Merge branch 'master' into core-updates

27 files changed, 691 insertions, 716 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libunwind-CVE-2015-3239.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libunwind-CVE-2015-3239.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f11ac7337
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libunwind-CVE-2015-3239.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1232265
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libunwind.git/tree/libunwind-1.1-fix-CVE-2015-3239.patch
+
+diff -up libunwind-1.1/include/dwarf_i.h.CVE20153239 libunwind-1.1/include/dwarf_i.h
+--- libunwind-1.1/include/dwarf_i.h.CVE20153239	2015-07-10 13:38:36.404996748 -0400
++++ libunwind-1.1/include/dwarf_i.h	2015-07-10 13:39:25.050707613 -0400
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
+ extern const uint8_t dwarf_to_unw_regnum_map[DWARF_REGNUM_MAP_LENGTH];
+ /* REG is evaluated multiple times; it better be side-effects free!  */
+ # define dwarf_to_unw_regnum(reg)					  \
+-  (((reg) <= DWARF_REGNUM_MAP_LENGTH) ? dwarf_to_unw_regnum_map[reg] : 0)
++  (((reg) < DWARF_REGNUM_MAP_LENGTH) ? dwarf_to_unw_regnum_map[reg] : 0)
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef UNW_LOCAL_ONLY
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CAN-2004-0941.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CAN-2004-0941.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..84dd9baee6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CAN-2004-0941.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CAN-2004-0941.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_png.c	2004-11-11 14:02:37.407589824 -0500
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_png.c	2004-11-11 14:04:29.672522960 -0500
+@@ -188,6 +188,14 @@
+ 
+   png_get_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, &width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
+ 		&interlace_type, NULL, NULL);
++  if (overflow2(sizeof (int), width)) 
++    {
++      return NULL;
++    }
++  if (overflow2(sizeof (int) * width, height)) 
++    {
++      return NULL;
++    }  
+   if ((color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB) ||
+       (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA))
+     {
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-0455.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-0455.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ceefc75bf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-0455.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-0455.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdft.c	2010-12-06 11:18:26.000000000 +0000
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdft.c	2010-12-06 11:21:09.000000000 +0000
+@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@
+ 	    {
+ 	      ch = c & 0xFF;	/* don't extend sign */
+ 	    }
+-	  next++;
++	  if (*next) next++;
+ 	}
+       else
+ 	{
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-2756.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-2756.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..feafac535a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-2756.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-2756.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_png.c	1 Apr 2007 20:41:01 -0000	1.21.2.1
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_png.c	16 May 2007 19:06:11 -0000
+@@ -78,8 +78,11 @@
+ gdPngReadData (png_structp png_ptr,
+ 	       png_bytep data, png_size_t length)
+ {
+-  gdGetBuf (data, length, (gdIOCtx *)
+-	    png_get_io_ptr (png_ptr));
++  int check;
++  check = gdGetBuf (data, length, (gdIOCtx *) png_get_io_ptr (png_ptr));
++  if (check != length) {
++    png_error(png_ptr, "Read Error: truncated data");
++  }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3472.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3472.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..180bdb5fc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3472.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+Based on a patch from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-3472.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
+@@ -106,6 +106,18 @@
+   gdImagePtr im;
+   unsigned long cpa_size;
+ 
++  if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  if (overflow2(sizeof (int *), sy)) {
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
++  if (overflow2(sizeof(int), sx)) {
++    return NULL;
++  }
++
+   im = (gdImage *) gdMalloc (sizeof (gdImage));
+   if (im == 0) return 0;
+   memset (im, 0, sizeof (gdImage));
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdhelpers.c	2010-12-06 11:47:31.000000000 +0000
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdhelpers.c	2010-12-06 11:48:04.000000000 +0000
+@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
+ #include "gdhelpers.h"
