gnu: Remove nss/fixed.

The merge preceding this commit ignored the nss replacement added in commit
7bc396bf353c5550c49b3f8791b34072ba417d90.  This commit removes the remaining
bits, because the fix is already present in nss@3.52.1.

* gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch: Delete file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly.
* gnu/packages/nss.scm (nss/fixed): Remove variable.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 138 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0d91b655e2..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2020-12399 (Timing attack on DSA signature generation: NSS has
-shown timing differences when performing DSA signatures, which was
-exploitable and could eventually leak private keys.)
-
-Copied from upstream:
-<https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/daa823a4a29bcef0fec33a379ec83857429aea2e>
-but with "nss/" inserted into the file name to patch.
-
-# HG changeset patch
-# User Robert Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com>
-# Date 1589907685 0
-# Node ID daa823a4a29bcef0fec33a379ec83857429aea2e
-# Parent  d2cfb4ccdf167e5ea06d2bb5bc39c50f789929c8
-Bug 1631576 - Force a fixed length for DSA exponentiation r=pereida,bbrumley
-
-Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D72011
-
-diff --git a/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c b/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
---- a/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
-+++ b/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
-@@ -308,23 +308,24 @@ DSA_NewKeyFromSeed(const PQGParams *para
-     SECItem seedItem;
-     seedItem.data = (unsigned char *)seed;
-     seedItem.len = PQG_GetLength(&params->subPrime);
-     return dsa_NewKeyExtended(params, &seedItem, privKey);
- }
- 
- static SECStatus
- dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
--               const unsigned char *kb)
-+               const unsigned char *kbytes)
- {
-     mp_int p, q, g; /* PQG parameters */
-     mp_int x, k;    /* private key & pseudo-random integer */
-     mp_int r, s;    /* tuple (r, s) is signature) */
-     mp_int t;       /* holding tmp values */
-     mp_int ar;      /* holding blinding values */
-+    mp_digit fuzz;  /* blinding multiplier for q */
-     mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
-     SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-     unsigned int dsa_subprime_len, dsa_signature_len, offset;
-     SECItem localDigest;
-     unsigned char localDigestData[DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN];
-     SECItem t2 = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
- 
-     /* FIPS-compliance dictates that digest is a SHA hash. */
-@@ -368,31 +369,46 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&x));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&k));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&t));
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&ar));
-+
-     /*
-     ** Convert stored PQG and private key into MPI integers.
-     */
-     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.prime, &p);
-     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.subPrime, &q);
-     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.base, &g);
-     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateValue, &x);
--    OCTETS_TO_MPINT(kb, &k, dsa_subprime_len);
-+    OCTETS_TO_MPINT(kbytes, &k, dsa_subprime_len);
-+
-+    /* k blinding  create a single value that has the high bit set in
-+     * the mp_digit*/
-+    if (RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(&fuzz, sizeof(mp_digit)) != SECSuccess) {
-+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-+        rv = SECFailure;
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+    fuzz |= 1ULL << ((sizeof(mp_digit) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1));
-     /*
-     ** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 1
-     **
-     ** r = (g**k mod p) mod q
-     */
--    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &k, &p, &r)); /* r = g**k mod p */
--    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&r, &q, &r));         /* r = r mod q    */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul_d(&q, fuzz, &t)); /* t = q*fuzz */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&k, &t, &t));     /* t = k+q*fuzz */
-+    /* length of t is now fixed, bits in k have been blinded */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &t, &p, &r)); /* r = g**t mod p */
-+    /* r is now g**(k+q*fuzz) == g**k mod p */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&r, &q, &r)); /* r = r mod q    */
-+
-     /*
-     ** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 2
-     **
-     ** s = (k**-1 * (HASH(M) + x*r)) mod q
-     */
-     if (DSA_NewRandom(NULL, &key->params.subPrime, &t2) != SECSuccess) {
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-         rv = SECFailure;
-@@ -406,25 +422,34 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
-         goto cleanup;
-     }
-     SECITEM_TO_MPINT(t2, &ar); /* ar <-$ Zq */
-     SECITEM_FreeItem(&t2, PR_FALSE);
- 
-     /* Using mp_invmod on k directly would leak bits from k. */
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&k, &ar, &k));       /* k = k * ar */
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
--    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k));     /* k = k**-1 mod q */
-+    /* k is now k*t*ar */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k)); /* k = k**-1 mod q */
-+    /* k is now (k*t*ar)**-1 */
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
--    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s);       /* s = HASH(M)     */
-+    /* k is now (k*ar)**-1 */
-+    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s); /* s = HASH(M)     */
-     /* To avoid leaking secret bits here the addition is blinded. */
--    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x));        /* x = x * ar */
--    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x));  /* x = x * r mod q */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x)); /* x = x * ar */
-+    /* x is now x*ar */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x)); /* x = x * r mod q */
-+    /* x is now x*r*ar */
-     CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &ar, &q, &t)); /* t = s * ar mod q */
--    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s));         /* s = t + x */
--    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s));  /* s = s * k mod q */
-+    /* t is now hash(M)*ar */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s)); /* s = t + x */
-+    /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar */
-+    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s)); /* s = s * k mod q */
-+    /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar*(k*ar)**-1 = (k**-1)*(HASH(M)+x*r) */
-+
-     /*
-     ** verify r != 0 and s != 0
-     ** mentioned as optional in FIPS 186-1.
-     */
-     if (mp_cmp_z(&r) == 0 || mp_cmp_z(&s) == 0) {
-         PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
-         rv = SECFailure;
-         goto cleanup;
-