gnu: openssh: Update to 7.3p1.

* gnu/packages/ssh.scm (openssh): Update to 7.3p1.
[source]: Remove patches.
* gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.

4 files changed, 0 insertions, 316 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8063e64ea7..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2016 10:39:57 +1000
-Subject: ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes
-
-If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables
-and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may
-attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables
-set via PAM.
-
-CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh, via Colin Watson
----
- session.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 4859245..4653b09 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
- 	 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
- 	 * been set by PAM.
- 	 */
--	if (options.use_pam) {
-+	if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
- 		char **p;
- 
- 		p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
--- 
-cgit v0.11.2
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9b46ec12a9..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-From e5ef9d3942cebda819a6fd81647b51c8d87d23df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 13:32:45 +1000
-Subject: Determine appropriate salt for invalid users.
-
-When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses
-the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the
-password supplied by the client.  That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on
-systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid
-salt, and even on those that do it may have significantly different timing
-from the hash methods used for real accounts (eg sha512).  This allows
-user enumeration by, eg, sending large password strings.  This was noted
-by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com (CVE-2016-6210).
-
-To mitigate, use the same hash algorithm that root uses for hashing
-passwords for users that do not exist on the system.  ok djm@
-
-Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc
-Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902
-Last-Update: 2016-07-22
-
-Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-1.patch
----
- auth-passwd.c           | 12 ++++++++----
- openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-passwd.c b/auth-passwd.c
-index 63ccf3c..530b5d4 100644
---- a/auth-passwd.c
-+++ b/auth-passwd.c
-@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int
- sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- {
- 	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
--	char *encrypted_password;
-+	char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
- 
- 	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
- 	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
-@@ -202,9 +202,13 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
- 		return (1);
- 
--	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
--	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password,
--	    (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx");
-+	/*
-+	 * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
-+	 * NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
-+	 */
-+	if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
-+		salt = pw_password;
-+	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
-index 8577cbd..8913bb8 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
- #include "includes.h"
- 
- #include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- 
-@@ -62,11 +63,44 @@
- #  define crypt DES_crypt
- # endif
- 
-+/*
-+ * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
-+ * system.
-+ */
-+static const char *
-+pick_salt(void)
-+{
-+	struct passwd *pw;
-+	char *passwd, *p;
-+	size_t typelen;
-+	static char salt[32];
-+
-+	if (salt[0] != '\0')
-+		return salt;
-+	strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
-+	if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
-+		return salt;
-+	passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
-+	if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL)
-+		return salt;  /* no $, DES */
-+	typelen = p - passwd + 1;
-+	strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
-+	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
-+	return salt;
-+}
-+
- char *
- xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
- {
- 	char *crypted;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for
-+	 * for timing purposes.  Pick an appropriate salt.
-+	 */
-+	if (salt == NULL)
-+		salt = pick_salt();
-+
- # ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
-         if (is_md5_salt(salt))
-                 crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt);
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1c580f90b9..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-From dde63f7f998ac3812a26bbb2c1b2947f24fcd060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 13:49:44 +1000
-Subject: Mitigate timing of disallowed users PAM logins.
-
-When sshd decides to not allow a login (eg PermitRootLogin=no) and
-it's using PAM, it sends a fake password to PAM so that the timing for
-the failure is not noticeably different whether or not the password
-is correct.  This behaviour can be detected by sending a very long
-password string which is slower to hash than the fake password.
-
-Mitigate by constructing an invalid password that is the same length
-as the one from the client and thus takes the same time to hash.
-Diff from djm@
-
-Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946
-Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902
-Last-Update: 2016-07-22
-
-Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-2.patch
----
- auth-pam.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
-index 8425af1..abd6a5e 100644
---- a/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/auth-pam.c
-@@ -232,7 +232,6 @@ static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
- static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
- static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
- static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
--static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
- 
- /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
- #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
-@@ -810,12 +809,35 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
- 	return (-1);
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
-+ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
-+ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
-+ */
-+static char *
-+fake_password(const char *wire_password)
-+{
-+	const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
-+	char *ret = NULL;
-+	size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
-+
-+	if (l >= INT_MAX)
-+		fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
-+
-+	ret = malloc(l + 1);
-+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
-+		ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
-+	ret[i] = '\0';
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
- static int
- sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
- {
- 	Buffer buffer;
- 	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
-+	char *fake;
- 
- 	debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
- 	switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
-@@ -836,8 +858,11 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
- 	    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
- 	    options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES))
- 		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp);
--	else
--		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw);
-+	else {
-+		fake = fake_password(*resp);
-+		buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, fake);
-+		free(fake);
-+	}
- 	if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) {
- 		buffer_free(&buffer);
- 		return (-1);
-@@ -1181,6 +1206,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- {
- 	int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
- 	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
-+	char *fake = NULL;
- 
- 	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
- 		fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
-@@ -1196,7 +1222,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 	 */
- 	if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- 	    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
--		sshpam_password = badpw;
-+		sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
- 
- 	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
- 	    (const void *)&passwd_conv);
-@@ -1206,6 +1232,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 
- 	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
- 	sshpam_password = NULL;
-+	free(fake);
- 	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
- 		debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
- 		    authctxt->user);
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 303c34ee1b..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-From abde8dda29c2db2405d6fbca2fe022430e2c1177 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 14:17:31 +1000
-Subject: Search users for one with a valid salt.
-
-If the root account is locked (eg password "!!" or "*LK*") keep looking
-until we find a user with a valid salt to use for crypting passwords of
-invalid users.  ok djm@
-
-Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=dbf788b4d9d9490a5fff08a7b09888272bb10fcc
-Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902
-Last-Update: 2016-07-22
-
-Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-3.patch
----
- openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
-index 8913bb8..cf6a9b9 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
-@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@
- 
- /*
-  * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
-- * system.
-+ * system by searching through accounts until we find one that has a valid
-+ * salt.  Usually this will be root unless the root account is locked out.
-+ * If we don't find one we return a traditional DES-based salt.
-  */
- static const char *
- pick_salt(void)
-@@ -78,14 +80,18 @@ pick_salt(void)
- 	if (salt[0] != '\0')
- 		return salt;
- 	strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
--	if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
--		return salt;
--	passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
--	if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL)
--		return salt;  /* no $, DES */
--	typelen = p - passwd + 1;
--	strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
--	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
-+	setpwent();
-+	while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
-+		passwd = shadow_pw(pw);
-+		if (passwd[0] == '$' && (p = strrchr(passwd+1, '$')) != NULL) {
-+			typelen = p - passwd + 1;
-+			strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
-+			explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+ out:
-+	endpwent();
- 	return salt;
- }
-