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ /* TBB: gd_strtok_r is not portable; provide an implementation */
+ 
+@@ -94,3 +95,18 @@
+ {
+   free (ptr);
+ }
++
++int overflow2(int a, int b)
++{
++	if(a < 0 || b < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "gd warning: one parameter to a memory allocation multiplication is negative, failing operation gracefully\n");
++		return 1;
++	}
++	if(b == 0)
++		return 0;
++	if(a > INT_MAX / b) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "gd warning: product of memory allocation multiplication would exceed INT_MAX, failing operation gracefully\n");
++		return 1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdhelpers.h	2010-12-06 11:47:17.000000000 +0000
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gdhelpers.h	2010-12-06 11:48:36.000000000 +0000
+@@ -15,4 +15,6 @@
+ void *gdMalloc(size_t size);
+ void *gdRealloc(void *ptr, size_t size);
+ 
++int overflow2(int a, int b);
++
+ #endif /* GDHELPERS_H */
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3473.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3473.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cb96c94a47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3473.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-3473.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
+@@ -2483,6 +2483,10 @@ BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromXbm (FILE * fd)
+     }
+   bytes = (w * h / 8) + 1;
+   im = gdImageCreate (w, h);
++  if (!im) {
++    return 0;
++  }
++
+   gdImageColorAllocate (im, 255, 255, 255);
+   gdImageColorAllocate (im, 0, 0, 0);
+   x = 0;
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3477.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3477.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e9f6f4278b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2007-3477.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2007-3477.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd.c
+@@ -1335,10 +1335,31 @@
+   int w2, h2;
+   w2 = w / 2;
+   h2 = h / 2;
+-  while (e < s)
+-    {
+-      e += 360;
+-    }
++
++  if ((s % 360)  == (e % 360)) {
++         s = 0; e = 360;
++  } else {
++         if (s > 360) {
++                 s = s % 360;
++         }
++
++         if (e > 360) {
++                 e = e % 360;
++         }
++
++         while (s < 0) {
++                 s += 360;
++         }
++
++         while (e < s) {
++                 e += 360;
++         }
++
++         if (s == e) {
++                 s = 0; e = 360;
++         }
++  }
++
+   for (i = s; (i <= e); i++)
+     {
+       int x, y;
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2009-3546.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2009-3546.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ef76fe0736
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2009-3546.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2009-3546.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_gd.c	2010-12-06 14:56:06.000000000 +0000
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/extra/gd/gd_gd.c	2010-12-06 14:57:04.000000000 +0000
+@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
+ 	    {
+ 	      goto fail1;
+ 	    }
++	  if (&im->colorsTotal > gdMaxColors)
++	    {
++	      goto fail1;
++	    }
+ 	}
+       /* Int to accommodate truecolor single-color transparency */
+       if (!gdGetInt (&im->transparent, in))
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+4588+4695+4696.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+4588+4695+4696.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 091fc8bb41..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+4588+4695+4696.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2015-0848, CVE-2015-4588, CVE-2015-4695, and CVE-2015-4696.
-Copied from Debian.
-
---- libwmf-0.2.8.4.orig/src/player/meta.h
-+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
-@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ static int meta_rgn_create (wmfAPI* API,
- 	objects = P->objects;
- 
- 	i = 0;
--	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
-+	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
- 
- 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
- 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
-@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ static int meta_dib_brush (wmfAPI* API,w
- 	objects = P->objects;
- 
- 	i = 0;
--	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
-+	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
- 
- 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
- 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
-@@ -2593,9 +2593,10 @@ static int meta_dc_restore (wmfAPI* API,
- 		polyrect.BR = 0;
- 
- 		polyrect.count = 0;
-+	
-+		if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
- 	}
- 
--	if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
- 
- 	return (changed);
- }
