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authorLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2018-04-30 16:29:36 -0400
committerLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2018-04-30 21:07:58 -0400
commit9eecf9bc13bd3746ce5a073c59920110c6cf3dd7 (patch)
treef084bd5e0d0f84eba0e0de17b96bffeed5b12a32 /gnu/packages/patches
parent08a752526df91de3a1779ccaa0946833618d775d (diff)
downloadguix-9eecf9bc13bd3746ce5a073c59920110c6cf3dd7.tar.gz
gnu: gimp: Update to 2.10.0.
* gnu/packages/gimp.scm (gimp): Update to 2.10.0.
[inputs]: Add glib-networking, gexiv2, libmypaint, mypaint-brushes and
poppler-data.
[native-inputs]: Add glib:bin.
[source]: Remove obsolete patches and use HTTPS URL.
[home-page]: Use HTTPS URL.
* gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17784.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17785.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17786.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17787.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17789.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17784.patch41
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17785.patch171
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17786.patch94
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17787.patch42
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17789.patch48
5 files changed, 0 insertions, 396 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17784.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17784.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c791772fb5..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17784.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-17784:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-17784
-https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790784
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://git.gnome.org/browse/gimp/commit/?id=c57f9dcf1934a9ab0cd67650f2dea18cb0902270
-
-From c57f9dcf1934a9ab0cd67650f2dea18cb0902270 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jehan <jehan@girinstud.io>
-Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2017 12:25:32 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Bug 790784 - (CVE-2017-17784) heap overread in gbr parser /
- load_image.
-
-We were assuming the input name was well formed, hence was
-nul-terminated. As any data coming from external input, this has to be
-thorougly checked.
-Similar to commit 06d24a79af94837d615d0024916bb95a01bf3c59 but adapted
-to older gimp-2-8 code.
----
- plug-ins/common/file-gbr.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/plug-ins/common/file-gbr.c b/plug-ins/common/file-gbr.c
-index b028100bef..d3f01d9c56 100644
---- a/plug-ins/common/file-gbr.c
-+++ b/plug-ins/common/file-gbr.c
-@@ -443,7 +443,8 @@ load_image (const gchar  *filename,
-     {
-       gchar *temp = g_new (gchar, bn_size);
- 
--      if ((read (fd, temp, bn_size)) < bn_size)
-+      if ((read (fd, temp, bn_size)) < bn_size ||
-+          temp[bn_size - 1] != '\0')
-         {
-           g_set_error (error, G_FILE_ERROR, G_FILE_ERROR_FAILED,
-                        _("Error in GIMP brush file '%s'"),
--- 
-2.15.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17785.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17785.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 939b01f214..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17785.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-17785:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-17785
-https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=739133
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://git.gnome.org/browse/gimp/commit/?id=1882bac996a20ab5c15c42b0c5e8f49033a1af54
-
-From 1882bac996a20ab5c15c42b0c5e8f49033a1af54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
-Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2017 15:19:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Bug 739133 - (CVE-2017-17785) Heap overflow while parsing FLI
- files.
-
-It is possible to trigger a heap overflow while parsing FLI files. The
-RLE decoder is vulnerable to out of boundary writes due to lack of
-boundary checks.
-
-The variable "framebuf" points to a memory area which was allocated
-with fli_header->width * fli_header->height bytes. The RLE decoder
-therefore must never write beyond that limit.
-
-If an illegal frame is detected, the parser won't stop, which means
-that the next valid sequence is properly parsed again. This should
-allow GIMP to parse FLI files as good as possible even if they are
-broken by an attacker or by accident.
