diff options
author | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2017-01-13 10:21:17 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2017-01-13 10:21:17 -0500 |
commit | cc0725914e74c4c4dec369f3e7cdb6f201b3fecd (patch) | |
tree | e68b452ed625a2db8ed10914fb0968fdc36c655d /gnu/packages/patches | |
parent | a25b6880f1398ad36aea1d0e4e4105936a8b7e70 (diff) | |
parent | ce195ba12277ec4286ad0d8ddf7294655987ea9d (diff) | |
download | guix-cc0725914e74c4c4dec369f3e7cdb6f201b3fecd.tar.gz |
Merge branch 'master' into python-tests
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
43 files changed, 2686 insertions, 452 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/awesome-reproducible-png.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/awesome-reproducible-png.patch index 0fae65bc71..d8e92c70f9 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/awesome-reproducible-png.patch +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/awesome-reproducible-png.patch @@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ See <https://wiki.debian.org/ReproducibleBuilds/TimestampsInPNG>. set(ALL_ICONS ${ALL_ICONS} ${output}) add_custom_command( -- COMMAND ${CONVERT_EXECUTABLE} ${input} ${ARGN} ${output} -+ COMMAND ${CONVERT_EXECUTABLE} +set date:create +set date:modify -define png:exclude-chunk=time ${input} ${ARGN} ${output} +- COMMAND ${CONVERT_EXECUTABLE} ${input} -strip ${ARGN} ${output} ++ COMMAND ${CONVERT_EXECUTABLE} +set date:create +set date:modify -define png:exclude-chunk=time ${input} -strip ${ARGN} ${output} OUTPUT ${output} DEPENDS ${input} VERBATIM) diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/chicken-CVE-2016-6830+CVE-2016-6831.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/chicken-CVE-2016-6830+CVE-2016-6831.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..59decde0e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/chicken-CVE-2016-6830+CVE-2016-6831.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +diff -ur a/irregex-core.scm b/irregex-core.scm +--- a/irregex-core.scm 2016-09-11 19:03:00.000000000 -0400 ++++ b/irregex-core.scm 2017-01-01 22:24:08.000000000 -0500 +@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ + + ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; + ;;;; History ++;; 0.9.6: 2016/12/05 - fixed exponential memory use of + in compilation ++;; of backtracking matcher. + ;; 0.9.5: 2016/09/10 - fixed a bug in irregex-fold handling of bow + ;; 0.9.4: 2015/12/14 - performance improvement for {n,m} matches + ;; 0.9.3: 2014/07/01 - R7RS library +@@ -3170,16 +3172,7 @@ + ((sre-empty? (sre-sequence (cdr sre))) + (error "invalid sre: empty *" sre)) + (else +- (letrec +- ((body +- (lp (sre-sequence (cdr sre)) +- n +- flags +- (lambda (cnk init src str i end matches fail) +- (body cnk init src str i end matches +- (lambda () +- (next cnk init src str i end matches fail) +- )))))) ++ (let ((body (rec (list '+ (sre-sequence (cdr sre)))))) + (lambda (cnk init src str i end matches fail) + (body cnk init src str i end matches + (lambda () +@@ -3204,10 +3197,21 @@ + (lambda () + (body cnk init src str i end matches fail)))))))) + ((+) +- (lp (sre-sequence (cdr sre)) +- n +- flags +- (rec (list '* (sre-sequence (cdr sre)))))) ++ (cond ++ ((sre-empty? (sre-sequence (cdr sre))) ++ (error "invalid sre: empty +" sre)) ++ (else ++ (letrec ++ ((body ++ (lp (sre-sequence (cdr sre)) ++ n ++ flags ++ (lambda (cnk init src str i end matches fail) ++ (body cnk init src str i end matches ++ (lambda () ++ (next cnk init src str i end matches fail) ++ )))))) ++ body)))) + ((=) + (rec `(** ,(cadr sre) ,(cadr sre) ,@(cddr sre)))) + ((>=) +diff -ur a/irregex-utils.scm b/irregex-utils.scm +--- a/irregex-utils.scm 2016-09-11 19:03:00.000000000 -0400 ++++ b/irregex-utils.scm 2017-01-01 22:25:25.000000000 -0500 +@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ + (case (car x) + ((: seq) + (cond +- ((and (pair? (cddr x)) (pair? (cddr x)) (not (eq? x obj))) ++ ((and (pair? (cdr x)) (pair? (cddr x)) (not (eq? x obj))) + (display "(?:" out) (for-each lp (cdr x)) (display ")" out)) + (else (for-each lp (cdr x))))) + ((submatch) +diff -ur "a/manual-html/Unit irregex.html" "b/manual-html/Unit irregex.html" +--- "a/manual-html/Unit irregex.html" 2016-09-11 19:10:47.000000000 -0400 ++++ "b/manual-html/Unit irregex.html" 2017-01-01 22:26:05.000000000 -0500 +@@ -353,6 +353,6 @@ + <dd class="defsig"><p>Returns an optimized SRE matching any of the literal strings in the list, like Emacs' <tt>regexp-opt</tt>. Note this optimization doesn't help when irregex is able to build a DFA.</p></dd> + </dl> + <h5 id="sec:sre-.3estring"><a href="#sec:sre-.3estring">sre->string</a></h5><dl class="defsig"><dt class="defsig" id="def:sre-.3estring"><span class="sig"><tt>(sre->string <sre>)</tt></span> <span class="type">procedure</span></dt> +-<dd class="defsig"><p>Convert an SRE to a POSIX-style regular expression string, if possible.</p></dd> ++<dd class="defsig"><p>Convert an SRE to a PCRE-style regular expression string, if possible.</p></dd> + </dl> +-<hr /><p>Previous: <a href="Unit%20extras.html">Unit extras</a></p><p>Next: <a href="Unit%20srfi-1.html">Unit srfi-1</a></p></div></div></body> +\ No newline at end of file ++<hr /><p>Previous: <a href="Unit%20extras.html">Unit extras</a></p><p>Next: <a href="Unit%20srfi-1.html">Unit srfi-1</a></p></div></div></body> diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/cracklib-fix-buffer-overflow.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/cracklib-fix-buffer-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b1c990f282 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/cracklib-fix-buffer-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +Fix buffer overflow processing long words in Mangle(). + +Patch adpated from upstream commit, omitting changes to 'NEWS': + +https://github.com/cracklib/cracklib/commit/33d7fa4585247cd2247a1ffa032ad245836c6edb + +From 33d7fa4585247cd2247a1ffa032ad245836c6edb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Dittberner <jan@dittberner.info> +Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2016 17:17:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow processing long words + +A buffer overflow processing long words has been discovered. This commit +applies the patch from +https://build.opensuse.org/package/view_file/Base:System/cracklib/0004-overflow-processing-long-words.patch +by Howard Guo. + +See https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=835386 and +http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/08/23/8 +--- + src/NEWS | 1 + + src/lib/rules.c | 5 ++--- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/lib/rules.c b/src/lib/rules.c +index d193cc0..3a2aa46 100644 +--- a/lib/rules.c ++++ b/lib/rules.c +@@ -434,9 +434,8 @@ Mangle(input, control) /* returns a pointer to a controlled Mangle */ + { + int limit; + register char *ptr; +- static char area[STRINGSIZE]; +- char area2[STRINGSIZE]; +- area[0] = '\0'; ++ static char area[STRINGSIZE * 2] = {0}; ++ char area2[STRINGSIZE * 2] = {0}; + strcpy(area, input); + + for (ptr = control; *ptr; ptr++) diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/gnupg-test-segfault-on-32bit-arch.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/gnupg-test-segfault-on-32bit-arch.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..79bb41caaa --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/gnupg-test-segfault-on-32bit-arch.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +This fixes a segfault on 32-bit architectures. Upstream discussion: + +https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2016-December/032364.html + +Guix thread: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/guix-devel/2016-12/msg00631.html + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=commitdiff;h=6e96cdd41a0e55b672309431062f37c4a4a9f485 + +From 6e96cdd41a0e55b672309431062f37c4a4a9f485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com> +Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 16:14:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] gpgscm: Guard use of union member. + +* tests/gpgscm/scheme.c (opexe_5): Check that we have a file port +before accessing filename. Fixes a crash on 32-bit architectures. + +Fixes-commit: e7429b1ced0c69fa7901f888f8dc25f00fc346a4 +Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com> +--- + tests/gpgscm/scheme.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/tests/gpgscm/scheme.c b/tests/gpgscm/scheme.c +index a5b7691..2844545 100644 +--- a/tests/gpgscm/scheme.c ++++ b/tests/gpgscm/scheme.c +@@ -4838,7 +4838,7 @@ static pointer opexe_5(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) { + } else { + sc->nesting_stack[sc->file_i]++; + #if USE_TAGS && SHOW_ERROR_LINE +- { ++ if (sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].kind & port_file) { + const char *filename = + sc->load_stack[sc->file_i].rep.stdio.filename; + int lineno = +-- +2.8.0.rc3 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/inkscape-drop-wait-for-targets.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/inkscape-drop-wait-for-targets.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3dbe6641e2..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/inkscape-drop-wait-for-targets.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -Copied from Fedora. - -http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/rpms/inkscape.git/plain/inkscape-0.91-drop-wait-for-targets.patch?id=eb5340800b563d6b05aa5f11a2f24f2cc0d8c80e - -=== modified file 'src/ui/clipboard.cpp' ---- src/ui/clipboard.cpp 2016-04-02 15:15:43 +0000 -+++ src/ui/clipboard.cpp 2016-04-07 16:30:32 +0000 -@@ -146,8 +146,6 @@ - void _setClipboardColor(guint32); - void _userWarn(SPDesktop *, char const *); - -- void _inkscape_wait_for_targets(std::list<Glib::ustring> &); -- - // private properites - SPDocument *_clipboardSPDoc; ///< Document that stores the clipboard until someone requests it - Inkscape::XML::Node *_defs; ///< Reference to the clipboard document's defs node -@@ -1302,9 +1300,7 @@ - */ - Glib::ustring ClipboardManagerImpl::_getBestTarget() - { -- // GTKmm's wait_for_targets() is broken, see the comment in _inkscape_wait_for_targets() -- std::list<Glib::ustring> targets; // = _clipboard->wait_for_targets(); -- _inkscape_wait_for_targets(targets); -+ std::list<Glib::ustring> targets = _clipboard->wait_for_targets(); - - // clipboard target debugging snippet - /* -@@ -1456,39 +1452,6 @@ - desktop->messageStack()->flash(Inkscape::WARNING_MESSAGE, msg); - } - -- --// GTKMM's clipboard::wait_for_targets is buggy and might return bogus, see --// --// https://bugs.launchpad.net/inkscape/+bug/296778 --// http://mail.gnome.org/archives/gtk-devel-list/2009-June/msg00062.html --// --// for details. Until this has been fixed upstream we will use our own implementation --// of this method, as copied from /gtkmm-2.16.0/gtk/gtkmm/clipboard.cc. --void ClipboardManagerImpl::_inkscape_wait_for_targets(std::list<Glib::ustring> &listTargets) --{ -- //Get a newly-allocated array of atoms: -- GdkAtom* targets = NULL; -- gint n_targets = 0; -- gboolean test = gtk_clipboard_wait_for_targets( gtk_clipboard_get(GDK_SELECTION_CLIPBOARD), &targets, &n_targets ); -- if (!test || (targets == NULL)) { -- return; -- } -- -- //Add the targets to the C++ container: -- for (int i = 0; i < n_targets; i++) -- { -- //Convert the atom to a string: -- gchar* const atom_name = gdk_atom_name(targets[i]); -- -- Glib::ustring target; -- if (atom_name) { -- target = Glib::ScopedPtr<char>(atom_name).get(); //This frees the gchar*. -- } -- -- listTargets.push_back(target); -- } --} -- - /* ####################################### - ClipboardManager class - ####################################### */ - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/kdbusaddons-kinit-file-name.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/kdbusaddons-kinit-file-name.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ffed88e043 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/kdbusaddons-kinit-file-name.patch @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +Add placeholder for kinit's store file name. + +diff --git a/src/kdeinitinterface.cpp b/src/kdeinitinterface.cpp +index 22fa5e5..3d40937 100644 +--- a/src/kdeinitinterface.cpp ++++ b/src/kdeinitinterface.cpp +@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ void KDEInitInterface::ensureKdeinitRunning() + // If not found in system paths, search other paths + if (srv.isEmpty()) { + const QStringList searchPaths = QStringList() +- << QCoreApplication::applicationDirPath() // then look where our application binary is located ++ << QString::fromUtf8("@SUBSTITUTEME@/bin") // using QStringLiteral would be more efficient, but breaks guix store reference detection. + << QLibraryInfo::location(QLibraryInfo::BinariesPath); // look where exec path is (can be set in qt.conf) + srv = QStandardPaths::findExecutable(QStringLiteral("kdeinit5"), searchPaths); + if (srv.isEmpty()) { diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/khal-disable-failing-tests.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/khal-disable-failing-tests.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2c65df8ce --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/khal-disable-failing-tests.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +Disable some tests that are known to fail: + +https://github.com/pimutils/khal/issues/546 +https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=844081 + +diff --git a/tests/khalendar_test.py b/tests/khalendar_test.py +index fd8dcc6..17732bf 100644 +--- a/tests/khalendar_test.py ++++ b/tests/khalendar_test.py +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ class TestCalendar(object): + else: + mtimes[cal] = mtime + ++ @pytest.mark.xfail + def test_db_needs_update(self, coll_vdirs): + coll, vdirs = coll_vdirs + +@@ -321,6 +322,7 @@ class TestDbCreation(object): + CalendarCollection(calendars, dbpath=dbpath, locale=aux.locale) + + ++@pytest.mark.xfail + def test_default_calendar(coll_vdirs): + """test if an update to the vdir is detected by the CalendarCollection""" + coll, vdirs = coll_vdirs +@@ -341,6 +343,7 @@ def test_default_calendar(coll_vdirs): + assert len(list(coll.get_events_on(today))) == 0 + + ++@pytest.mark.xfail + def test_only_update_old_event(coll_vdirs, monkeypatch): + coll, vdirs = coll_vdirs + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libpng-CVE-2016-10087.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libpng-CVE-2016-10087.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8093b3e448 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libpng-CVE-2016-10087.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-10087, a null pointer dereference in png_set_text_2(): + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-10087 +http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q4/777 + +Patch adapted from upstream source repository: + +https://sourceforge.net/p/libpng/code/ci/812768d7a9c973452222d454634496b25ed415eb/ + +From 812768d7a9c973452222d454634496b25ed415eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Randers-Pehrson <glennrp at users.sourceforge.net> +Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2016 07:51:33 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] [libpng16] Fixed a potential null pointer dereference in + png_set_text_2() + +(bug report and patch by Patrick Keshishian). +--- + ANNOUNCE | 2 ++ + CHANGES | 2 ++ + png.c | 1 + + 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/png.c b/png.c +index 8afc28fc2..2e05de159 100644 +--- a/png.c ++++ b/png.c +@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ png_free_data(png_const_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 mask, + png_free(png_ptr, info_ptr->text); + info_ptr->text = NULL; + info_ptr->num_text = 0; ++ info_ptr->max_text = 0; + } + } + #endif +-- +2.11.0 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-10092.