gnu: wpa-supplicant: Add fixes for CVE-2016-{4476,4477}.

* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal)[source]: Add patches.

5 files changed, 327 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..acad6be0a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
+
+WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
+characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as
+STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or
+WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase.
+
+This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated
+the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from
+an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should
+such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file
+could become invalid and fail to be parsed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ src/utils/common.c         | 12 ++++++++++++
+ src/utils/common.h         |  1 +
+ src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c
+index 450e2c6..27b7c02 100644
+--- a/src/utils/common.c
++++ b/src/utils/common.c
+@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
++		if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127)
++			return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
+ 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
+ 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
+diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h
+index 701dbb2..a972240 100644
+--- a/src/utils/common.h
++++ b/src/utils/common.h
+@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
+ 
+ char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
+ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
+ size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
+ 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
+ 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
+diff --git a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
+index eadb22f..e8c4579 100644
+--- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
++++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
+@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred)
+ 		cred->key_len--;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */
+ 	}
++
++
++	if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) &&
++	    (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase");
++		wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key",
++				      cred->key, cred->key_len);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..507a96e47c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase
+ character
+
+WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
+characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
+includes an invalid passphrase.
+
+This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
+configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
+interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
+accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
+an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
+does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
+wpa_supplicant.
+
+This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
+almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
+file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
+opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
+load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
+This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
+wpa_supplicant process privileges.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+index b1c7870..fdd9643 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data,
+ 		}
+ 		wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)",
+ 				      (u8 *) value, len);
++		if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++				   "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character",
++				   line);
++			return -1;
++		}
+ 		if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len &&
+ 		    os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) {
+ 			/* No change to the previously configured value */
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..684d25de96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network
+ output
+
+Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
+wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
+parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
+been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
+characters in the psk parameter.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
+---
+ src/utils/common.c      | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/utils/common.h      |  1 +
+ wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c
+index 27b7c02..9856463 100644
+--- a/src/utils/common.c
++++ b/src/utils/common.c
+@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++int has_newline(const char *str)
++{
++	while (*str) {
++		if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r')
++			return 1;
++		str++;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
+ 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
+ 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
+diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h
+index a972240..d19927b 100644
+--- a/src/utils/common.h
++++ b/src/utils/common.h
+@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
+ char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
+ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
+ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
++int has_newline(const char *str);
+ size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
+ 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
+ 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+index fdd9643..eb97cd5 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var)
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) {
+ 		const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i];
+-		if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0)
+-			return field->writer(field, ssid);
++		if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) {
++			char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid);
++
++			if (ret && has_newline(ret)) {
++				wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++					   "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it",
++					   var);
++				os_free(ret);
++				ret = NULL;
++			}
++
++			return ret;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return NULL;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2dd38fee31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the
+ string values
+
+Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
+filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
+unexpected configuration file data might be written.
+
+This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
+configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
+interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
+accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
+an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
+does not validate the credential value before passing it to
+wpa_supplicant.
+
+This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
+into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
+wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
+pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
+controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
+library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+index eb97cd5..69152ef 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
+ 
+ 	if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 &&
+ 	    os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) {
++		if (has_newline(value))
++			return -1;
+ 		str_clear_free(cred->password);
+ 		cred->password = os_strdup(value);
+ 		cred->ext_password = 1;
+@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len);
+-	if (val == NULL) {
++	if (val == NULL ||
++	    (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 &&
++	     os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
++	     os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
++	     has_newline(val))) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string "
+ 			   "value '%s'.", line, var, value);
++		os_free(val);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5f42aa9219
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the
+ string values
+
+Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
+without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
+value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.
+
+This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
+configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
+interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
+accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
+an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
+does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
+wpa_supplicant.
+
+This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
+into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
+wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
+pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
+controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
+library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (has_newline(pos)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline",
++			   line, data->name);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	tmp = os_strdup(pos);
+ 	if (tmp == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+-- 
+1.9.1
+