-@@ -3067,7 +3068,7 @@ static int meta_pen_create (wmfAPI* API,
- 	objects = P->objects;
- 
- 	i = 0;
--	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
-+	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
- 
- 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
- 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
-@@ -3181,7 +3182,7 @@ static int meta_brush_create (wmfAPI* AP
- 	objects = P->objects;
- 
- 	i = 0;
--	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
-+	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
- 
- 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
- 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
-@@ -3288,7 +3289,7 @@ static int meta_font_create (wmfAPI* API
- 	objects = P->objects;
- 
- 	i = 0;
--	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
-+	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
- 
- 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
- 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
-@@ -3396,7 +3397,7 @@ static int meta_palette_create (wmfAPI*
- 	objects = P->objects;
- 
- 	i = 0;
--	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
-+	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
- 
- 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
- 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
---- libwmf-0.2.8.4.orig/src/ipa/ipa.h
-+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa.h
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static int            ReadBlobByte (BMPS
- static unsigned short ReadBlobLSBShort (BMPSource*);
- static unsigned long  ReadBlobLSBLong (BMPSource*);
- static long           TellBlob (BMPSource*);
--static void           DecodeImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*,unsigned int,unsigned char*);
-+static int            DecodeImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*,unsigned int,unsigned char*);
- static void           ReadBMPImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*);
- static int            ExtractColor (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,wmfRGB*,unsigned int,unsigned int);
- static void           SetColor (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,wmfRGB*,unsigned char,unsigned int,unsigned int);
---- libwmf-0.2.8.4.orig/src/ipa/ipa/bmp.h
-+++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa/bmp.h
-@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static long TellBlob (BMPSource* src)
- %
- %
- */
--static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmfBMP* bmp,BMPSource* src,unsigned int compression,unsigned char* pixels)
-+static int DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmfBMP* bmp,BMPSource* src,unsigned int compression,unsigned char* pixels)
- {	int byte;
- 	int count;
- 	int i;
-@@ -870,12 +870,14 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
- 	U32 u;
- 
- 	unsigned char* q;
-+	unsigned char* end;
- 
- 	for (u = 0; u < ((U32) bmp->width * (U32) bmp->height); u++) pixels[u] = 0;
- 
- 	byte = 0;
- 	x = 0;
- 	q = pixels;
-+	end = pixels + bmp->width * bmp->height;
- 
- 	for (y = 0; y < bmp->height; )
- 	{	count = ReadBlobByte (src);
-@@ -884,7 +886,10 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
- 		{	/* Encoded mode. */
- 			byte = ReadBlobByte (src);
- 			for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
--			{	if (compression == 1)
-+			{	
-+				if (q == end)
-+					return 0;
-+			 	if (compression == 1)
- 				{	(*(q++)) = (unsigned char) byte;
- 				}
- 				else
-@@ -896,13 +901,15 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
- 		else
- 		{	/* Escape mode. */
- 			count = ReadBlobByte (src);
--			if (count == 0x01) return;
-+			if (count == 0x01) return 1;
- 			switch (count)
- 			{
- 			case 0x00:
- 			 {	/* End of line. */
- 				x = 0;
- 				y++;
-+				if (y >= bmp->height)
-+					return 0;
- 				q = pixels + y * bmp->width;
- 				break;
- 			 }
-@@ -910,13 +917,20 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
- 			 {	/* Delta mode. */
- 				x += ReadBlobByte (src);
- 				y += ReadBlobByte (src);
-+				if (y >= bmp->height)
-+					return 0;
-+				if (x >= bmp->width)
-+					return 0;
- 				q = pixels + y * bmp->width + x;
- 				break;
- 			 }
- 			default:
- 			 {	/* Absolute mode. */
- 				for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
--				{	if (compression == 1)
-+				{
-+					if (q == end)
-+						return 0;
-+					if (compression == 1)
- 					{	(*(q++)) = ReadBlobByte (src);
- 					}
- 					else
-@@ -943,7 +957,7 @@ static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmf
- 	byte = ReadBlobByte (src);  /* end of line */
- 	byte = ReadBlobByte (src);
- 
--	return;
-+	return 1;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -1143,8 +1157,18 @@ static void ReadBMPImage (wmfAPI* API,wm
- 		}
- 	}
- 	else
--	{	/* Convert run-length encoded raster pixels. */
--		DecodeImage (API,bmp,src,(unsigned int) bmp_info.compression,data->image);
-+	{