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-10092.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d5fd796169 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-10092.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-10092: + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2620 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-10092 +https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-10092 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix readContigStripsIntoBuffer() in -i (ignore) + mode so that the output buffer is correctly incremented to avoid write + outside bounds. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2620 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1178; previous revision: 1.1177 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c,v <-- tools/tiffcrop.c +new revision: 1.47; previous revision: 1.46 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c,v +retrieving revision 1.46 +retrieving revision 1.47 +diff -u -r1.46 -r1.47 +--- libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c 18 Nov 2016 14:58:46 -0000 1.46 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c 3 Dec 2016 11:35:56 -0000 1.47 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tiffcrop.c,v 1.46 2016-11-18 14:58:46 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tiffcrop.c,v 1.47 2016-12-03 11:35:56 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* tiffcrop.c -- a port of tiffcp.c extended to include manipulations of + * the image data through additional options listed below +@@ -3698,7 +3698,7 @@ + (unsigned long) strip, (unsigned long)rows); + return 0; + } +- bufp += bytes_read; ++ bufp += stripsize; + } + + return 1; diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-10093.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-10093.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5897ec1029 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-10093.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-10093: + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-10093 +https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-10093 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiffcp.c: fix uint32 underflow/overflow that can cause + heap-based buffer overflow. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1187; previous revision: 1.1186 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v <-- tools/tiffcp.c +new revision: 1.59; previous revision: 1.58 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v +retrieving revision 1.58 +retrieving revision 1.59 +diff -u -r1.58 -r1.59 +--- libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 3 Dec 2016 15:44:15 -0000 1.58 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 3 Dec 2016 16:40:01 -0000 1.59 +@@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ + + static void + cpStripToTile(uint8* out, uint8* in, +- uint32 rows, uint32 cols, int outskew, int inskew) ++ uint32 rows, uint32 cols, int outskew, int64 inskew) + { + while (rows-- > 0) { + uint32 j = cols; +@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ + tdata_t tilebuf; + uint32 imagew = TIFFScanlineSize(in); + uint32 tilew = TIFFTileRowSize(in); +- int iskew = imagew - tilew; ++ int64 iskew = (int64)imagew - (int64)tilew; + uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf; + uint32 tw, tl; + uint32 row; +@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ + status = 0; + goto done; + } +- if (colb + tilew > imagew) { ++ if (colb > iskew) { + uint32 width = imagew - colb; + uint32 oskew = tilew - width; + cpStripToTile(bufp + colb, diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-10094.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-10094.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9018773565 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-CVE-2016-10094.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-10094: + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2640 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-10094 +https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-10094 + +2016-12-20 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiff2pdf.c: avoid potential heap-based overflow in + t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile(). + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2640 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1199; previous revision: 1.1198 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c,v <-- tools/tiff2pdf.c +new revision: 1.101; previous revision: 1.100 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c,v +retrieving revision 1.100 +retrieving revision 1.101 +diff -u -r1.100 -r1.101 +--- libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c 20 Dec 2016 17:24:35 -0000 1.100 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c 20 Dec 2016 17:28:17 -0000 1.101 +@@ -2895,7 +2895,7 @@ + return(0); + } + if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, &jpt) != 0) { +- if (count >= 4) { ++ if (count > 4) { + int retTIFFReadRawTile; + /* Ignore EOI marker of JpegTables */ + _TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count - 2); diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-assertion-failure.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-assertion-failure.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ef747fbdd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-assertion-failure.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +Fix assertion failure in readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2605 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiffcp.c: replace assert( (bps % 8) == 0 ) by a non assert +check. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2605 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1188; previous revision: 1.1187 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v <-- tools/tiffcp.c +new revision: 1.60; previous revision: 1.59 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v +retrieving revision 1.59 +retrieving revision 1.60 +diff -u -r1.59 -r1.60 +--- libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 3 Dec 2016 16:40:01 -0000 1.59 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 3 Dec 2016 16:50:02 -0000 1.60 +@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ + #include <string.h> + + #include <ctype.h> +-#include <assert.h> + + #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H + # include <unistd.h> +@@ -1393,7 +1392,12 @@ + status = 0; + goto done; + } +- assert( bps % 8 == 0 ); ++ if( (bps % 8) != 0 ) ++ { ++ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Error, cannot handle BitsPerSample that is not a multiple of 8"); ++ status = 0; ++ goto done; ++ } + bytes_per_sample = bps/8; + + for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) { +@@ -1584,7 +1588,12 @@ + _TIFFfree(obuf); + return 0; + } +- assert( bps % 8 == 0 ); ++ if( (bps % 8) != 0 ) ++ { ++ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out), "Error, cannot handle BitsPerSample that is not a multiple of 8"); ++ _TIFFfree(obuf); ++ return 0; ++ } + bytes_per_sample = bps/8; + + for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) { diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero-ojpeg.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero-ojpeg.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a96b68521 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero-ojpeg.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +Fix divide-by-zero in OJPEGDecodeRaw(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure +in + OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other +issues. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1177; previous revision: 1.1176 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c,v <-- libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c +new revision: 1.66; previous revision: 1.65 + +Index: libtiff/libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c,v +retrieving revision 1.65 +retrieving revision 1.66 +diff -u -r1.65 -r1.66 +--- libtiff/libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c 4 Sep 2016 21:32:56 -0000 1.65 ++++ libtiff/libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c 3 Dec 2016 11:15:18 -0000 1.66 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tif_ojpeg.c,v 1.65 2016-09-04 21:32:56 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tif_ojpeg.c,v 1.66 2016-12-03 11:15:18 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* WARNING: The type of JPEG encapsulation defined by the TIFF Version 6.0 + specification is now totally obsolete and deprecated for new applications and +@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ + + typedef struct { + TIFF* tif; ++ int decoder_ok; + #ifndef LIBJPEG_ENCAP_EXTERNAL + JMP_BUF exit_jmpbuf; + #endif +@@ -722,6 +723,7 @@ + } + sp->write_curstrile++; + } ++ sp->decoder_ok = 1; + return(1); + } + +@@ -784,8 +786,14 @@ + static int + OJPEGDecode(TIFF* tif, uint8* buf, tmsize_t cc, uint16 s) + { ++ static const char module[]="OJPEGDecode"; + OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data; + (void)s; ++ if( !sp->decoder_ok ) ++ { ++ TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Cannot decode: decoder not correctly initialized"); ++ return 0; ++ } + if (sp->libjpeg_jpeg_query_style==0) + { + if (OJPEGDecodeRaw(tif,buf,cc)==0) diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero-tiffcp.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero-tiffcp.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d3f1c2b60e --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero-tiffcp.patch @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +Fix two divide-by-zero bugs in readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2597 +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2607 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiffcp.c: avoid potential division by zero is BitsPerSamples +tag is + missing. + Reported by Agostino sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2597 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1183; previous revision: 1.1182 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v <-- tools/tiffcp.c +new revision: 1.57; previous revision: 1.56 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v +retrieving revision 1.56 +retrieving revision 1.57 +diff -u -r1.56 -r1.57 +--- libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 2 Dec 2016 22:13:32 -0000 1.56 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 3 Dec 2016 14:42:40 -0000 1.57 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tiffcp.c,v 1.56 2016-12-02 22:13:32 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tiffcp.c,v 1.57 2016-12-03 14:42:40 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ + uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf; + uint32 tw, tl; + uint32 row; +- uint16 bps, bytes_per_sample; ++ uint16 bps = 0, bytes_per_sample; + + tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tilesize); + if (tilebuf == 0) +@@ -1387,6 +1387,12 @@ + (void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw); + (void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl); + (void) TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps); ++ if( bps == 0 ) ++ { ++ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Error, cannot read BitsPerSample"); ++ status = 0; ++ goto done; ++ } + assert( bps % 8 == 0 ); + bytes_per_sample = bps/8; + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiffcp.c: avoid potential division by zero is BitsPerSamples +tag is + missing. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2607 + + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1186; previous revision: 1.1185 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v <-- tools/tiffcp.c +new revision: 1.58; previous revision: 1.57 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v +retrieving revision 1.57 +retrieving revision 1.58 +diff -u -r1.57 -r1.58 +--- libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 3 Dec 2016 14:42:40 -0000 1.57 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 3 Dec 2016 15:44:15 -0000 1.58 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tiffcp.c,v 1.57 2016-12-03 14:42:40 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tiffcp.c,v 1.58 2016-12-03 15:44:15 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -1569,7 +1569,7 @@ + uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf; + uint32 tl, tw; + uint32 row; +- uint16 bps, bytes_per_sample; ++ uint16 bps = 0, bytes_per_sample; + + obuf = _TIFFmalloc(TIFFTileSize(out)); + if (obuf == NULL) +@@ -1578,6 +1578,12 @@ + (void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl); + (void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw); + (void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps); ++ if( bps == 0 ) ++ { ++ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out), "Error, cannot read BitsPerSample"); ++ _TIFFfree(obuf); ++ return 0; ++ } + assert( bps % 8 == 0 ); + bytes_per_sample = bps/8; + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero-tiffcrop.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero-tiffcrop.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..823293f1cf --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero-tiffcrop.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +Fix divide-by-zero in readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2619 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix integer division by zero when BitsPerSample is +missing. + Reported by Agostina Sarubo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2619 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1180; previous revision: 1.1179 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c,v <-- tools/tiffcrop.c +new revision: 1.49; previous revision: 1.48 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c,v +retrieving revision 1.48 +retrieving revision 1.49 +diff -u -r1.48 -r1.49 +--- libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c 3 Dec 2016 12:19:32 -0000 1.48 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c 3 Dec 2016 13:00:04 -0000 1.49 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tiffcrop.c,v 1.48 2016-12-03 12:19:32 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tiffcrop.c,v 1.49 2016-12-03 13:00:04 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* tiffcrop.c -- a port of tiffcp.c extended to include manipulations of + * the image data through additional options listed below +@@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ + tdata_t obuf; + + (void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(out, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rowsperstrip); +- (void) TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps); ++ (void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(out, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps); + bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8; + if( width == 0 || + (uint32)bps * (uint32)spp > TIFF_UINT32_MAX / width || +@@ -4760,7 +4760,7 @@ + int i, bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel, shift_width, result = 1; + uint32 j; + int32 bytes_read = 0; +- uint16 bps, planar; ++ uint16 bps = 0, planar; + uint32 nstrips; + uint32 strips_per_sample; + uint32 src_rowsize, dst_rowsize, rows_processed, rps; +@@ -4780,7 +4780,7 @@ + } + + memset (srcbuffs, '\0', sizeof(srcbuffs)); +- TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps); ++ TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps); + TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, &planar); + TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps); + if (rps > length) diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6dbd4666cd --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-divide-by-zero.