, namelen, errp) < 0) {
-         return -EIO;
-     }
--- 
-2.15.0
-