-+		if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 8)	/* Convert run-length encoded raster pixels. */
-+		{
-+			if (!DecodeImage (API,bmp,src,(unsigned int) bmp_info.compression,data->image))
-+			{	WMF_ERROR (API,"corrupt bmp");
-+				API->err = wmf_E_BadFormat;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		else
-+		{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Unexpected pixel depth");
-+			API->err = wmf_E_BadFormat;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	if (ERR (API))
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+CVE-2015-4588.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+CVE-2015-4588.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..871be1d267
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-0848+CVE-2015-4588.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2015-0848+CVE-2015-4588.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa/bmp.h	2015-06-08 14:46:24.591876404 +0100
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa/bmp.h	2015-06-08 14:46:35.345993247 +0100
+@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@
+ %
+ %
+ */
+-static void DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmfBMP* bmp,BMPSource* src,unsigned int compression,unsigned char* pixels)
++static int DecodeImage (wmfAPI* API,wmfBMP* bmp,BMPSource* src,unsigned int compression,unsigned char* pixels)
+ {	int byte;
+ 	int count;
+ 	int i;
+@@ -870,12 +870,14 @@
+ 	U32 u;
+ 
+ 	unsigned char* q;
++	unsigned char* end;
+ 
+ 	for (u = 0; u < ((U32) bmp->width * (U32) bmp->height); u++) pixels[u] = 0;
+ 
+ 	byte = 0;
+ 	x = 0;
+ 	q = pixels;
++	end = pixels + bmp->width * bmp->height;
+ 
+ 	for (y = 0; y < bmp->height; )
+ 	{	count = ReadBlobByte (src);
+@@ -884,7 +886,10 @@
+ 		{	/* Encoded mode. */
+ 			byte = ReadBlobByte (src);
+ 			for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+-			{	if (compression == 1)
++			{	
++				if (q == end)
++					return 0;
++			 	if (compression == 1)
+ 				{	(*(q++)) = (unsigned char) byte;
+ 				}
+ 				else
+@@ -896,13 +901,15 @@
+ 		else
+ 		{	/* Escape mode. */
+ 			count = ReadBlobByte (src);
+-			if (count == 0x01) return;
++			if (count == 0x01) return 1;
+ 			switch (count)
+ 			{
+ 			case 0x00:
+ 			 {	/* End of line. */
+ 				x = 0;
+ 				y++;
++				if (y >= bmp->height)
++					return 0;
+ 				q = pixels + y * bmp->width;
+ 				break;
+ 			 }
+@@ -910,13 +917,20 @@
+ 			 {	/* Delta mode. */
+ 				x += ReadBlobByte (src);
+ 				y += ReadBlobByte (src);
++				if (y >= bmp->height)
++					return 0;
++				if (x >= bmp->width)
++					return 0;
+ 				q = pixels + y * bmp->width + x;
+ 				break;
+ 			 }
+ 			default:
+ 			 {	/* Absolute mode. */
+ 				for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+-				{	if (compression == 1)
++				{
++					if (q == end)
++						return 0;
++					if (compression == 1)
+ 					{	(*(q++)) = ReadBlobByte (src);
+ 					}
+ 					else
+@@ -943,7 +957,7 @@
+ 	byte = ReadBlobByte (src);  /* end of line */
+ 	byte = ReadBlobByte (src);
+ 
+-	return;
++	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1143,8 +1157,18 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	else
+-	{	/* Convert run-length encoded raster pixels. */
+-		DecodeImage (API,bmp,src,(unsigned int) bmp_info.compression,data->image);
++	{
++		if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 8)	/* Convert run-length encoded raster pixels. */
++		{
++			if (!DecodeImage (API,bmp,src,(unsigned int) bmp_info.compression,data->image))
++			{	WMF_ERROR (API,"corrupt bmp");
++				API->err = wmf_E_BadFormat;
++			}
++		}
++		else
++		{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Unexpected pixel depth");
++			API->err = wmf_E_BadFormat;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (ERR (API))
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa.h	2015-06-08 14:46:24.590876393 +0100
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/ipa/ipa.h	2015-06-08 14:46:35.345993247 +0100
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
+ static unsigned short ReadBlobLSBShort (BMPSource*);
+ static unsigned long  ReadBlobLSBLong (BMPSource*);
+ static long           TellBlob (BMPSource*);
+-static void           DecodeImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*,unsigned int,unsigned char*);
++static int            DecodeImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*,unsigned int,unsigned char*);
+ static void           ReadBMPImage (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,BMPSource*);
+ static int            ExtractColor (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,wmfRGB*,unsigned int,unsigned int);
+ static void           SetColor (wmfAPI*,wmfBMP*,wmfRGB*,unsigned char,unsigned int,unsigned int);
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4695.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4695.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..42c4d55f40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4695.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2015-4695.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