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +Fix an integer overflow in TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that led to division-by-zero: + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2596 + +2016-12-02 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * libtiff/tif_read.c, libtiff/tiffiop.h: fix uint32 overflow in + TIFFReadEncodedStrip() that caused an integer division by zero. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2596 + + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1173; previous revision: 1.1172 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_read.c,v <-- libtiff/tif_read.c +new revision: 1.50; previous revision: 1.49 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tiffiop.h,v <-- libtiff/tiffiop.h +new revision: 1.90; previous revision: 1.89 + +Index: libtiff/libtiff/tif_read.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_read.c,v +retrieving revision 1.49 +retrieving revision 1.50 +diff -u -r1.49 -r1.50 +--- libtiff/libtiff/tif_read.c 10 Jul 2016 18:00:21 -0000 1.49 ++++ libtiff/libtiff/tif_read.c 2 Dec 2016 21:56:56 -0000 1.50 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tif_read.c,v 1.49 2016-07-10 18:00:21 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tif_read.c,v 1.50 2016-12-02 21:56:56 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ + rowsperstrip=td->td_rowsperstrip; + if (rowsperstrip>td->td_imagelength) + rowsperstrip=td->td_imagelength; +- stripsperplane=((td->td_imagelength+rowsperstrip-1)/rowsperstrip); ++ stripsperplane= TIFFhowmany_32_maxuint_compat(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip); + stripinplane=(strip%stripsperplane); + plane=(uint16)(strip/stripsperplane); + rows=td->td_imagelength-stripinplane*rowsperstrip; +Index: libtiff/libtiff/tiffiop.h +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tiffiop.h,v +retrieving revision 1.89 +retrieving revision 1.90 +diff -u -r1.89 -r1.90 +--- libtiff/libtiff/tiffiop.h 23 Jan 2016 21:20:34 -0000 1.89 ++++ libtiff/libtiff/tiffiop.h 2 Dec 2016 21:56:56 -0000 1.90 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tiffiop.h,v 1.89 2016-01-23 21:20:34 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tiffiop.h,v 1.90 2016-12-02 21:56:56 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -250,6 +250,10 @@ + #define TIFFhowmany_32(x, y) (((uint32)x < (0xffffffff - (uint32)(y-1))) ? \ + ((((uint32)(x))+(((uint32)(y))-1))/((uint32)(y))) : \ + 0U) ++/* Variant of TIFFhowmany_32() that doesn't return 0 if x close to MAXUINT. */ ++/* Caution: TIFFhowmany_32_maxuint_compat(x,y)*y might overflow */ ++#define TIFFhowmany_32_maxuint_compat(x, y) \ ++ (((uint32)(x) / (uint32)(y)) + ((((uint32)(x) % (uint32)(y)) != 0) ? 1 : 0)) + #define TIFFhowmany8_32(x) (((x)&0x07)?((uint32)(x)>>3)+1:(uint32)(x)>>3) + #define TIFFroundup_32(x, y) (TIFFhowmany_32(x,y)*(y)) + #define TIFFhowmany_64(x, y) ((((uint64)(x))+(((uint64)(y))-1))/((uint64)(y))) diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-pixarlog-luv.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-pixarlog-luv.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d5e23586d --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-pixarlog-luv.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +Fix heap-based buffer overflow in _TIFFmemcpy(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer + overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with + ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample. + The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind + of issue of PixarLog. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1175; previous revision: 1.1174 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_luv.c,v <-- libtiff/tif_luv.c +new revision: 1.44; previous revision: 1.43 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c,v <-- +libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c +new revision: 1.49; previous revision: 1.48 + +Index: libtiff/libtiff/tif_luv.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_luv.c,v +retrieving revision 1.43 +retrieving revision 1.44 +diff -u -r1.43 -r1.44 +--- libtiff/libtiff/tif_luv.c 4 Sep 2016 21:32:56 -0000 1.43 ++++ libtiff/libtiff/tif_luv.c 2 Dec 2016 23:05:51 -0000 1.44 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tif_luv.c,v 1.43 2016-09-04 21:32:56 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tif_luv.c,v 1.44 2016-12-02 23:05:51 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Greg Ward Larson +@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ + typedef struct logLuvState LogLuvState; + + struct logLuvState { ++ int encoder_state; /* 1 if encoder correctly initialized */ + int user_datafmt; /* user data format */ + int encode_meth; /* encoding method */ + int pixel_size; /* bytes per pixel */ +@@ -1552,6 +1553,7 @@ + td->td_photometric, "must be either LogLUV or LogL"); + break; + } ++ sp->encoder_state = 1; + return (1); + notsupported: + TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, +@@ -1563,19 +1565,27 @@ + static void + LogLuvClose(TIFF* tif) + { ++ LogLuvState* sp = (LogLuvState*) tif->tif_data; + TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir; + ++ assert(sp != 0); + /* + * For consistency, we always want to write out the same + * bitspersample and sampleformat for our TIFF file, + * regardless of the data format being used by the application. + * Since this routine is called after tags have been set but + * before they have been recorded in the file, we reset them here. ++ * Note: this is really a nasty approach. See PixarLogClose + */ +- td->td_samplesperpixel = +- (td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ? 1 : 3; +- td->td_bitspersample = 16; +- td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_INT; ++ if( sp->encoder_state ) ++ { ++ /* See PixarLogClose. Might avoid issues with tags whose size depends ++ * on those below, but not completely sure this is enough. */ ++ td->td_samplesperpixel = ++ (td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ? 1 : 3; ++ td->td_bitspersample = 16; ++ td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_INT; ++ } + } + + static void +Index: libtiff/libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c,v +retrieving revision 1.48 +retrieving revision 1.49 +diff -u -r1.48 -r1.49 +--- libtiff/libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c 23 Sep 2016 22:12:18 -0000 1.48 ++++ libtiff/libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c 2 Dec 2016 23:05:51 -0000 1.49 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tif_pixarlog.c,v 1.48 2016-09-23 22:12:18 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tif_pixarlog.c,v 1.49 2016-12-02 23:05:51 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -1233,8 +1233,10 @@ + static void + PixarLogClose(TIFF* tif) + { ++ PixarLogState* sp = (PixarLogState*) tif->tif_data; + TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir; + ++ assert(sp != 0); + /* In a really sneaky (and really incorrect, and untruthful, and + * troublesome, and error-prone) maneuver that completely goes against + * the spirit of TIFF, and breaks TIFF, on close, we covertly +@@ -1243,8 +1245,19 @@ + * readers that don't know about PixarLog, or how to set + * the PIXARLOGDATFMT pseudo-tag. + */ +- td->td_bitspersample = 8; +- td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT; ++ ++ if (sp->state&PLSTATE_INIT) { ++ /* We test the state to avoid an issue such as in ++ * http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604 ++ * What appends in that case is that the bitspersample is 1 and ++ * a TransferFunction is set. The size of the TransferFunction ++ * depends on 1<<bitspersample. So if we increase it, an access ++ * out of the buffer will happen at directory flushing. ++ * Another option would be to clear those targs. ++ */ ++ td->td_bitspersample = 8; ++ td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT; ++ } + } + + static void diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-tif-dirread.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-tif-dirread.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..68889b121b --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-tif-dirread.patch @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +Fix heap-based buffer overflow in TIFFFillStrip(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to + instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, +rowsperstrip), + instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is + the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and +thus + results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays +when + using TIFFReadScanline(). + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608. + + * libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done + for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 +since + the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary. + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1176; previous revision: 1.1175 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_dirread.c,v <-- +libtiff/tif_dirread.c +new revision: 1.205; previous revision: 1.204 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_strip.c,v <-- libtiff/tif_strip.c +new revision: 1.38; previous revision: 1.37 + +Index: libtiff/libtiff/tif_dirread.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_dirread.c,v +retrieving revision 1.204 +retrieving revision 1.205 +diff -u -r1.204 -r1.205 +--- libtiff/libtiff/tif_dirread.c 16 Nov 2016 15:14:15 -0000 1.204 ++++ libtiff/libtiff/tif_dirread.c 3 Dec 2016 11:02:15 -0000 1.205 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tif_dirread.c,v 1.204 2016-11-16 15:14:15 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tif_dirread.c,v 1.205 2016-12-03 11:02:15 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -5502,8 +5502,7 @@ + uint64 rowblockbytes; + uint64 stripbytes; + uint32 strip; +- uint64 nstrips64; +- uint32 nstrips32; ++ uint32 nstrips; + uint32 rowsperstrip; + uint64* newcounts; + uint64* newoffsets; +@@ -5534,18 +5533,17 @@ + return; + + /* +- * never increase the number of strips in an image ++ * never increase the number of rows per strip + */ + if (rowsperstrip >= td->td_rowsperstrip) + return; +- nstrips64 = TIFFhowmany_64(bytecount, stripbytes); +- if ((nstrips64==0)||(nstrips64>0xFFFFFFFF)) /* something is wonky, do nothing. */ +- return; +- nstrips32 = (uint32)nstrips64; ++ nstrips = TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip); ++ if( nstrips == 0 ) ++ return; + +- newcounts = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64), ++ newcounts = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips, sizeof (uint64), + "for chopped \"StripByteCounts\" array"); +- newoffsets = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64), ++ newoffsets = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips, sizeof (uint64), + "for chopped \"StripOffsets\" array"); + if (newcounts == NULL || newoffsets == NULL) { + /* +@@ -5562,18 +5560,18 @@ + * Fill the strip information arrays with new bytecounts and offsets + * that reflect the broken-up format. + */ +- for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips32; strip++) { ++ for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips; strip++) { + if (stripbytes > bytecount) + stripbytes = bytecount; + newcounts[strip] = stripbytes; +- newoffsets[strip] = offset; ++ newoffsets[strip] = stripbytes ? offset : 0; + offset += stripbytes; + bytecount -= stripbytes; + } + /* + * Replace old single strip info with multi-strip info. + */ +- td->td_stripsperimage = td->td_nstrips = nstrips32; ++ td->td_stripsperimage = td->td_nstrips = nstrips; + TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, rowsperstrip); + + _TIFFfree(td->td_stripbytecount); +Index: libtiff/libtiff/tif_strip.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_strip.c,v +retrieving revision 1.37 +retrieving revision 1.38 +diff -u -r1.37 -r1.38 +--- libtiff/libtiff/tif_strip.c 9 Nov 2016 23:00:49 -0000 1.37 ++++ libtiff/libtiff/tif_strip.c 3 Dec 2016 11:02:15 -0000 1.38 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tif_strip.c,v 1.37 2016-11-09 23:00:49 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tif_strip.c,v 1.38 2016-12-03 11:02:15 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1991-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -63,15 +63,6 @@ + TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir; + uint32 nstrips; + +- /* If the value was already computed and store in td_nstrips, then return it, +- since ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip might have altered and resized the +- since the td_stripbytecount and td_stripoffset arrays to the new value +- after the initial affectation of td_nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips() in +- tif_dirread.c ~line 3612. +- See http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 */ +- if( td->td_nstrips ) +- return td->td_nstrips; +- + nstrips = (td->td_rowsperstrip == (uint32) -1 ? 1 : + TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, td->td_rowsperstrip)); + if (td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-tiffcp.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-tiffcp.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f0fef08bf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-tiffcp.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +Fix heap buffer overflow in tiffcp when parsing number of inks: + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2599 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tif_dir.c: when TIFFGetField(, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, ) is +called, + limit the return number of inks to SamplesPerPixel, so that code that +parses + ink names doesn't go past the end of the buffer. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2599 + + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1184; previous revision: 1.1183 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_dir.c,v <-- libtiff/tif_dir.c +new revision: 1.128; previous revision: 1.127 + +Index: libtiff/libtiff/tif_dir.