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authorMarius Bakke <marius@gnu.org>2020-05-25 00:12:06 +0200
committerMarius Bakke <mbakke@fastmail.com>2020-05-25 00:17:18 +0200
commit8bd0b533b30d7ee5e03aee99a2eb96d5b0b1c836 (patch)
treefdab66886f61669eea998da99f0b03553965015e /gnu/packages/patches
parente451612602c5ae8bca1e56492bbfa7b2fe434cbd (diff)
downloadguix-8bd0b533b30d7ee5e03aee99a2eb96d5b0b1c836.tar.gz
gnu: libexif: Update to 0.6.22 [security fixes].
This fixes CVE-2020-13114, CVE-2020-13113, CVE-2020-13112, CVE-2020-0093,
CVE-2019-9278, and CVE-2020-12767.

* gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2016-6328.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2017-7544.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2018-20030.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly.
* gnu/packages/photo.scm (libexif): Update to 0.6.22.
[source](uri): Adjust for upstream GitHub migration.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2016-6328.patch72
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2017-7544.patch29
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2018-20030.patch120
3 files changed, 0 insertions, 221 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2016-6328.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2016-6328.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 67fee0f528..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2016-6328.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2016-6328:
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1366239
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-6328
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/libexif/libexif/commit/41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d
-
-From 41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
-Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:44:44 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] fixes some (not all) buffer overreads during decoding pentax
- makernote entries.
-
-This should fix:
-https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/125/ CVE-2016-6328
----
- libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
-index d03d159..ea0429a 100644
---- a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
-+++ b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
-@@ -425,24 +425,34 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
- 		case EXIF_FORMAT_SHORT:
- 		  {
- 			const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
--		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val);
-+		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
-+
-+			sizeleft = entry->size;
- 		  	for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
-+				if (sizeleft < 2)
-+					break;
- 				vs = exif_get_short (data, entry->order);
- 				snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%i ", vs);
- 				len = strlen(val);
- 				data += 2;
-+				sizeleft -= 2;
- 			}
- 		  }
- 		  break;
- 		case EXIF_FORMAT_LONG:
- 		  {
- 			const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
--		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val);
-+		  	size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
-+
-+			sizeleft = entry->size;
- 		  	for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
-+				if (sizeleft < 4)
-+					break;
- 				vl = exif_get_long (data, entry->order);
- 				snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%li", (long int) vl);
- 				len = strlen(val);
- 				data += 4;
-+				sizeleft -= 4;
- 			}
- 		  }
- 		  break;
-@@ -455,5 +465,5 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
- 		break;
- 	}
- 
--	return (val);
-+	return val;
- }
--- 
-2.16.0
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2017-7544.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2017-7544.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c4ea373dc5..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2017-7544.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-7544:
-
-https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130/
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7544
-
-Patch copied from upstream bug tracker:
-
-https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130/#489a
-
-Index: libexif/exif-data.c
-===================================================================
-RCS file: /cvsroot/libexif/libexif/libexif/exif-data.c,v
-retrieving revision 1.131
-diff -u -r1.131 exif-data.c
---- a/libexif/exif-data.c	12 Jul 2012 17:28:26 -0000	1.131
-+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c	25 Jul 2017 21:34:06 -0000
-@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@
- 			exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6);
- 			exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size);
- 			e->components = e->size;
-+			if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) {
-+				/* e->format is taken from input code,
-+				 * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte
-+				 * entity due to the multiplication below. */
-+				e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED;
-+			}
- 		}
- 	}
- 
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2018-20030.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2018-20030.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 57e4746b58..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/libexif-CVE-2018-20030.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-https://github.com/libexif/libexif/commit/6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89.patch
-
-NEWS section was removed
-'12' -> '30' on line 79
-
-From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com>
-Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in
- exif_data_load_data_content.
-
-The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases
-causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags
-into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion
-but with a very large number of tags.  This improves on commit 5d28011c
-which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case.
-
-The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres,
-Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned
-the identifier CVE-2018-20030.
----
- NEWS                |  1 +
- libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
-index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644
---- a/libexif/exif-data.c
-+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
-@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
- #include <libexif/olympus/exif-mnote-data-olympus.h>
- #include <libexif/pentax/exif-mnote-data-pentax.h>
- 
-+#include <math.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) {				\
- 	break;						\
- }
- 
-+/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading.
-+ *
-+ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation
-+ *   work=1.1**cost
-+ */
-+static unsigned int
-+level_cost(unsigned int n)
-+{
-+    static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493;
-+
-+	/* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */
-+	return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1);
-+}
-+
- /*! Load data for an IFD.
-  *
-  * \param[in,out] data #ExifData
-@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) {				\
-  * \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data
-  * \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d
-  * \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts
-- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been
-- * recursively called without returning
-+ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive
-+ * call could be
-  */
- static void
- exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
- 			     const unsigned char *d,
--			     unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth)
-+			     unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost)
- {
- 	ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0;
- 	ExifShort n;
-@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
- 	if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT))
- 	  return;
- 
--	if (recursion_depth > 30) {
-+	if (recursion_cost > 170) {
-+		/*
-+		 * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this
-+		 * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of
-+		 * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive
-+		 * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion
-+		 * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up
-+		 * causing recursion.
-+		 * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a
-+		 * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very
-+		 * many tags) to only 2.
-+		 */
- 		exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
--			  "Deep recursion detected!");
-+			  "Deep/expensive recursion detected!");
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
- 			switch (tag) {
- 			case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
- 				CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF);
--				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
-+				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o,
-+					recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
- 				break;
- 			case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER:
- 				CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS);
--				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
-+				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o,
-+					recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
- 				break;
- 			case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER:
- 				CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY);
--				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
-+				exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o,
-+					recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
- 				break;
- 			case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT:
- 				thumbnail_offset = o;