diff options
author | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-05-11 12:46:31 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-05-11 12:51:47 -0400 |
commit | d48c8e7b6070a63dc12ead0bb9ea47b790e237f0 (patch) | |
tree | addb863d86c362a9287f9277bdc65d79620ab306 /gnu/packages/patches | |
parent | 1ec78e9d71d7c38c5739c90d3927e227bce23caa (diff) | |
download | guix-d48c8e7b6070a63dc12ead0bb9ea47b790e237f0.tar.gz |
gnu: wpa-supplicant: Add security fixes.
* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch: New files. * gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add them. * gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-light)[source]: Add patches.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
7 files changed, 377 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cd097006d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/ + +From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser + +strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and +resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could +result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length +argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault. + +This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that +has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This +would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with +upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER +(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used). + +Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to +rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be +larger than the maximum configured body length. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c +index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644 +--- a/src/wps/httpread.c ++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c +@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + if (!isxdigit(*cbp)) + goto bad; + h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16); ++ if (h->chunk_size < 0 || ++ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d", ++ h->chunk_size); ++ goto bad; ++ } + /* throw away chunk header + * so we have only real data + */ +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..de042f0c49 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/ + +From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser + +The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the +length of the information elements (int left) could end up being +negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack +buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing +so, resulting in segmentation fault. + +This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service +attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses +hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based +drivers). + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c +index 6d4177c..314e244 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wmm.c ++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c +@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + return; + } + ++ if (left < 0) ++ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */ ++ + /* extract the tspec info element */ + if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7ebf5f4cc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/ + +From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit + and Confirm + +The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not +checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read +overflow when processing an invalid message. + +Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before +processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to +make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm +message before the previous exchanges have been completed. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index f2b0926..a629437 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; + u16 offset; + u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL; ++ size_t prime_len, order_len; ++ ++ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) { ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ ++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); ++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); ++ ++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, ++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); ++ goto fin; ++ } + + if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) || +@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; + int offset; + ++ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) { ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ ++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + /* + * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function | + * prf +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c11e4175d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/ + +From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit + and Confirm + +The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not +checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read +overflow when processing an invalid message. + +Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before +processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to +make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm +message before the previous exchanges have been completed. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; + EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL; + int res = 0; ++ size_t prime_len, order_len; + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response"); + ++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); ++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); ++ ++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, ++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) || +@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; + int offset; + ++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */ + grp = htons(data->group_num); + ptr = (u8 *) &cs; +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..963dac9270 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/ + +From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment + reassembly + +The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the +Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked +prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could +have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted +as a huge positive integer. + +In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress +before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a +potential memory leak when processing invalid message. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index a629437..1d2079b 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field + */ + if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (len < 2) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ return NULL; ++ } + tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose " + "total length = %d", tot_len); + if (tot_len > 15000) + return NULL; ++ if (data->inbuf) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ return NULL; ++ } + data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); + if (data->inbuf == NULL) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer " +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3d945382bc --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/ + +From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment + reassembly + +The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the +Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked +prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could +have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted +as a huge positive integer. + +In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress +before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a +potential memory leak when processing invalid message. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + * the first fragment has a total length + */ + if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (len < 2) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); ++ return; ++ } + tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total " + "length = %d", tot_len); + if (tot_len > 15000) + return; ++ if (data->inbuf) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); ++ return; ++ } + data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); + if (data->inbuf == NULL) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to " +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30f71974ad --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/ + +From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior + +The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding +whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This +fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid +for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in +triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process +due to invalid buffer allocation. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + /* + * we have output! Do we need to fragment it? + */ ++ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch); + len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf); + if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) { + resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu, +-- +1.9.1 + |