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/libtiff/tif_dir.c,v +retrieving revision 1.127 +retrieving revision 1.128 +diff -u -r1.127 -r1.128 +--- libtiff/libtiff/tif_dir.c 25 Oct 2016 21:35:15 -0000 1.127 ++++ libtiff/libtiff/tif_dir.c 3 Dec 2016 15:30:31 -0000 1.128 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tif_dir.c,v 1.127 2016-10-25 21:35:15 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tif_dir.c,v 1.128 2016-12-03 15:30:31 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -854,6 +854,32 @@ + if( fip == NULL ) /* cannot happen since TIFFGetField() already checks it */ + return 0; + ++ if( tag == TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS ) ++ { ++ int i; ++ for (i = 0; i < td->td_customValueCount; i++) { ++ uint16 val; ++ TIFFTagValue *tv = td->td_customValues + i; ++ if (tv->info->field_tag != tag) ++ continue; ++ val = *(uint16 *)tv->value; ++ /* Truncate to SamplesPerPixel, since the */ ++ /* setting code for INKNAMES assume that there are SamplesPerPixel */ ++ /* inknames. */ ++ /* Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2599 */ ++ if( val > td->td_samplesperpixel ) ++ { ++ TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,"_TIFFVGetField", ++ "Truncating NumberOfInks from %u to %u", ++ val, td->td_samplesperpixel); ++ val = td->td_samplesperpixel; ++ } ++ *va_arg(ap, uint16*) = val; ++ return 1; ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + /* + * We want to force the custom code to be used for custom + * fields even if the tag happens to match a well known diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-tiffcrop.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-tiffcrop.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8166c55758 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-heap-overflow-tiffcrop.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +Fix heap-based buffer overflow in combineSeparateSamples16bits(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2621 + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiffcrop.c: add 3 extra bytes at end of strip buffer in + readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer() to avoid read outside of heap allocated +buffer. + Reported by Agostina Sarubo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2621 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1179; previous revision: 1.1178 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c,v <-- tools/tiffcrop.c +new revision: 1.48; previous revision: 1.47 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c,v +retrieving revision 1.47 +retrieving revision 1.48 +diff -u -r1.47 -r1.48 +--- libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c 3 Dec 2016 11:35:56 -0000 1.47 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiffcrop.c 3 Dec 2016 12:19:32 -0000 1.48 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tiffcrop.c,v 1.47 2016-12-03 11:35:56 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tiffcrop.c,v 1.48 2016-12-03 12:19:32 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* tiffcrop.c -- a port of tiffcp.c extended to include manipulations of + * the image data through additional options listed below +@@ -4815,10 +4815,17 @@ + nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in); + strips_per_sample = nstrips /spp; + ++ /* Add 3 padding bytes for combineSeparateSamples32bits */ ++ if( (size_t) stripsize > 0xFFFFFFFFU - 3U ) ++ { ++ TIFFError("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size."); ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++ + for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++) + { + srcbuffs[s] = NULL; +- buff = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize); ++ buff = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize + 3); + if (!buff) + { + TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer", +@@ -4827,6 +4834,9 @@ + _TIFFfree (srcbuffs[i]); + return 0; + } ++ buff[stripsize] = 0; ++ buff[stripsize+1] = 0; ++ buff[stripsize+2] = 0; + srcbuffs[s] = buff; + } + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-invalid-read.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-invalid-read.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92742d8757 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-invalid-read.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +Fix invalid read in t2p_writeproc(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2639 + +2016-12-20 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiff2pdf.c: avoid potential invalid memory read in + t2p_writeproc. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2639 + + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1198; previous revision: 1.1197 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c,v <-- tools/tiff2pdf.c +new revision: 1.100; previous revision: 1.99 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c,v +retrieving revision 1.99 +retrieving revision 1.100 +diff -u -r1.99 -r1.100 +--- libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c 20 Dec 2016 17:13:26 -0000 1.99 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiff2pdf.c 20 Dec 2016 17:24:35 -0000 1.100 +@@ -2896,6 +2896,7 @@ + } + if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, &jpt) != 0) { + if (count >= 4) { ++ int retTIFFReadRawTile; + /* Ignore EOI marker of JpegTables */ + _TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count - 2); + bufferoffset += count - 2; +@@ -2903,22 +2904,23 @@ + table_end[0] = buffer[bufferoffset-2]; + table_end[1] = buffer[bufferoffset-1]; + xuint32 = bufferoffset; +- bufferoffset -= 2; +- bufferoffset += TIFFReadRawTile( ++ bufferoffset -= 2; ++ retTIFFReadRawTile= TIFFReadRawTile( + input, + tile, + (tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]), + -1); ++ if( retTIFFReadRawTile < 0 ) ++ { ++ _TIFFfree(buffer); ++ t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR; ++ return(0); ++ } ++ bufferoffset += retTIFFReadRawTile; + /* Overwrite SOI marker of image scan with previously */ + /* saved end of JpegTables */ + buffer[xuint32-2]=table_end[0]; + buffer[xuint32-1]=table_end[1]; +- } else { +- bufferoffset += TIFFReadRawTile( +- input, +- tile, +- (tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]), +- -1); + } + } + t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset); diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-null-dereference.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-null-dereference.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8c6345b804 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-null-dereference.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +Fix NULL pointer dereference in TIFFReadRawData(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2594 + + +2016-12-03 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiffinfo.c: fix null pointer dereference in -r mode when + * the +image has + no StripByteCount tag. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2594 + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1182; previous revision: 1.1181 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffinfo.c,v <-- tools/tiffinfo.c +new revision: 1.26; previous revision: 1.25 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiffinfo.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffinfo.c,v +retrieving revision 1.25 +retrieving revision 1.26 +diff -u -r1.25 -r1.26 +--- libtiff/tools/tiffinfo.c 12 Nov 2016 20:06:05 -0000 1.25 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiffinfo.c 3 Dec 2016 14:18:49 -0000 1.26 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tiffinfo.c,v 1.25 2016-11-12 20:06:05 bfriesen Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tiffinfo.c,v 1.26 2016-12-03 14:18:49 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ + uint64* stripbc=NULL; + + TIFFGetField(tif, TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS, &stripbc); +- if (nstrips > 0) { ++ if (stripbc != NULL && nstrips > 0) { + uint32 bufsize = (uint32) stripbc[0]; + tdata_t buf = _TIFFmalloc(bufsize); + tstrip_t s; diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-tiffcp-underflow.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-tiffcp-underflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5615cbb3e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libtiff-tiffcp-underflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +Fix a integer underflow in tiffcp that led to heap overflows in +TIFFReverseBits(): + +http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2598 + +2016-12-02 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com> + + * tools/tiffcp.c: avoid uint32 underflow in cpDecodedStrips that + can cause various issues, such as buffer overflows in the library. + Reported by Agostino Sarubbo. + Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2598 + + +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/ChangeLog,v <-- ChangeLog +new revision: 1.1174; previous revision: 1.1173 +/cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v <-- tools/tiffcp.c +new revision: 1.56; previous revision: 1.55 + +Index: libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c +=================================================================== +RCS file: /cvs/maptools/cvsroot/libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c,v +retrieving revision 1.55 +retrieving revision 1.56 +diff -u -r1.55 -r1.56 +--- libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 8 Oct 2016 15:54:57 -0000 1.55 ++++ libtiff/tools/tiffcp.c 2 Dec 2016 22:13:32 -0000 1.56 +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $Id: tiffcp.c,v 1.55 2016-10-08 15:54:57 erouault Exp $ */ ++/* $Id: tiffcp.c,v 1.56 2016-12-02 22:13:32 erouault Exp $ */ + + /* + * Copyright (c) 1988-1997 Sam Leffler +@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ + tstrip_t s, ns = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in); + uint32 row = 0; + _TIFFmemset(buf, 0, stripsize); +- for (s = 0; s < ns; s++) { ++ for (s = 0; s < ns && row < imagelength; s++) { + tsize_t cc = (row + rowsperstrip > imagelength) ? + TIFFVStripSize(in, imagelength - row) : stripsize; + if (TIFFReadEncodedStrip(in, s, buf, cc) < 0 diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libupnp-CVE-2016-8863.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libupnp-CVE-2016-8863.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9978b39487 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libupnp-CVE-2016-8863.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-8863: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-8863 +https://sourceforge.net/p/pupnp/bugs/133/ + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://sourceforge.net/p/pupnp/code/ci/9c099c2923ab4d98530ab5204af1738be5bddba7/ + +From 9c099c2923ab4d98530ab5204af1738be5bddba7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Uwe=20Kleine-K=C3=B6nig?= <ukleinek@debian.org> +Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2016 17:11:53 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix out-of-bound access in create_url_list() (CVE-2016-8863) + +If there is an invalid URL in URLS->buf after a valid one, uri_parse is +called with out pointing after the allocated memory. As uri_parse writes +to *out before returning an error the loop in create_url_list must be +stopped early to prevent an out-of-bound access + +Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/pupnp/bugs/133/ +Bug-CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-8863 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/842093 +Bug-Redhat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1388771 +(cherry picked from commit a0f6e719bc03c4d2fe6a4a42ef6b8761446f520b) +--- + upnp/src/gena/gena_device.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/upnp/src/gena/gena_device.c b/upnp/src/gena/gena_device.c +index fb04a29..245c56b 100644 +--- a/upnp/src/gena/gena_device.c ++++ b/upnp/src/gena/gena_device.c +@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ static int create_url_list( + /*! [out] . */ + URL_list *out) + { +- size_t URLcount = 0; ++ size_t URLcount = 0, URLcount2 = 0; + size_t i; + int return_code = 0; + uri_type temp; +@@ -1155,16 +1155,23 @@ static int create_url_list( + } + memcpy( out->URLs, URLS->buff, URLS->size ); + out->URLs[URLS->size] = 0; +- URLcount = 0; + for( i = 0; i < URLS->size; i++ ) { + if( ( URLS->buff[i] == '<' ) && ( i + 1 < URLS->size ) ) { + if( ( ( return_code = + parse_uri( &out->URLs[i + 1], URLS->size - i + 1, +- &out->parsedURLs[URLcount] ) ) == ++ &out->parsedURLs[URLcount2] ) ) == + HTTP_SUCCESS ) +- && ( out->parsedURLs[URLcount].hostport.text.size != ++ && ( out->parsedURLs[URLcount2].hostport.text.size != + 0 ) ) { +- URLcount++; ++ URLcount2++; ++ if (URLcount2 >= URLcount) ++ /* ++ * break early here in case there is a bogus URL that ++ * was skipped above. This prevents to access ++ * out->parsedURLs[URLcount] which is beyond the ++ * allocation. ++ */ ++ break; + } else { + if( return_code == UPNP_E_OUTOF_MEMORY ) { + free( out->URLs ); +-- +2.11.0 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libxml2-CVE-2016-4658.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libxml2-CVE-2016-4658.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a4e1f31fae --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libxml2-CVE-2016-4658.patch @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-4658: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4658 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=c1d1f7121194036608bf555f08d3062a36fd344b + +From c1d1f7121194036608bf555f08d3062a36fd344b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de> +Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2016 18:34:52 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Disallow namespace nodes in XPointer ranges + +Namespace nodes must be copied to avoid use-after-free errors. +But they don't necessarily have a physical representation in a +document, so simply disallow them in XPointer ranges. + +Found with afl-fuzz. + +Fixes CVE-2016-4658. +--- + xpointer.c | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------------- + 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xpointer.c b/xpointer.c +index a7b03fbd..694d120e 100644 +--- a/xpointer.c ++++ b/xpointer.c +@@ -320,6 +320,45 @@ xmlXPtrRangesEqual(xmlXPathObjectPtr range1, xmlXPathObjectPtr range2) { + } + + /** ++ * xmlXPtrNewRangeInternal: ++ * @start: the starting node ++ * @startindex: the start index ++ * @end: the ending point ++ * @endindex: the ending index ++ * ++ * Internal function to create a new xmlXPathObjectPtr of type range ++ * ++ * Returns the newly created object. ++ */ ++static xmlXPathObjectPtr ++xmlXPtrNewRangeInternal(xmlNodePtr start, int startindex, ++ xmlNodePtr end, int endindex) { ++ xmlXPathObjectPtr ret; ++ ++ /* ++ * Namespace nodes must be copied (see xmlXPathNodeSetDupNs). ++ * Disallow them for now. ++ */ ++ if ((start != NULL) && (start->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)) ++ return(NULL); ++ if ((end != NULL) && (end->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)) ++ return(NULL); ++ ++ ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); ++ if (ret == NULL) { ++ xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating range"); ++ return(NULL); ++ } ++ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); ++ ret->type = XPATH_RANGE; ++ ret->user = start; ++ ret->index = startindex; ++ ret->user2 = end; ++ ret->index2 = endindex; ++ return(ret); ++} ++ ++/** + * xmlXPtrNewRange: + * @start: the starting node + * @startindex: the start index +@@ -344,17 +383,7 @@ xmlXPtrNewRange(xmlNodePtr start, int startindex, + if (endindex < 0) + return(NULL); + +- ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- if (ret == NULL) { +- xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating range"); +- return(NULL); +- } +- memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- ret->type = XPATH_RANGE; +- ret->user = start; +- ret->index = startindex; +- ret->user2 = end; +- ret->index2 = endindex; ++ ret = xmlXPtrNewRangeInternal(start, startindex, end, endindex); + xmlXPtrRangeCheckOrder(ret); + return(ret); + } +@@ -381,17 +410,8 @@ xmlXPtrNewRangePoints(xmlXPathObjectPtr start, xmlXPathObjectPtr end) { + if (end->type != XPATH_POINT) + return(NULL); + +- ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- if (ret == NULL) { +- xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating range"); +- return(NULL); +- } +- memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- ret->type = XPATH_RANGE; +- ret->user = start->user; +- ret->index = start->index; +- ret->user2 = end->user; +- ret->index2 = end->index; ++ ret = xmlXPtrNewRangeInternal(start->user, start->index, end->user, ++ end->index); + xmlXPtrRangeCheckOrder(ret); + return(ret); + } +@@ -416,17 +436,7 @@ xmlXPtrNewRangePointNode(xmlXPathObjectPtr start, xmlNodePtr end) { + if (start->type != XPATH_POINT) + return(NULL); + +- ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- if (ret == NULL) { +- xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating range"); +- return(NULL); +- } +- memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- ret->type = XPATH_RANGE; +- ret->user = start->user; +- ret->index = start->index; +- ret->user2 = end; +- ret->index2 = -1; ++ ret = xmlXPtrNewRangeInternal(start->user, start->index, end, -1); + xmlXPtrRangeCheckOrder(ret); + return(ret); + } +@@ -453,17 +463,7 @@ xmlXPtrNewRangeNodePoint(xmlNodePtr start, xmlXPathObjectPtr end) { + if (end->type != XPATH_POINT) + return(NULL); + +- ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- if (ret == NULL) { +- xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating range"); +- return(NULL); +- } +- memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- ret->type = XPATH_RANGE; +- ret->user = start; +- ret->index = -1; +- ret->user2 = end->user; +- ret->index2 = end->index; ++ ret = xmlXPtrNewRangeInternal(start, -1, end->user, end->index); + xmlXPtrRangeCheckOrder(ret); + return(ret); + } +@@ -486,17 +486,7 @@ xmlXPtrNewRangeNodes(xmlNodePtr start, xmlNodePtr end) { + if (end == NULL) + return(NULL); + +- ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- if (ret == NULL) { +- xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating range"); +- return(NULL); +- } +- memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- ret->type = XPATH_RANGE; +- ret->user = start; +- ret->index = -1; +- ret->user2 = end; +- ret->index2 = -1; ++ ret = xmlXPtrNewRangeInternal(start, -1, end, -1); + xmlXPtrRangeCheckOrder(ret); + return(ret); + } +@@ -516,17 +506,7 @@ xmlXPtrNewCollapsedRange(xmlNodePtr start) { + if (start == NULL) + return(NULL); + +- ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- if (ret == NULL) { +- xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating range"); +- return(NULL); +- } +- memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- ret->type = XPATH_RANGE; +- ret->user = start; +- ret->index = -1; +- ret->user2 = NULL; +- ret->index2 = -1; ++ ret = xmlXPtrNewRangeInternal(start, -1, NULL, -1); + return(ret); + } + +@@ -541,6 +521,8 @@ xmlXPtrNewCollapsedRange(xmlNodePtr start) { + */ + xmlXPathObjectPtr + xmlXPtrNewRangeNodeObject(xmlNodePtr start, xmlXPathObjectPtr end) { ++ xmlNodePtr endNode; ++ int endIndex; + xmlXPathObjectPtr ret; + + if (start == NULL) +@@ -549,7 +531,12 @@ xmlXPtrNewRangeNodeObject(xmlNodePtr start, xmlXPathObjectPtr end) { + return(NULL); + switch (end->type) { + case XPATH_POINT: ++ endNode = end->user; ++ endIndex = end->index; ++ break; + case XPATH_RANGE: ++ endNode = end->user2; ++ endIndex = end->index2; + break; + case XPATH_NODESET: + /* +@@ -557,39 +544,15 @@ xmlXPtrNewRangeNodeObject(xmlNodePtr start, xmlXPathObjectPtr end) { + */ + if (end->nodesetval->nodeNr <= 0) + return(NULL); ++ endNode = end->nodesetval->nodeTab[end->nodesetval->nodeNr - 1]; ++ endIndex = -1; + break; + default: + /* TODO */ + return(NULL); + } + +- ret = (xmlXPathObjectPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- if (ret == NULL) { +- xmlXPtrErrMemory("allocating range"); +- return(NULL); +- } +- memset(ret, 0 , (size_t) sizeof(xmlXPathObject)); +- ret->type = XPATH_RANGE; +- ret->user = start; +- ret->index = -1; +- switch (end->type) { +- case XPATH_POINT: +- ret->user2 = end->user; +- ret->index2 = end->index; +- break; +- case XPATH_RANGE: +- ret->user2 = end->user2; +- ret->index2 = end->index2; +- break; +- case XPATH_NODESET: { +- ret->user2 = end->nodesetval->nodeTab[end->nodesetval->nodeNr - 1]; +- ret->index2 = -1; +- break; +- } +- default: +- STRANGE +- return(NULL); +- } ++ ret = xmlXPtrNewRangeInternal(start, -1, endNode, endIndex); + xmlXPtrRangeCheckOrder(ret); + return(ret); + } +-- +2.11.0 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libxml2-CVE-2016-5131.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libxml2-CVE-2016-5131.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..38938c8e3e --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libxml2-CVE-2016-5131.patch @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-5131: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-5131 + +Patches copied from upstream source repository (the test suite fails +without the 2nd patch): + +https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=9ab01a277d71f54d3143c2cf333c5c2e9aaedd9e +https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=a005199330b86dada19d162cae15ef9bdcb6baa8 + +From 9ab01a277d71f54d3143c2cf333c5c2e9aaedd9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de> +Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2016 14:22:23 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix XPointer paths beginning with range-to + +The old code would invoke the broken xmlXPtrRangeToFunction. range-to +isn't really a function but a special kind of location step. Remove +this function and always handle range-to in the XPath code. + +The old xmlXPtrRangeToFunction could also be abused to trigger a +use-after-free error with the potential for remote code execution. + +Found with afl-fuzz. + +Fixes CVE-2016-5131. +--- + result/XPath/xptr/vidbase | 13 ++++++++ + test/XPath/xptr/vidbase | 1 + + xpath.c | 7 ++++- + xpointer.c | 76 ++++------------------------------------------- + 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/result/XPath/xptr/vidbase b/result/XPath/xptr/vidbase +index 8b9e92d6..f19193e7 100644 +--- a/result/XPath/xptr/vidbase ++++ b/result/XPath/xptr/vidbase +@@ -17,3 +17,16 @@ Object is a Location Set: + To node + ELEMENT p + ++ ++======================== ++Expression: xpointer(range-to(id('chapter2'))) ++Object is a Location Set: ++1 : Object is a range : ++ From node ++ / ++ To node ++ ELEMENT chapter ++ ATTRIBUTE id ++ TEXT ++ content=chapter2 ++ +diff --git a/test/XPath/xptr/vidbase b/test/XPath/xptr/vidbase +index b1463830..884b1065 100644 +--- a/test/XPath/xptr/vidbase ++++ b/test/XPath/xptr/vidbase +@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ + xpointer(id('chapter1')/p) + xpointer(id('chapter1')/p[1]/range-to(following-sibling::p[2])) ++xpointer(range-to(id('chapter2'))) +diff --git a/xpath.c b/xpath.c +index d992841e..5a01b1b3 100644 +--- a/xpath.c ++++ b/xpath.c +@@ -10691,13 +10691,18 @@ xmlXPathCompPathExpr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) { + lc = 1; + break; + } else if ((NXT(len) == '(')) { +- /* Note Type or Function */ ++ /* Node Type or Function */ + if (xmlXPathIsNodeType(name)) { + #ifdef DEBUG_STEP + xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, + "PathExpr: Type search\n"); + #endif + lc = 1; ++#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED ++ } else if (ctxt->xptr && ++ xmlStrEqual(name, BAD_CAST "range-to")) { ++ lc = 1; ++#endif + } else { + #ifdef DEBUG_STEP + xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, +diff --git a/xpointer.c b/xpointer.c +index 676c5105..d74174a3 100644 +--- a/xpointer.c ++++ b/xpointer.c +@@ -1332,8 +1332,6 @@ xmlXPtrNewContext(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr here, xmlNodePtr origin) { + ret->here = here; + ret->origin = origin; + +- xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ret, (xmlChar *)"range-to", +- xmlXPtrRangeToFunction); + xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ret, (xmlChar *)"range", + xmlXPtrRangeFunction); + xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ret, (xmlChar *)"range-inside", +@@ -2243,76 +2241,14 @@ xmlXPtrRangeInsideFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) { + * @nargs: the number of args + * + * Implement the range-to() XPointer function ++ * ++ * Obsolete. range-to is not a real function but a special type of location ++ * step which is handled in xpath.c. + */ + void +-xmlXPtrRangeToFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) { +- xmlXPathObjectPtr range; +- const xmlChar *cur; +- xmlXPathObjectPtr res, obj; +- xmlXPathObjectPtr tmp; +- xmlLocationSetPtr newset = NULL; +- xmlNodeSetPtr oldset; +- int i; +- +- if (ctxt == NULL) return; +- CHECK_ARITY(1); +- /* +- * Save the expression pointer since we will have to evaluate +- * it multiple times. Initialize the new set. +- */ +- CHECK_TYPE(XPATH_NODESET); +- obj = valuePop(ctxt); +- oldset = obj->nodesetval; +- ctxt->context->node = NULL; +- +- cur = ctxt->cur; +- newset = xmlXPtrLocationSetCreate(NULL); +- +- for (i = 0; i < oldset->nodeNr; i++) { +- ctxt->cur = cur; +- +- /* +- * Run the evaluation with a node list made of a single item +- * in the nodeset. +- */ +- ctxt->context->node = oldset->nodeTab[i]; +- tmp = xmlXPathNewNodeSet(ctxt->context->node); +- valuePush(ctxt, tmp); +- +- xmlXPathEvalExpr(ctxt); +- CHECK_ERROR; +- +- /* +- * The result of the evaluation need to be tested to +- * decided whether the filter succeeded or not +- */ +- res = valuePop(ctxt); +- range = xmlXPtrNewRangeNodeObject(oldset->nodeTab[i], res); +- if (range != NULL) { +- xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newset, range); +- } +- +- /* +- * Cleanup +- */ +- if (res != NULL) +- xmlXPathFreeObject(res); +- if (ctxt->value == tmp) { +- res = valuePop(ctxt); +- xmlXPathFreeObject(res); +- } +- +- ctxt->context->node = NULL; +- } +- +- /* +- * The result is used as the new evaluation set. +- */ +- xmlXPathFreeObject(obj); +- ctxt->context->node = NULL; +- ctxt->context->contextSize = -1; +- ctxt->context->proximityPosition = -1; +- valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPtrWrapLocationSet(newset)); ++xmlXPtrRangeToFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, ++ int nargs ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) { ++ XP_ERROR(XPATH_EXPR_ERROR); + } + + /** +-- +2.11.0 + +From a005199330b86dada19d162cae15ef9bdcb6baa8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de> +Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2016 14:19:58 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix comparison with root node in xmlXPathCmpNodes + +This change has already been made in xmlXPathCmpNodesExt but not in +xmlXPathCmpNodes. +--- + xpath.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xpath.c b/xpath.c +index 751665b8..d992841e 100644 +--- a/xpath.c ++++ b/xpath.c +@@ -3342,13 +3342,13 @@ xmlXPathCmpNodes(xmlNodePtr node1, xmlNodePtr node2) { + * compute depth to root + */ + for (depth2 = 0, cur = node2;cur->parent != NULL;cur = cur->parent) { +- if (cur == node1) ++ if (cur->parent == node1) + return(1); + depth2++; + } + root = cur; + for (depth1 = 0, cur = node1;cur->parent != NULL;cur = cur->parent) { +- if (cur == node2) ++ if (cur->parent == node2) + return(-1); + depth1++; + } +-- +2.11.0 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libxt-guix-search-paths.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libxt-guix-search-paths.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c618f48da5 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libxt-guix-search-paths.patch @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +--- libXt-1.1.5/src/Intrinsic.c 2015-05-01 07:36:20.000000000 +0200 ++++ Intrinsic.c 2016-12-12 00:42:16.567388450 +0100 +@@ -1303,21 +1303,101 @@ + } else (void) strcpy(*rest, string); + } + +-/* +- * default path used if environment variable XFILESEARCHPATH +- * is not defined. Also substitued for %D. +- * The exact value should be documented in the implementation +- * notes for any Xt implementation. ++ ++ ++/* ++ Return the default search path for the function ++ XtResolvePathname to use if XFILESEARCHPATH is ++ not defined. ++ ++ It returns the combination the set of values which are the 6 "stems" below, ++ prepended with "/run/current-system/profile", and $GUIX_PROFILE and ++ "$HOME/.guix-profile" ++ ++ These values provide the default paths where Guix/GuixSD can expect ++ to find resources for installed packages. + */ +-static const char *implementation_default_path(void) ++static const char *guix_default_path(void) + { +-#if defined(WIN32) +- static char xfilesearchpath[] = ""; +- +- return xfilesearchpath; +-#else +- return XFILESEARCHPATHDEFAULT; +-#endif ++ static const char *search_path_default_stem[] = { ++ "/lib/X11/%L/%T/%N%C%S", ++ "/lib/X11/%l/%T/%N%C%S", ++ "/lib/X11/%T/%N%C%S", ++ "/lib/X11/%L/%T/%N%S", ++ "/lib/X11/%l/%T/%N%S", ++ "/lib/X11/%T/%N%S" ++ }; ++ ++#define SIZEOF_STEMS (strlen (search_path_default_stem[0]) \ ++ + strlen (search_path_default_stem[1]) \ ++ + strlen (search_path_default_stem[2]) \ ++ + strlen (search_path_default_stem[3]) \ ++ + strlen (search_path_default_stem[4]) \ ++ + strlen (search_path_default_stem[5])) ++ ++ ++ int i; ++ const char *current_profile = "/run/current-system/profile"; ++ char *home = getenv ("HOME"); ++ char *guix_profile = getenv ("GUIX_PROFILE"); ++ ++ size_t bytesAllocd = SIZEOF_STEMS + 1; ++ ++ /* This function is evaluated multiple times and the calling ++ code assumes that it is idempotent. So we must not allow ++ (say) a changed environment variable to cause it to return ++ something different. */ ++ static char *path = NULL; ++ if (path) ++ return path; ++ ++ bytesAllocd += 6 * (1 + strlen (current_profile)); ++ ++ if (guix_profile != NULL) ++ { ++ bytesAllocd += SIZEOF_STEMS; ++ bytesAllocd += 6 * (1 + strlen (guix_profile)); ++ } ++ ++ if (home != NULL) ++ { ++ bytesAllocd += SIZEOF_STEMS; ++ bytesAllocd += 6 * (1 + strlen(home) + strlen ("/.guix-profile")); ++ } ++ ++ path = XtMalloc(bytesAllocd); ++ if (path == NULL) _XtAllocError(NULL); ++ ++ memset (path, 0, bytesAllocd); ++ ++ for (i = 0 ; i < 6 ; ++i) ++ { ++ strcat (path, current_profile); ++ strcat (path, search_path_default_stem[i]); ++ strcat (path, ":"); ++ } ++ ++ if (guix_profile != NULL) ++ for (i = 0 ; i < 6 ; ++i) ++ { ++ strcat (path, guix_profile); ++ strcat (path, search_path_default_stem[i]); ++ strcat (path, ":"); ++ } ++ ++ if (home != NULL) ++ for (i = 0 ; i < 6 ; ++i) ++ { ++ strcat (path, home); ++ strcat (path, "/.guix-profile"); ++ strcat (path, search_path_default_stem[i]); ++ strcat (path, ":"); ++ } ++ ++ /* Remove final : */ ++ path[strlen(path) - 1] = '\0'; ++ ++ return path; + } + + +@@ -1345,7 +1425,7 @@ + { + XtPerDisplay pd; + static const char *defaultPath = NULL; +- const char *impl_default = implementation_default_path(); ++ const char *impl_default = guix_default_path(); + int idef_len = strlen(impl_default); + char *massagedPath; + int bytesAllocd, bytesLeft; diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4409.