gnu: qemu: Update to 2.8.1 [security fixes].

Fixes CVE-2016-{9602,9603} and CVE-2017-{2615,2620,2630,5667,5931}.

* gnu/packages/qemu.scm (qemu): Update to 2.8.1.
* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.

5 files changed, 0 insertions, 334 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ede1f8c89d..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64
-this patch is from qemu-git.
-
-
-From 62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2017 09:35:01 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix oob access issue (CVE-2017-2615)
-
-When doing bitblt copy in backward mode, we should minus the
-blt width first just like the adding in the forward mode. This
-can avoid the oob access of the front of vga's vram.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-
-{ kraxel: with backward blits (negative pitch) addr is the topmost
-          address, so check it as-is against vram size ]
-
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
-Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
-Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
-Fixes: d3532a0db02296e687711b8cdc7791924efccea0 (CVE-2014-8106)
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Message-id: 1485938101-26602-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
-Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
----
- hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 7 +++----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-index 7db6409dc5..16f27e8ac5 100644
---- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-@@ -274,10 +274,9 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
- {
-     if (pitch < 0) {
-         int64_t min = addr
--            + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
--        int32_t max = addr
--            + s->cirrus_blt_width;
--        if (min < 0 || max > s->vga.vram_size) {
-+            + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
-+            - s->cirrus_blt_width;
-+        if (min < -1 || addr >= s->vga.vram_size) {
-             return true;
-         }
-     } else {
--- 
-2.11.0
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d3111827b7..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-2620:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-2620
-https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-02/msg04700.html
-
-Both patches copied from upstream source repository:
-
-Fixes CVE-2017-2620:
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=92f2b88cea48c6aeba8de568a45f2ed958f3c298
-
-The CVE-2017-2620 bug-fix depends on this earlier patch:
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=913a87885f589d263e682c2eb6637c6e14538061
-
-From 92f2b88cea48c6aeba8de568a45f2ed958f3c298 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 11:18:36 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: add blit_is_unsafe call to cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo
- (CVE-2017-2620)
-
-CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC blits do NOT check blit destination
-and blit width, at all.  Oops.  Fix it.
-
-Security impact: high.
-
-The missing blit destination check allows to write to host memory.
-Basically same as CVE-2014-8106 for the other blit variants.
-
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-index 1deb52070a..b9e7cb1df1 100644
---- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-@@ -900,6 +900,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
- {
-     int w;
- 
-+    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     s->cirrus_blt_mode &= ~CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC;
-     s->cirrus_srcptr = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
-     s->cirrus_srcptr_end = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
-@@ -925,6 +929,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
- 	}
-         s->cirrus_srccounter = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch * s->cirrus_blt_height;
-     }
-+
-+    /* the blit_is_unsafe call above should catch this */
-+    assert(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch <= CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE);
-+
-     s->cirrus_srcptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
-     s->cirrus_srcptr_end = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
-     cirrus_update_memory_access(s);
--- 
-2.12.0
-
-From 913a87885f589d263e682c2eb6637c6e14538061 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 13:35:20 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: ignore source pitch value as needed in
- blit_is_unsafe
-
-Commit 4299b90 added a check which is too broad, given that the source
-pitch value is not required to be initialized for solid fill operations.
-This patch refines the blit_is_unsafe() check to ignore source pitch in
-that case. After applying the above commit as a security patch, we
-noticed the SLES 11 SP4 guest gui failed to initialize properly.
-
-Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
-Message-id: 20170109203520.5619-1-brogers@suse.com
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
----
- hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 11 +++++++----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-index bdb092ee9d..379910db2d 100644
---- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
-@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
-     return false;
- }
- 
--static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
-+static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
- {
-     /* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
-     assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
-@@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
-                               s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
-         return true;
-     }
-+    if (dst_only) {
-+        return false;
-+    }
-     if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
-                               s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
-         return true;
-@@ -673,7 +676,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
- 
-     dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
- 
--    if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
-+    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
-         return 0;
- 
-     (*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
-@@ -691,7 +694,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
- {
-     cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
- 
--    if (blit_is_unsafe(s)) {
-+    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
-         return 0;
-     }
-     rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
-@@ -795,7 +798,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
- 
- static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
- {
--    if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
-+    if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
-         return 0;
- 
-     return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
--- 
-2.12.0
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b154d171f1..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-2630:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-2630
-https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-02/msg01246.html
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=2563c9c6b8670400c48e562034b321a7cf3d9a85
-
-From 2563c9c6b8670400c48e562034b321a7cf3d9a85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 09:16:27 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH] nbd/client: fix drop_sync [CVE-2017-2630]
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Comparison symbol is misused. It may lead to memory corruption.
-Introduced in commit 7d3123e.
-
-Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
-Message-Id: <20170203154757.36140-6-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
-[eblake: add CVE details, update conditional]
-Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
-Message-Id: <20170307151627.27212-1-eblake@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
----
- nbd/client.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/nbd/client.c b/nbd/client.c
-index 5c9dee37fa..3dc2564cd0 100644
---- a/nbd/client.c
-+++ b/nbd/client.c
-@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static ssize_t drop_sync(QIOChannel *ioc, size_t size)
-     char small[1024];
-     char *buffer;
- 
--    buffer = sizeof(small) < size ? small : g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
-+    buffer = sizeof(small) >= size ? small : g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
-     while (size > 0) {
-         ssize_t count = read_sync(ioc, buffer, MIN(65536, size));
- 
--- 
-2.12.0
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5adea0d278..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-5667 (sdhci OOB access during multi block SDMA transfer):
-
-http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/243
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5667
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9
-
-From 42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 18:29:59 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] sd: sdhci: check data length during dma_memory_read
-
-While doing multi block SDMA transfer in routine
-'sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks', the 's->fifo_buffer' starting
-index 'begin' and data length 's->data_count' could end up to be same.
-This could lead to an OOB access issue. Correct transfer data length
-to avoid it.
-
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Reported-by: Jiang Xin <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
-Message-id: 20170130064736.9236-1-ppandit@redhat.com
-Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
----
- hw/sd/sdhci.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
-index 01fbf228be..5bd5ab6319 100644
---- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
-+++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
-@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
-                 boundary_count -= block_size - begin;
-             }
-             dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, s->sdmasysad,
--                            &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count);
-+                            &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count - begin);
-             s->sdmasysad += s->data_count - begin;
-             if (s->data_count == block_size) {
-                 for (n = 0; n < block_size; n++) {
--- 
-2.11.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 08910e5fac..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-5931 (integer overflow in handling virtio-crypto requests):
-
-http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/337
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5931
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4
-
-From a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
-Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 14:50:03 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] virtio-crypto: fix possible integer and heap overflow
-
-Because the 'size_t' type is 4 bytes in 32-bit platform, which
-is the same with 'int'. It's easy to make 'max_len' to zero when
-integer overflow and then cause heap overflow if 'max_len' is zero.
-
-Using uint_64 instead of size_t to avoid the integer overflow.
-
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
-Tested-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
----
- hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
-index 2f2467e859..c23e1ad458 100644
---- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
-+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
-@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
-     uint32_t hash_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_hash = 0;
-     uint32_t cipher_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_cipher = 0;
- 
--    size_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
-+    uint64_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
-     size_t s;
- 
-     /* Plain cipher */
-@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
-         return NULL;
-     }
- 
--    max_len = iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
-+    max_len = (uint64_t)iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
-     if (unlikely(max_len > vcrypto->conf.max_size)) {
-         virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-crypto too big length");
-         return NULL;
--- 
-2.11.1
-