-
-While at it, I changed the variable xc to be of type size_t, because
-the multiplication of width and height could overflow a 16 bit type.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
-(cherry picked from commit edb251a7ef1602d20a5afcbf23f24afb163de63b)
----
- plug-ins/file-fli/fli.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/plug-ins/file-fli/fli.c b/plug-ins/file-fli/fli.c
-index 313efeb977..ffb651e2af 100644
---- a/plug-ins/file-fli/fli.c
-+++ b/plug-ins/file-fli/fli.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
- 
- #include "config.h"
- 
-+#include <glib/gstdio.h>
-+
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- 
-@@ -461,23 +463,27 @@ void fli_read_brun(FILE *f, s_fli_header *fli_header, unsigned char *framebuf)
- 	unsigned short yc;
- 	unsigned char *pos;
- 	for (yc=0; yc < fli_header->height; yc++) {
--		unsigned short xc, pc, pcnt;
-+		unsigned short pc, pcnt;
-+		size_t n, xc;
- 		pc=fli_read_char(f);
- 		xc=0;
- 		pos=framebuf+(fli_header->width * yc);
-+		n=(size_t)fli_header->width * (fli_header->height-yc);
- 		for (pcnt=pc; pcnt>0; pcnt--) {
- 			unsigned short ps;
- 			ps=fli_read_char(f);
- 			if (ps & 0x80) {
- 				unsigned short len;
--				for (len=-(signed char)ps; len>0; len--) {
-+				for (len=-(signed char)ps; len>0 && xc<n; len--) {
- 					pos[xc++]=fli_read_char(f);
- 				}
- 			} else {
- 				unsigned char val;
-+				size_t len;
-+				len=MIN(n-xc,ps);
- 				val=fli_read_char(f);
--				memset(&(pos[xc]), val, ps);
--				xc+=ps;
-+				memset(&(pos[xc]), val, len);
-+				xc+=len;
- 			}
- 		}
- 	}
-@@ -564,25 +570,34 @@ void fli_read_lc(FILE *f, s_fli_header *fli_header, unsigned char *old_framebuf,
- 	memcpy(framebuf, old_framebuf, fli_header->width * fli_header->height);
- 	firstline = fli_read_short(f);
- 	numline = fli_read_short(f);
-+	if (numline > fli_header->height || fli_header->height-numline < firstline)
-+		return;
-+
- 	for (yc=0; yc < numline; yc++) {
--		unsigned short xc, pc, pcnt;
-+		unsigned short pc, pcnt;
-+		size_t n, xc;
- 		pc=fli_read_char(f);
- 		xc=0;
- 		pos=framebuf+(fli_header->width * (firstline+yc));
-+		n=(size_t)fli_header->width * (fli_header->height-firstline-yc);
- 		for (pcnt=pc; pcnt>0; pcnt--) {
- 			unsigned short ps,skip;
- 			skip=fli_read_char(f);
- 			ps=fli_read_char(f);
--			xc+=skip;
-+			xc+=MIN(n-xc,skip);
- 			if (ps & 0x80) {
- 				unsigned char val;
-+				size_t len;
- 				ps=-(signed char)ps;
- 				val=fli_read_char(f);
--				memset(&(pos[xc]), val, ps);
--				xc+=ps;
-+				len=MIN(n-xc,ps);
-+				memset(&(pos[xc]), val, len);
-+				xc+=len;
- 			} else {
--				fread(&(pos[xc]), ps, 1, f);
--				xc+=ps;
-+				size_t len;
-+				len=MIN(n-xc,ps);
-+				fread(&(pos[xc]), len, 1, f);
-+				xc+=len;
- 			}
- 		}
- 	}
-@@ -689,7 +704,8 @@ void fli_read_lc_2(FILE *f, s_fli_header *fli_header, unsigned char *old_framebu
- 	yc=0;
- 	numline = fli_read_short(f);
- 	for (lc=0; lc < numline; lc++) {
--		unsigned short xc, pc, pcnt, lpf, lpn;
-+		unsigned short pc, pcnt, lpf, lpn;
-+		size_t n, xc;
- 		pc=fli_read_short(f);
- 		lpf=0; lpn=0;
- 		while (pc & 0x8000) {
-@@ -700,26 +716,30 @@ void fli_read_lc_2(FILE *f, s_fli_header *fli_header, unsigned char *old_framebu
- 			}
- 			pc=fli_read_short(f);
- 		}
-+		yc=MIN(yc, fli_header->height);
- 		xc=0;
- 		pos=framebuf+(fli_header->width * yc);
-+		n=(size_t)fli_header->width * (fli_header->height-yc);
- 		for (pcnt=pc; pcnt>0; pcnt--) {
- 			unsigned short ps,skip;
- 			skip=fli_read_char(f);
- 			ps=fli_read_char(f);
--			xc+=skip;
-+			xc+=MIN(n-xc,skip);
- 			if (ps & 0x80) {
- 				unsigned char v1,v2;
- 				ps=-(signed char)ps;