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4409.patch index 60cf8e0430..3089f962f7 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4409.patch +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4409.patch @@ -3,30 +3,17 @@ From: Tom Callaway <spot@fedoraproject.org> Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 11:39:29 -0400 Subject: apply fix for CVE-2012-4409 (thanks to Raphael Geissert) ---- - mcrypt-CVE-2012-4409.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ - mcrypt.spec | 10 +++++++++- - 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - create mode 100644 mcrypt-CVE-2012-4409.patch - -diff --git a/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4409.patch b/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4409.patch -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..747f428 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4409.patch -@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ -+diff -up mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c.CVE-2012-4409 mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c -+--- mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c.CVE-2012-4409 2012-09-07 11:00:55.906870746 -0400 -++++ mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c 2012-09-07 11:00:27.967858365 -0400 -+@@ -242,6 +242,8 @@ int check_file_head(FILE * fstream, char -+ if (m_getbit(0, sflag) != 0) { /* if the first bit is set */ -+ *salt_size = m_setbit(0, sflag, 0); -+ if (*salt_size > 0) { -++ if (*salt_size > sizeof(tmp_buf)) -++ err_quit(_("Salt is too long\n")); -+ fread(tmp_buf, 1, *salt_size, -+ fstream); -+ memmove(salt, tmp_buf, *salt_size); +--- mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c.CVE-2012-4409 2012-09-07 11:00:55.906870746 -0400 ++++ mcrypt-2.6.8/src/extra.c 2012-09-07 11:00:27.967858365 -0400 +@@ -242,6 +242,8 @@ int check_file_head(FILE * fstream, char + if (m_getbit(0, sflag) != 0) { /* if the first bit is set */ + *salt_size = m_setbit(0, sflag, 0); + if (*salt_size > 0) { ++ if (*salt_size > sizeof(tmp_buf)) ++ err_quit(_("Salt is too long\n")); + fread(tmp_buf, 1, *salt_size, + fstream); + memmove(salt, tmp_buf, *salt_size); -- cgit v0.12 diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4527.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4527.patch index d931dd174b..dfbf048583 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4527.patch +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4527.patch @@ -3,109 +3,97 @@ From: Tom Callaway <spot@fedoraproject.org> Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2012 15:39:24 -0400 Subject: apply workaround to CVE-2012-4527 ---- - mcrypt-CVE-2012-4527-80-width-patch | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - mcrypt.spec | 10 +++- - 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - create mode 100644 mcrypt-CVE-2012-4527-80-width-patch - -diff --git a/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4527-80-width-patch b/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4527-80-width-patch -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..0eb94d8 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/mcrypt-CVE-2012-4527-80-width-patch -@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ -+--- mcrypt-2.6.8.orig/src/mcrypt.c -++++ mcrypt-2.6.8/src/mcrypt.c -+@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ -+ # include <time.h> -+ #endif -+ -++#define WIDTH 80 -++ -+ static char rcsid[] = -+ "$Id: mcrypt.c,v 1.2 2007/11/07 17:10:21 nmav Exp $"; -+ -+@@ -482,7 +484,7 @@ -+ #ifdef HAVE_STAT -+ if (stream_flag == FALSE) { -+ if (is_normal_file(file[i]) == FALSE) { -+- sprintf(tmperr, -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, -+ _ -+ ("%s: %s is not a regular file. Skipping...\n"), -+ program_name, file[i]); -+@@ -501,7 +503,7 @@ -+ dinfile = file[i]; -+ if ((isatty(fileno((FILE *) (stdin))) == 1) -+ && (stream_flag == TRUE) && (force == 0)) { /* not a tty */ -+- sprintf(tmperr, -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, -+ _ -+ ("%s: Encrypted data will not be read from a terminal.\n"), -+ program_name); -+@@ -520,7 +522,7 @@ -+ einfile = file[i]; -+ if ((isatty(fileno((FILE *) (stdout))) == 1) -+ && (stream_flag == TRUE) && (force == 0)) { /* not a tty */ -+- sprintf(tmperr, -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, -+ _ -+ ("%s: Encrypted data will not be written to a terminal.\n"), -+ program_name); -+@@ -544,7 +546,7 @@ -+ strcpy(outfile, einfile); -+ /* if file has already the .nc ignore it */ -+ if (strstr(outfile, ".nc") != NULL) { -+- sprintf(tmperr, -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, -+ _ -+ ("%s: file %s has the .nc suffix... skipping...\n"), -+ program_name, outfile); -+@@ -590,10 +592,10 @@ -+ -+ if (x == 0) { -+ if (stream_flag == FALSE) { -+- sprintf(tmperr, _("File %s was decrypted.\n"), dinfile); -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, _("File %s was decrypted.\n"), dinfile); -+ err_warn(tmperr); -+ } else { -+- sprintf(tmperr, _("Stdin was decrypted.\n")); -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, _("Stdin was decrypted.\n")); -+ err_warn(tmperr); -+ } -+ #ifdef HAVE_STAT -+@@ -610,7 +612,7 @@ -+ -+ } else { -+ if (stream_flag == FALSE) { -+- sprintf(tmperr, -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, -+ _ -+ ("File %s was NOT decrypted successfully.\n"), -+ dinfile); -+@@ -636,10 +638,10 @@ -+ -+ if (x == 0) { -+ if (stream_flag == FALSE) { -+- sprintf(tmperr, _("File %s was encrypted.\n"), einfile); -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, _("File %s was encrypted.\n"), einfile); -+ err_warn(tmperr); -+ } else { -+- sprintf(tmperr, _("Stdin was encrypted.\n")); -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, _("Stdin was encrypted.\n")); -+ err_warn(tmperr); -+ } -+ #ifdef HAVE_STAT -+@@ -655,7 +657,7 @@ -+ -+ } else { -+ if (stream_flag == FALSE) { -+- sprintf(tmperr, -++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, -+ _ -+ ("File %s was NOT encrypted successfully.\n"), -+ einfile); --- -cgit v0.12 +--- mcrypt-2.6.8.orig/src/mcrypt.c ++++ mcrypt-2.6.8/src/mcrypt.c +@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ + # include <time.h> + #endif + ++#define WIDTH 80 ++ + static char rcsid[] = + "$Id: mcrypt.c,v 1.2 2007/11/07 17:10:21 nmav Exp $"; + +@@ -482,7 +484,7 @@ + #ifdef HAVE_STAT + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { + if (is_normal_file(file[i]) == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, + _ + ("%s: %s is not a regular file. Skipping...\n"), + program_name, file[i]); +@@ -501,7 +503,7 @@ + dinfile = file[i]; + if ((isatty(fileno((FILE *) (stdin))) == 1) + && (stream_flag == TRUE) && (force == 0)) { /* not a tty */ +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, + _ + ("%s: Encrypted data will not be read from a terminal.\n"), + program_name); +@@ -520,7 +522,7 @@ + einfile = file[i]; + if ((isatty(fileno((FILE *) (stdout))) == 1) + && (stream_flag == TRUE) && (force == 0)) { /* not a tty */ +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, + _ + ("%s: Encrypted data will not be written to a terminal.\n"), + program_name); +@@ -544,7 +546,7 @@ + strcpy(outfile, einfile); + /* if file has already the .nc ignore it */ + if (strstr(outfile, ".nc") != NULL) { +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, + _ + ("%s: file %s has the .nc suffix... skipping...\n"), + program_name, outfile); +@@ -590,10 +592,10 @@ + + if (x == 0) { + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, _("File %s was decrypted.\n"), dinfile); ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, _("File %s was decrypted.\n"), dinfile); + err_warn(tmperr); + } else { +- sprintf(tmperr, _("Stdin was decrypted.\n")); ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, _("Stdin was decrypted.\n")); + err_warn(tmperr); + } + #ifdef HAVE_STAT +@@ -610,7 +612,7 @@ + + } else { + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, + _ + ("File %s was NOT decrypted successfully.\n"), + dinfile); +@@ -636,10 +638,10 @@ + + if (x == 0) { + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, _("File %s was encrypted.\n"), einfile); ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, _("File %s was encrypted.\n"), einfile); + err_warn(tmperr); + } else { +- sprintf(tmperr, _("Stdin was encrypted.\n")); ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, _("Stdin was encrypted.\n")); + err_warn(tmperr); + } + #ifdef HAVE_STAT +@@ -655,7 +657,7 @@ + + } else { + if (stream_flag == FALSE) { +- sprintf(tmperr, ++ snprintf(tmperr, WIDTH, + _ + ("File %s was NOT encrypted successfully.\n"), + einfile); +- +git v0.12 diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/multiqc-fix-git-subprocess-error.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/multiqc-fix-git-subprocess-error.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..87be6142f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/multiqc-fix-git-subprocess-error.patch @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +Without this patch, the incorrect exception is caught when 'git' is not in +PATH. See https://github.com/ewels/MultiQC/pull/377. + +diff --git a/multiqc/utils/config.py b/multiqc/utils/config.py +index 01fa554..4a11793 100755 +--- a/multiqc/utils/config.py ++++ b/multiqc/utils/config.py +@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ try: + git_hash = subprocess.check_output(['git', 'rev-parse', 'HEAD'], stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) + git_hash_short = git_hash[:7] + version = '{} ({})'.format(version, git_hash_short) +-except subprocess.CalledProcessError: ++except (subprocess.CalledProcessError, FileNotFoundError): + pass + os.chdir(cwd) + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/ocaml-Add-a-.file-directive.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/ocaml-Add-a-.file-directive.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..07842e9c32 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/ocaml-Add-a-.file-directive.patch @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From: Stephane Glondu <steph@glondu.net> +Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2015 20:59:14 +0200 +Subject: Add a .file directive to generated .s files + +When no .file directive is given, the toolchain records the filename +of the .o file, which is sometimes random, making generated objects +non-deterministic. + +We use Location.input_name for adding .file directives to assembly +files. Note: when the file is preprocessed, this reference holds the +name of the temporary file. Hence, files compiled with -pp are still +not deterministic. + +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/795784 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/796336 +--- + asmcomp/amd64/emit.mlp | 1 + + asmcomp/arm/emit.mlp | 1 + + asmcomp/arm64/emit.mlp | 1 + + asmcomp/i386/emit.mlp | 1 + + asmcomp/power/emit.mlp | 1 + + asmcomp/sparc/emit.mlp | 1 + + 6 files changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/asmcomp/amd64/emit.mlp b/asmcomp/amd64/emit.mlp +index d56d0f5..4d7aa30 100644 +--- a/asmcomp/amd64/emit.mlp ++++ b/asmcomp/amd64/emit.mlp +@@ -794,6 +794,7 @@ let data l = + let begin_assembly() = + reset_debug_info(); (* PR#5603 *) + float_constants := []; ++ ` .file \"{emit_string (String.escaped !Location.input_name)}\"\n`; + if !Clflags.dlcode then begin + (* from amd64.S; could emit these constants on demand *) + if macosx then +diff --git a/asmcomp/arm/emit.mlp b/asmcomp/arm/emit.mlp +index 4948fb2..6f30fba 100644 +--- a/asmcomp/arm/emit.mlp ++++ b/asmcomp/arm/emit.mlp +@@ -892,6 +892,7 @@ let data l = + + let begin_assembly() = + reset_debug_info(); ++ ` .file \"{emit_string (String.escaped !Location.input_name)}\"\n`; + ` .syntax unified\n`; + begin match !arch with + | ARMv4 -> ` .arch armv4t\n` +diff --git a/asmcomp/arm64/emit.mlp b/asmcomp/arm64/emit.mlp +index 750c2b2..5afbb8a 100644 +--- a/asmcomp/arm64/emit.mlp ++++ b/asmcomp/arm64/emit.mlp +@@ -942,6 +942,7 @@ let data l = + + let begin_assembly() = + reset_debug_info(); ++ ` .file \"{emit_string (String.escaped !Location.input_name)}\"\n`; + let lbl_begin = Compilenv.make_symbol (Some "data_begin") in + ` .data\n`; + ` .globl {emit_symbol lbl_begin}\n`; +diff --git a/asmcomp/i386/emit.mlp b/asmcomp/i386/emit.mlp +index 98df5f9..531150f 100644 +--- a/asmcomp/i386/emit.mlp ++++ b/asmcomp/i386/emit.mlp +@@ -986,6 +986,7 @@ let data l = + let begin_assembly() = + reset_debug_info(); (* PR#5603 *) + float_constants := []; ++ ` .file \"{emit_string (String.escaped !Location.input_name)}\"\n`; + let lbl_begin = Compilenv.make_symbol (Some "data_begin") in + ` .data\n`; + ` .globl {emit_symbol lbl_begin}\n`; +diff --git a/asmcomp/power/emit.mlp b/asmcomp/power/emit.mlp +index 4344085..343132b 100644 +--- a/asmcomp/power/emit.mlp ++++ b/asmcomp/power/emit.mlp +@@ -887,6 +887,7 @@ let data l = + let begin_assembly() = + defined_functions := StringSet.empty; + external_functions := StringSet.empty; ++ ` .file \"{emit_string (String.escaped !Location.input_name)}\"\n`; + (* Emit the beginning of the segments *) + let lbl_begin = Compilenv.make_symbol (Some "data_begin") in + emit_string data_space; +diff --git a/asmcomp/sparc/emit.mlp b/asmcomp/sparc/emit.mlp +index 877a3d5..7b041e9 100644 +--- a/asmcomp/sparc/emit.mlp ++++ b/asmcomp/sparc/emit.mlp +@@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ let data l = + (* Beginning / end of an assembly file *) + + let begin_assembly() = ++ ` .file \"{emit_string (String.escaped !Location.input_name)}\"\n`; + let lbl_begin = Compilenv.make_symbol (Some "data_begin") in + ` .data\n`; + ` .global {emit_symbol lbl_begin}\n`; diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/ocaml-bisect-fix-camlp4-in-another-directory.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/ocaml-bisect-fix-camlp4-in-another-directory.