- 				v1=fli_read_char(f);
- 				v2=fli_read_char(f);
--				while (ps>0) {
-+				while (ps>0 && xc+1<n) {
- 					pos[xc++]=v1;
- 					pos[xc++]=v2;
- 					ps--;
- 				}
- 			} else {
--				fread(&(pos[xc]), ps, 2, f);
--				xc+=ps << 1;
-+				size_t len;
-+				len=MIN((n-xc)/2,ps);
-+				fread(&(pos[xc]), len, 2, f);
-+				xc+=len << 1;
- 			}
- 		}
- 		if (lpf) pos[xc]=lpn;
--- 
-2.15.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17786.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17786.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 851227ac1d..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17786.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-17786:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-17786
-https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=739134
-
-Both patches copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://git.gnome.org/browse/gimp/commit/?id=ef9c821fff8b637a2178eab1c78cae6764c50e12
-https://git.gnome.org/browse/gimp/commit/?id=22e2571c25425f225abdb11a566cc281fca6f366
-
-From ef9c821fff8b637a2178eab1c78cae6764c50e12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jehan <jehan@girinstud.io>
-Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 13:02:38 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Bug 739134 - (CVE-2017-17786) Out of bounds read / heap
- overflow in...
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-... TGA importer.
-
-Be more thorough on valid TGA RGB and RGBA images.
-In particular current TGA plug-in can import RGBA as 32 bits (8 bits per
-channel) and 16 bits (5 bits per color channel and 1 bit for alpha), and
-RGB as 15 and 24 bits.
-Maybe there exist more variants, but if they do exist, we simply don't
-support them yet.
-
-Thanks to Hanno Böck for the report and a first patch attempt.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 674b62ad45b6579ec6d7923dc3cb1ef4e8b5498b)
----
- plug-ins/common/file-tga.c | 12 ++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/plug-ins/common/file-tga.c b/plug-ins/common/file-tga.c
-index aef98702d4..426acc2925 100644
---- a/plug-ins/common/file-tga.c
-+++ b/plug-ins/common/file-tga.c
-@@ -564,12 +564,16 @@ load_image (const gchar  *filename,
-           }
-         break;
-       case TGA_TYPE_COLOR:
--        if (info.bpp != 15 && info.bpp != 16 &&
--            info.bpp != 24 && info.bpp != 32)
-+        if ((info.bpp != 15 && info.bpp != 16 &&
-+             info.bpp != 24 && info.bpp != 32)      ||
-+            ((info.bpp == 15 || info.bpp == 24) &&
-+             info.alphaBits != 0)                   ||
-+            (info.bpp == 16 && info.alphaBits != 1) ||
-+            (info.bpp == 32 && info.alphaBits != 8))
-           {
--            g_message ("Unhandled sub-format in '%s' (type = %u, bpp = %u)",
-+            g_message ("Unhandled sub-format in '%s' (type = %u, bpp = %u, alpha = %u)",
-                        gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename),
--                       info.imageType, info.bpp);
-+                       info.imageType, info.bpp, info.alphaBits);
-             return -1;
-           }
-         break;
--- 
-2.15.1
-
-From 22e2571c25425f225abdb11a566cc281fca6f366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jehan <jehan@girinstud.io>
-Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 13:26:26 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] plug-ins: TGA 16-bit RGB (without alpha bit) is also valid.
-
-According to some spec on the web, 16-bit RGB is also valid. In this
-case, the last bit is simply ignored (at least that's how it is
-implemented right now).
-
-(cherry picked from commit 8ea316667c8a3296bce2832b3986b58d0fdfc077)
----
- plug-ins/common/file-tga.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/plug-ins/common/file-tga.c b/plug-ins/common/file-tga.c
-index 426acc2925..eb14a1dadc 100644
---- a/plug-ins/common/file-tga.c
-+++ b/plug-ins/common/file-tga.c
-@@ -568,7 +568,8 @@ load_image (const gchar  *filename,
-              info.bpp != 24 && info.bpp != 32)      ||
-             ((info.bpp == 15 || info.bpp == 24) &&
-              info.alphaBits != 0)                   ||
--            (info.bpp == 16 && info.alphaBits != 1) ||
-+            (info.bpp == 16 && info.alphaBits != 1 &&
-+             info.alphaBits != 0)                   ||
-             (info.bpp == 32 && info.alphaBits != 8))
-           {
-             g_message ("Unhandled sub-format in '%s' (type = %u, bpp = %u, alpha = %u)",
--- 
-2.15.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17787.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17787.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b5310d33d9..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17787.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-17787:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-17787
-https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790853
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://git.gnome.org/browse/gimp/commit/?id=87ba505fff85989af795f4ab6a047713f4d9381d
-
-From 87ba505fff85989af795f4ab6a047713f4d9381d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jehan <jehan@girinstud.io>
-Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2017 12:49:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Bug 790853 - (CVE-2017-17787) heap overread in psp importer.
-
-As any external data, we have to check that strings being read at fixed
-length are properly nul-terminated.
-
-(cherry picked from commit eb2980683e6472aff35a3117587c4f814515c74d)
----
- plug-ins/common/file-psp.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/plug-ins/common/file-psp.c b/plug-ins/common/file-psp.c
-index 4cbafe37b1..e350e4d88d 100644
---- a/plug-ins/common/file-psp.c
-+++ b/plug-ins/common/file-psp.c
-@@ -890,6 +890,12 @@ read_creator_block (FILE     *f,
-               g_free (string);
-               return -1;
-             }
-+          if (string[length - 1] != '\0')
-+            {
-+              g_message ("Creator keyword data not nul-terminated");
-+              g_free (string);
-+              return -1;
-+            }
-           switch (keyword)
-             {
-             case PSP_CRTR_FLD_TITLE:
--- 
-2.15.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17789.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17789.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6dfa435fd0..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/gimp-CVE-2017-17789.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-17789:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-17789
-https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790849
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://git.gnome.org/browse/gimp/commit/?id=01898f10f87a094665a7fdcf7153990f4e511d3f
-
-From 01898f10f87a094665a7fdcf7153990f4e511d3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jehan <jehan@girinstud.io>
-Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 16:44:20 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Bug 790849 - (CVE-2017-17789) CVE-2017-17789 Heap buffer
- overflow...
-
-... in PSP importer.
-Check if declared block length is valid (i.e. within the actual file)
-before going further.
-Consider the file as broken otherwise and fail loading it.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 28e95fbeb5720e6005a088fa811f5bf3c1af48b8)
----
- plug-ins/common/file-psp.c | 9 +++++++++
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/plug-ins/common/file-psp.c b/plug-ins/common/file-psp.c
-index ac0fff78f0..4cbafe37b1 100644
---- a/plug-ins/common/file-psp.c
-+++ b/plug-ins/common/file-psp.c
-@@ -1771,6 +1771,15 @@ load_image (const gchar  *filename,
-     {
-       block_start = ftell (f);
- 
-+      if (block_start + block_total_len > st.st_size)
-+        {
-+          g_set_error (error, G_FILE_ERROR, G_FILE_ERROR_FAILED,
-+                       _("Could not open '%s' for reading: %s"),
-+                       gimp_filename_to_utf8 (filename),
-+                       _("invalid block size"));
-+          goto error;
-+        }
-+
-       if (id == PSP_IMAGE_BLOCK)
-         {
-           if (block_number != 0)
--- 
-2.15.1
-