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2056b42356 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/ocaml-bisect-fix-camlp4-in-another-directory.patch @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +From 26cac62fe0154cf65c06faaee10805531e9dade8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Julien Lepiller <julien@lepiller.eu> +Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 14:14:59 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] fix camlp4 in another directory + +--- + Makefile | 11 ++++++----- + configure | 13 ++++++++++++- + myocamlbuild.ml | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile +index 4a8ce17..d94a6d5 100644 +--- a/Makefile ++++ b/Makefile +@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ PATH_BUILD=$(PATH_BASE)/_build + PATH_OCAMLDOC=$(PATH_BASE)/ocamldoc + PATH_SRC=$(PATH_BASE)/src + PATH_TESTS=$(PATH_BASE)/tests +-PATH_INSTALL=$(PATH_OCAML_PREFIX)/lib/ocaml/bisect ++PATH_INSTALL=$(PREFIX)/lib/ocaml/bisect + + + # DEFINITIONS +@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ PATH_INSTALL=$(PATH_OCAML_PREFIX)/lib/ocaml/bisect + PROJECT_NAME=bisect + OCAMLBUILD=$(PATH_OCAML_PREFIX)/bin/ocamlbuild + OCAMLBUILD_ENV=WARNINGS=$(WARNINGS) PATH_OCAML_PREFIX=$(PATH_OCAML_PREFIX) +-OCAMLBUILD_FLAGS=-classic-display -no-links ++CAMLP4_INCLUDE=$(shell test -z $(CAMLP4_LIBDIR) || echo "-cflags -I,$(CAMLP4_LIBDIR)") ++OCAMLBUILD_FLAGS=-classic-display -no-links $(CAMLP4_INCLUDE) + MODULES_ODOCL=$(PROJECT_NAME).odocl + MODULES_MLPACK=$(PROJECT_NAME).mlpack + MODULES_MLPACK_PP=$(PROJECT_NAME)_pp.mlpack +@@ -80,11 +81,11 @@ veryclean: clean + rm -f $(PATH_OCAMLDOC)/*.html $(PATH_OCAMLDOC)/*.css + + install: FORCE +- cp $(PATH_BUILD)/src/report/report.byte $(PATH_OCAML_PREFIX)/bin/bisect-report; \ ++ cp $(PATH_BUILD)/src/report/report.byte $(PREFIX)/bin/bisect-report; \ + if [ "$(PPX)" = "TRUE" ]; then \ +- cp $(PATH_BUILD)/src/syntax/bisect_ppx.byte $(PATH_OCAML_PREFIX)/bin; \ ++ cp $(PATH_BUILD)/src/syntax/bisect_ppx.byte $(PREFIX)/bin; \ + fi; \ +- (test -x $(PATH_OCAML_PREFIX)/bin/ocamlopt && cp $(PATH_BUILD)/src/report/report.native $(PATH_OCAML_PREFIX)/bin/bisect-report.opt || true); \ ++ (test -x $(PATH_OCAML_PREFIX)/bin/ocamlopt && cp $(PATH_BUILD)/src/report/report.native $(PREFIX)/bin/bisect-report.opt || true); \ + if [ -x "$(PATH_OCAMLFIND)" ]; then \ + $(PATH_OCAMLFIND) query $(PROJECT_NAME) && $(PATH_OCAMLFIND) remove $(PROJECT_NAME) || true; \ + $(PATH_OCAMLFIND) install $(PROJECT_NAME) META -optional \ +diff --git a/configure b/configure +index bb7ebf4..61a3095 100755 +--- a/configure ++++ b/configure +@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ + # default values + ocamlbuild=`which ocamlbuild || echo '/usr/local/bin/ocamlbuild'` + bin_path=`dirname $ocamlbuild` ++prefix='' + ocaml_prefix=`dirname $bin_path` ++camlp4_prefix=`dirname $(dirname $(which camlp4of))` + ocamlfind=`which ocamlfind 2> /dev/null || echo ''` + native_dynlink='TRUE' + devel='FALSE' +@@ -32,8 +34,12 @@ ppx='FALSE' + while [ $# -gt 0 ] + do + case "$1" in ++ -prefix) ++ prefix="$2"; shift;; + -ocaml-prefix) + ocaml_prefix="$2"; shift;; ++ -camlp4-prefix) ++ camlp4_prefix="$2"; shift;; + -ocamlfind) + ocamlfind="$2"; shift;; + -no-native-dynlink) +@@ -45,7 +51,7 @@ do + -ppx) + ppx='TRUE';; + *) +- echo "usage: $0 [-ocaml-prefix <path>] [-ocamlfind <path>] [-no-native-dynlink] [-devel]"; ++ echo "usage: $0 [-prefix <path>] [-ocaml-prefix <path>] [-ocamlfind <path>] [-no-native-dynlink] [-devel]"; + exit 1;; + esac + shift +@@ -57,6 +63,9 @@ if [ "$no_camlp4" = "TRUE" -a "$ppx" = "FALSE" ]; then + exit 1 + fi + ++# prefix default value ++test -z $prefix && prefix=$ocaml_prefix ++ + # make options + make_quiet=`make -f - <<EOF + default: gnumake +@@ -67,11 +76,13 @@ EOF` + # file creation + echo "# timestamp: `date`" > Makefile.config + echo "PATH_OCAML_PREFIX=$ocaml_prefix" >> Makefile.config ++echo "PATH_CAMLP4_PREFIX=$camlp4_prefix" >> Makefile.config + echo "PATH_OCAMLFIND=$ocamlfind" >> Makefile.config + echo "NATIVE_DYNLINK=$native_dynlink" >> Makefile.config + echo "WARNINGS=$devel" >> Makefile.config + echo "NO_CAMLP4=$no_camlp4" >> Makefile.config + echo "PPX=$ppx" >> Makefile.config + echo "MAKE_QUIET=$make_quiet" >> Makefile.config ++echo "PREFIX=$prefix" >> Makefile.config + echo "" >> Makefile.config + echo 'Makefile.config successfully created' +diff --git a/myocamlbuild.ml b/myocamlbuild.ml +index 8aa25fd..09a7d48 100644 +--- a/myocamlbuild.ml ++++ b/myocamlbuild.ml +@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ let () = + | After_rules -> + let camlp4of = + try +- let path_bin = Filename.concat (Sys.getenv "PATH_OCAML_PREFIX") "bin" in ++ let path_bin = Filename.concat (Sys.getenv "PATH_CAMLP4_PREFIX") "bin" in + Filename.concat path_bin "camlp4of" + with _ -> "camlp4of" in + flag ["ocaml"; "compile"; "pp_camlp4of"] (S[A"-pp"; A camlp4of]); +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/ocaml-bitstring-fix-configure.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/ocaml-bitstring-fix-configure.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c358bf3d6b --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/ocaml-bitstring-fix-configure.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 0aaddfceeea3e89df196ab1846da54d09713a512 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Julien Lepiller <julien@lepiller.eu> +Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 21:17:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] fix configure + +--- + Makefile.in | 9 +++++---- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in +index d040f4c..85e0b38 100644 +--- a/Makefile.in ++++ b/Makefile.in +@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ BISECT_REPORT = @BISECT_REPORT@ + BYTESWAP_H = @BYTESWAP_H@ + + OCAMLLIB = @OCAMLLIB@ ++BISECTLIB = $(shell if test -z $${BISECTLIB}; then echo $(OCAMLLIB); else echo $${BISECTLIB}; fi) + top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ + + pkg_cil = @OCAML_PKG_cil@ +@@ -47,9 +48,9 @@ OCAMLOPTPACKAGES = $(OCAMLCPACKAGES) + OCAMLOPTLIBS = -linkpkg + + ifneq ($(enable_coverage),no) +-OCAMLCFLAGS += -I +bisect -pp 'camlp4o $(OCAMLLIB)/bisect/instrument.cma' ++OCAMLCFLAGS += -I +bisect -pp 'camlp4o $(BISECTLIB)/bisect/instrument.cma' + OCAMLCLIBS += -I +bisect bisect.cma +-OCAMLOPTFLAGS += -I +bisect -pp 'camlp4o $(OCAMLLIB)/bisect/instrument.cma' ++OCAMLOPTFLAGS += -I +bisect -pp 'camlp4o $(BISECTLIB)/bisect/instrument.cma' + OCAMLOPTLIBS += -I +bisect bisect.cmxa + endif + +@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ bitstring_persistent.cmi: bitstring_persistent.mli + -I +camlp4 -pp camlp4of -c $< + + pa_bitstring.cmo: pa_bitstring.ml bitstring.cma bitstring_persistent.cma +- $(OCAMLFIND) ocamlc bitstring.cma -I +camlp4 dynlink.cma camlp4lib.cma \ ++ $(OCAMLFIND) ocamlc $(OCAMLCFLAGS) bitstring.cma -I +camlp4 dynlink.cma camlp4lib.cma \ + -pp camlp4of -c $< -o $@ + + bitstring-objinfo: bitstring_objinfo.cmo bitstring.cma bitstring_persistent.cma +@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ byteswap.h: byteswap.in.h + ifeq ($(enable_coverage),no) + PP = -pp 'camlp4o bitstring.cma bitstring_persistent.cma pa_bitstring.cmo' + else +-PP = -pp 'camlp4o $(OCAMLLIB)/bisect/bisect.cma bitstring.cma bitstring_persistent.cma pa_bitstring.cmo' ++PP = -pp 'camlp4o $(BISECTLIB)/bisect/bisect.cma bitstring.cma bitstring_persistent.cma pa_bitstring.cmo' + endif + + check: test +-- +2.11.0 diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-memory-exhaustion.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-memory-exhaustion.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 91fe294ca4..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-memory-exhaustion.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -Fix a memory exhaustion bug in the key exchange, whereby an unauthenticated user -could potentially consume 38400 MB of memory on the server: - -http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q4/185 - -Patch adapted from upstream source repository: - -https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad - -From ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "markus@openbsd.org" <markus@openbsd.org> -Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2016 19:28:48 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit - -Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been -received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause -allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by -shilei-c at 360.cn - -Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05 ---- - kex.c | 3 ++- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c -index 3f97f8c..6a94bc5 100644 ---- a/kex.c -+++ b/kex.c -@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) - if (kex == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - -+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL); - ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); - if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) - return r; --- -2.10.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/python-dendropy-exclude-failing-tests.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/python-dendropy-exclude-failing-tests.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 288a58b06f..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/python-dendropy-exclude-failing-tests.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/dendropy/test/test_phylogenetic_distance_matrix.py b/dendropy/test/test_phylogenetic_distance_matrix.py -index 10c05f5..a18ba52 100644 ---- a/dendropy/test/test_phylogenetic_distance_matrix.py -+++ b/dendropy/test/test_phylogenetic_distance_matrix.py -@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ class PdmUpgmaTree(PdmTreeChecker, unittest.TestCase): - expected_tree=expected_tree) - - class NodeToNodeDistancesTest(unittest.TestCase): -- -+ @unittest.expectedFailure - def test_distances(self): - ## get distances from ape - # library(ape) -@@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ class NodeToNodeDistancesTest(unittest.TestCase): - e = reference_table[nd1.label, nd2.label] - self.assertAlmostEqual(d, e) - -+ @unittest.expectedFailure - def test_mrca(self): - test_runs = [ - "hiv1.newick", diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/python-pycrypto-CVE-2013-7459.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/python-pycrypto-CVE-2013-7459.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3570b94e9b --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/python-pycrypto-CVE-2013-7459.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +Fix CVE-2013-7459: + +https://github.com/dlitz/pycrypto/issues/176 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-7459 + +Copied from Debian: + +https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/collab-maint/python-crypto.git/commit/?id=0de2243837ed369a086f15c50cca2be85bdfab9d + +Debian adapts this upstream commit: + +https://github.com/dlitz/pycrypto/commit/8dbe0dc3eea5c689d4f76b37b93fe216cf1f00d4 + +From 8dbe0dc3eea5c689d4f76b37b93fe216cf1f00d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 22 Dec 2013 22:24:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Throw exception when IV is used with ECB or CTR + +The IV parameter is currently ignored when initializing +a cipher in ECB or CTR mode. + +For CTR mode, it is confusing: it takes some time to see +that a different parameter is needed (the counter). + +For ECB mode, it is outright dangerous. + +This patch forces an exception to be raised. +--- + lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + src/block_template.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py ++++ b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py +@@ -239,19 +239,34 @@ class RoundtripTest(unittest.TestCase): + return """%s .decrypt() output of .encrypt() should not be garbled""" % (self.module_name,) + + def runTest(self): +- for mode in (self.module.MODE_ECB, self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB, self.module.MODE_OPENPGP): ++ ++ ## ECB mode ++ mode = self.module.MODE_ECB ++ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode) ++ ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext) ++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode) ++ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext) ++ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext) ++ ++ ## OPENPGP mode ++ mode = self.module.MODE_OPENPGP ++ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) ++ eiv_ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext) ++ eiv = eiv_ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2] ++ ciphertext = eiv_ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:] ++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv) ++ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext) ++ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext) ++ ++ ## All other non-AEAD modes (but CTR) ++ for mode in (self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB): + encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) + ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext) +- +- if mode != self.module.MODE_OPENPGP: +- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) +- else: +- eiv = ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2] +- ciphertext = ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:] +- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv) ++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) + decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext) + self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext) + ++ + class PGPTest(unittest.TestCase): + def __init__(self, module, params): + unittest.TestCase.__init__(self) +--- a/src/block_template.c ++++ b/src/block_template.c +@@ -170,6 +170,17 @@ ALGnew(PyObject *self, PyObject *args, P + "Key cannot be the null string"); + return NULL; + } ++ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_ECB) ++ { ++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, "ECB mode does not use IV"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_CTR) ++ { ++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, ++ "CTR mode needs counter parameter, not IV"); ++ return NULL; ++ } + if (IVlen != BLOCK_SIZE && mode != MODE_ECB && mode != MODE_CTR) + { + PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/python-pygpgme-fix-pinentry-tests.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/python-pygpgme-fix-pinentry-tests.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1f7a4cadb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/python-pygpgme-fix-pinentry-tests.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +Fix test failure of test_XXX caused by upgrade of gpgme from 1.6.0 to +1.8.0: + +====================================================================== +FAIL: test_encrypt_to_signonly (tests.test_encrypt_decrypt.EncryptDecryptTestCase) +---------------------------------------------------------------------- +Traceback (most recent call last): + File "/tmp/guix-build-python2-pygpgme-0.3.drv-0/pygpgme-0.3/tests/test_encrypt_decrypt.py", line 185, in test_encrypt_to_signonly + self.assertEqual(exc.args[0], gpgme.ERR_SOURCE_UNKNOWN) +AssertionError: 7 != 0 + +---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Patch copied from the Debian package pygpgme-0.3-1.2: + +https://sources.debian.net/src/pygpgme/0.3-1.2/debian/patches/0005-Fix-test-failures-with-pinentry.patch/ + +From: "Dr. Tobias Quathamer" <toddy@debian.org> +Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2016 12:20:54 +0100 +Subject: Fix test failures with pinentry + +--- + tests/test_encrypt_decrypt.py | 5 +++-- + tests/test_passphrase.py | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tests/test_encrypt_decrypt.py b/tests/test_encrypt_decrypt.py +index 21ae83e..05707e1 100644 +--- a/tests/test_encrypt_decrypt.py ++++ b/tests/test_encrypt_decrypt.py +@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ class EncryptDecryptTestCase(GpgHomeTestCase): + os.write(fd, b'Symmetric passphrase\n') + ctx = gpgme.Context() + ctx.armor = True ++ ctx.pinentry_mode = gpgme.PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK + ctx.passphrase_cb = passphrase + ctx.encrypt(None, 0, plaintext, ciphertext) + self.assertTrue( +@@ -182,8 +183,8 @@ class EncryptDecryptTestCase(GpgHomeTestCase): + ctx.encrypt([recipient], gpgme.ENCRYPT_ALWAYS_TRUST, + plaintext, ciphertext) + except gpgme.GpgmeError as exc: +- self.assertEqual(exc.args[0], gpgme.ERR_SOURCE_UNKNOWN) +- self.assertEqual(exc.args[1], gpgme.ERR_GENERAL) ++ self.assertEqual(exc.args[0], gpgme.ERR_SOURCE_GPGME) ++ self.assertEqual(exc.args[1], gpgme.ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY) + else: + self.fail('gpgme.GpgmeError not raised') + +diff --git a/tests/test_passphrase.py b/tests/test_passphrase.py +index 35b3c59..05e6811 100644 +--- a/tests/test_passphrase.py ++++ b/tests/test_passphrase.py +@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ class PassphraseTestCase(GpgHomeTestCase): + ctx = gpgme.Context() + key = ctx.get_key('EFB052B4230BBBC51914BCBB54DCBBC8DBFB9EB3') + ctx.signers = [key] ++ ctx.pinentry_mode = gpgme.PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK + plaintext = BytesIO(b'Hello World\n') + signature = BytesIO() + +@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ class PassphraseTestCase(GpgHomeTestCase): + ctx = gpgme.Context() + key = ctx.get_key('EFB052B4230BBBC51914BCBB54DCBBC8DBFB9EB3') + ctx.signers = [key] ++ ctx.pinentry_mode = gpgme.PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK + ctx.passphrase_cb = self.passphrase_cb + plaintext = BytesIO(b'Hello World\n') + signature = BytesIO() diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-8576.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-8576.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5031b59d81..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-8576.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -From 20009bdaf95d10bf748fa69b104672d3cfaceddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 10:15:29 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] xhci: limit the number of link trbs we are willing to process - -Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> ---- - hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 10 ++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c -index 726435c..ee4fa48 100644 ---- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c -+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c -@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ - * to the specs when it gets them */ - #define ER_FULL_HACK - -+#define TRB_LINK_LIMIT 4 -+ - #define LEN_CAP 0x40 - #define LEN_OPER (0x400 + 0x10 * MAXPORTS) - #define LEN_RUNTIME ((MAXINTRS + 1) * 0x20) -@@ -1000,6 +1002,7 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb, - dma_addr_t *addr) - { - PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(xhci); -+ uint32_t link_cnt = 0; - - while (1) { - TRBType type; -@@ -1026,6 +1029,9 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb, - ring->dequeue += TRB_SIZE; - return type; - } else { -+ if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) { -+ return 0; -+ } - ring->dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb->parameter); - if (trb->control & TRB_LK_TC) { - ring->ccs = !ring->ccs; -@@ -1043,6 +1049,7 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring) - bool ccs = ring->ccs; - /* hack to bundle together the two/three TDs that make a setup transfer */ - bool control_td_set = 0; -+ uint32_t link_cnt = 0; - - while (1) { - TRBType type; -@@ -1058,6 +1065,9 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring) - type = TRB_TYPE(trb); - - if (type == TR_LINK) { -+ if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) { -+ return -length; -+ } - dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb.parameter); - if (trb.control & TRB_LK_TC) { - ccs = !ccs; --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-8577.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-8577.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c4132d2fb1..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-8577.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] 9pfs: fix potential host memory leak in v9fs_read -From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com> - -In 9pfs read dispatch function, it doesn't free two QEMUIOVector -object thus causing potential memory leak. This patch avoid this. - -Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com> ---- - hw/9pfs/9p.c | 5 +++-- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c -index 119ee58..543a791 100644 ---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c -+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c -@@ -1826,14 +1826,15 @@ static void v9fs_read(void *opaque) - if (len < 0) { - /* IO error return the error */ - err = len; -- goto out; -+ goto out_free_iovec; - } - } while (count < max_count && len > 0); - err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", count); - if (err < 0) { -- goto out; -+ goto out_free_iovec; - } - err += offset + count; -+out_free_iovec: - qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov); - qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full); - } else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) { --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-8578.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-8578.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 92ba365727..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-8578.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -From: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com> - -In 9pfs function v9fs_iov_vunmarshal, it will not allocate space -for empty string. This will cause several NULL pointer dereference -issues. this patch fix this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@gmail.com> ---- - fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c -index 663cad5..1d16f8d 100644 ---- a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c -+++ b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c -@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ ssize_t v9fs_iov_vunmarshal(struct iovec *out_sg, int out_num, size_t offset, - str->data = g_malloc(str->size + 1); - copied = v9fs_unpack(str->data, out_sg, out_num, offset, - str->size); -- if (copied > 0) { -+ if (copied >= 0) { - str->data[str->size] = 0; - } else { - v9fs_string_free(str); --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/ruby-yard-fix-skip-of-markdown-tests.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/ruby-yard-fix-skip-of-markdown-tests.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f592f5cd51..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/ruby-yard-fix-skip-of-markdown-tests.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17 +0,0 @@ -The tests currently fail due to use of 'skip' rather than 'pending' to skip a -test usually not skipped by upstream. This patch has been proposed upstream -at https://github.com/lsegal/yard/pull/1033 - -diff --git a/spec/templates/helpers/html_helper_spec.rb b/spec/templates/helpers/html_helper_spec.rb -index 84624c3..9c4fc2b 100644 ---- a/spec/templates/helpers/html_helper_spec.rb -+++ b/spec/templates/helpers/html_helper_spec.rb -@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ describe YARD::Templates::Helpers::HtmlHelper do - it "creates tables (markdown specific)" do - log.enter_level(Logger::FATAL) do - unless markup_class(:markdown).to_s == "RedcarpetCompat" -- skip "This test depends on a markdown engine that supports tables" -+ pending "This test depends on a markdown engine that supports tables" - end - end - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/slock-CVE-2016-6866.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/slock-CVE-2016-6866.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2f94b8c1a9..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/slock-CVE-2016-6866.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -Fix CVE-2016-6866. - -https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-6866 -https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-6866 - -Copied from upstream source repository: -http://git.suckless.org/slock/commit/?id=d8bec0f6fdc8a246d78cb488a0068954b46fcb29 - -From d8bec0f6fdc8a246d78cb488a0068954b46fcb29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Markus Teich <markus.teich@stusta.mhn.de> -Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 22:59:06 +0000 -Subject: fix CVE-2016-6866 - ---- -diff --git a/slock.c b/slock.c -index 847b328..8ed59ca 100644 ---- a/slock.c -+++ b/slock.c -@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ readpw(Display *dpy) - readpw(Display *dpy, const char *pws) - #endif - { -- char buf[32], passwd[256]; -+ char buf[32], passwd[256], *encrypted; - int num, screen; - unsigned int len, color; - KeySym ksym; -@@ -159,7 +159,11 @@ readpw(Display *dpy, const char *pws) - #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH - running = !auth_userokay(getlogin(), NULL, "auth-slock", passwd); - #else -- running = !!strcmp(crypt(passwd, pws), pws); -+ errno = 0; -+ if (!(encrypted = crypt(passwd, pws))) -+ fprintf(stderr, "slock: crypt: %s\n", strerror(errno)); -+ else -+ running = !!strcmp(encrypted, pws); - #endif - if (running) { - XBell(dpy, 100); -@@ -312,6 +316,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) { - - #ifndef HAVE_BSD_AUTH - pws = getpw(); -+ if (strlen(pws) < 2) -+ die("slock: failed to get user password hash.\n"); - #endif - - if (!(dpy = XOpenDisplay(NULL))) --- -cgit v0.9.0.3-65-g4555 diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..badd1b8ed6 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unrtf-CVE-2016-10091.patch @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-10091 (stack-based buffer overflows in cmd_* functions): + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-10091 +https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=849705 +http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q4/787 + +Patch adapted from Debian: + +https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/collab-maint/unrtf.git/commit/?h=jessie&id=7500a48fb0fbad3ab963fb17560b2f90a8a485c8 + +The Debian patch adapts this upstream commit so that it can be applied +to the 0.21.9 release tarball: + +http://hg.savannah.gnu.org/hgweb/unrtf/rev/3b16893a6406 + +From 7dd568ed8a6a5acb6c04f2b40f457d63a00435f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willi Mann <willi@debian.org> +Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2016 20:31:38 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Add patch from upstream to fix CVE-2016-10091 (buffer + overflow in various cmd_ functions) + +diff --git a/src/attr.c b/src/attr.c +index 02b5c81..e2951ea 100644 +--- a/src/attr.c ++++ b/src/attr.c +@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ char * + assemble_string(char *string, int nr) + { + +- char *s, tmp[12];/* Number of characters that can be in int type (including '\0') - AF */ ++ char *s, tmp[20]; + int i = 0, j = 0; + + if (string == NULL) +@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ assemble_string(char *string, int nr) + } + + if (string[i] != '\0') { +- sprintf(tmp, "%d", nr); ++ snprintf(tmp, 20, "%d", nr); + strcpy(&s[j], tmp); + j = j + strlen(tmp); + } +diff --git a/src/convert.c b/src/convert.c +index c76d7d6..8eacdcb 100644 +--- a/src/convert.c ++++ b/src/convert.c +@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static const int fcharsetparmtocp(int parm) + } + + // Translate code page to encoding name hopefully suitable as iconv input +-static char *cptoencoding(parm) ++static char *cptoencoding(int parm) + { + // Note that CP0 is supposed to mean current system default, which does + // not make any sense as a stored value, we don't handle it. +@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ cmd_cf (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num) + } + else + { +- sprintf(str,"#%02x%02x%02x", ++ snprintf(str, 40, "#%02x%02x%02x", + color_table[num].r, + color_table[num].g, + color_table[num].b); +@@ -993,7 +993,7 @@ cmd_cb (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num) + } + else + { +- sprintf(str,"#%02x%02x%02x", ++ snprintf(str, 40, "#%02x%02x%02x", + color_table[num].r, + color_table[num].g, + color_table[num].b); +@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ cmd_fs (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int points) { + /* Note, fs20 means 10pt */ + points /= 2; + +- sprintf(str,"%d",points); ++ snprintf(str, 20, "%d", points); + attr_push(ATTR_FONTSIZE,str); + + return FALSE; +@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ cmd_f (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num) + { + // TOBEDONE: WHAT'S THIS ??? + name = my_malloc(12); +- sprintf(name, "%d", num); ++ snprintf(name, 12, "%d", num); + } + + /* we are going to output entities, so should not output font */ +@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ cmd_highlight (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int num) + } + else + { +- sprintf(str,"#%02x%02x%02x", ++ snprintf(str, 40, "#%02x%02x%02x", + color_table[num].r, + color_table[num].g, + color_table[num].b); +@@ -1373,9 +1373,9 @@ cmd_ftech (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + + static int + cmd_expand (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { +- char str[10]; ++ char str[20]; + if (has_param) { +- sprintf(str, "%d", param/4); ++ snprintf(str, 20, "%d", param / 4); + if (!param) + attr_pop(ATTR_EXPAND); + else +@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ cmd_expand (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + + static int + cmd_emboss (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { +- char str[10]; ++ char str[20]; + if (has_param && !param) + #ifdef SUPPORT_UNNESTED + attr_find_pop(ATTR_EMBOSS); +@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ cmd_emboss (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + #endif + else + { +- sprintf(str, "%d", param); ++ snprintf(str, 20, "%d", param); + attr_push(ATTR_EMBOSS, str); + } + return FALSE; +@@ -1419,12 +1419,12 @@ cmd_emboss (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + + static int + cmd_engrave (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { +- char str[10]; ++ char str[20]; + if (has_param && !param) + attr_pop(ATTR_ENGRAVE); + else + { +- sprintf(str, "%d", param); ++ snprintf(str, 20, "%d", param); + attr_push(ATTR_ENGRAVE, str); + } + return FALSE; +@@ -1976,7 +1976,7 @@ static int cmd_u (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + + short done=0; + long unicode_number = (long) param; /* On 16bit architectures int is too small to store unicode characters. - AF */ +- char tmp[12]; /* Number of characters that can be in int type (including '\0'). If int size is greater than 4 bytes change this value. - AF */ ++ char tmp[20]; /* Number of characters that can be in int type (including '\0'). If int size is greater than 4 bytes change this value. - AF */ + const char *alias; + #define DEBUG 0 + #if DEBUG +@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int cmd_u (Word *w, int align, char has_param, int param) { + /* RTF spec: Unicode values beyond 32767 are represented by negative numbers */ + unicode_number += 65536; + } +- sprintf(tmp, "%ld", unicode_number); ++ snprintf(tmp, 20, "%ld", unicode_number); + + if (safe_printf(1, op->unisymbol_print, tmp)) fprintf(stderr, TOO_MANY_ARGS, "unisymbol_print"); + done++; +diff --git a/src/output.c b/src/output.c +index 86d8b5c..4cdbfa6 100644 +--- a/src/output.c ++++ b/src/output.c +@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ op_begin_std_fontsize (OutputPersonality *op, int size) + if (!found_std_expr) { + if (op->fontsize_begin) { + char expr[16]; +- sprintf (expr, "%d", size); ++ snprintf(expr, 16, "%d", size); + if (safe_printf (1, op->fontsize_begin, expr)) fprintf(stderr, TOO_MANY_ARGS, "fontsize_begin"); + } else { + /* If we cannot write out a change for the exact +@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ op_end_std_fontsize (OutputPersonality *op, int size) + if (!found_std_expr) { + if (op->fontsize_end) { + char expr[16]; +- sprintf (expr, "%d", size); ++ snprintf(expr, 16, "%d", size); + if (safe_printf(1, op->fontsize_end, expr)) fprintf(stderr, TOO_MANY_ARGS, "fontsize_end"); + } else { + /* If we cannot write out a change for the exact +- +.11.0 + |