+@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ static int meta_rgn_create (wmfAPI* API,
+ 	objects = P->objects;
+ 
+ 	i = 0;
+-	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
++	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
+ 
+ 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
+ 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
+@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ static int meta_dib_brush (wmfAPI* API,w
+ 	objects = P->objects;
+ 
+ 	i = 0;
+-	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
++	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
+ 
+ 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
+ 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
+@@ -3067,7 +3067,7 @@ static int meta_pen_create (wmfAPI* API,
+ 	objects = P->objects;
+ 
+ 	i = 0;
+-	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
++	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
+ 
+ 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
+ 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
+@@ -3181,7 +3181,7 @@ static int meta_brush_create (wmfAPI* AP
+ 	objects = P->objects;
+ 
+ 	i = 0;
+-	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
++	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
+ 
+ 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
+ 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
+@@ -3288,7 +3288,7 @@ static int meta_font_create (wmfAPI* API
+ 	objects = P->objects;
+ 
+ 	i = 0;
+-	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
++	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
+ 
+ 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
+ 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
+@@ -3396,7 +3396,7 @@ static int meta_palette_create (wmfAPI*
+ 	objects = P->objects;
+ 
+ 	i = 0;
+-	while (objects[i].type && (i < NUM_OBJECTS (API))) i++;
++	while ((i < NUM_OBJECTS (API)) && objects[i].type) i++;
+ 
+ 	if (i == NUM_OBJECTS (API))
+ 	{	WMF_ERROR (API,"Object out of range!");
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4696.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4696.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3674458c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4696.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/libwmf.git/tree/libwmf-0.2.8.4-CVE-2015-4696.patch
+
+--- libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
++++ libwmf-0.2.8.4/src/player/meta.h
+@@ -2585,6 +2585,8 @@
+ 			polyrect.BR[i] = clip->rects[i].BR;
+ 		}
+ 
++		if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
++
+ 		wmf_free (API,polyrect.TL);
+ 		wmf_free (API,polyrect.BR);
+ 	}
+@@ -2593,9 +2595,10 @@
+ 		polyrect.BR = 0;
+ 
+ 		polyrect.count = 0;
++	
++		if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (FR->region_clip) FR->region_clip (API,&polyrect);
+ 
+ 	return (changed);
+ }
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch
index a38c3da51c..03c1e3c068 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch
@@ -1,40 +1,28 @@
-Copied from Debian.
+Copied from Fedora.
 
-From: mancha <mancha1 AT zoho DOT com>
-Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014
-Subject: Info-ZIP UnZip buffer overflow
-Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/776589
-
-By carefully crafting a corrupt ZIP archive with "extra fields" that
-purport to have compressed blocks larger than the corresponding
-uncompressed blocks in STORED no-compression mode, an attacker can
-trigger a heap overflow that can result in application crash or
-possibly have other unspecified impact.
-
-This patch ensures that when extra fields use STORED mode, the
-"compressed" and uncompressed block sizes match.
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-overflow.patch?id=d18f821e
 
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index a0a4929..9ef80b3 100644
 --- a/extract.c
 +++ b/extract.c
-@@ -2228,6 +2228,7 @@
+@@ -2214,6 +2214,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata)
      ulg eb_ucsize;
      uch *eb_ucptr;
      int r;
-+    ush eb_compr_method;
++    ush method;
  
      if (compr_offset < 4)                /* field is not compressed: */
          return PK_OK;                    /* do nothing and signal OK */
-@@ -2244,6 +2245,14 @@
-      ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))))
-         return IZ_EF_TRUNC;             /* no/bad compressed data! */
+@@ -2223,6 +2224,12 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata)
+          eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))
+         return IZ_EF_TRUNC;               /* no compressed data! */
  
-+    /* 2014-11-03 Michal Zalewski, SMS.
-+     * For STORE method, compressed and uncompressed sizes must agree.
-+     * http://www.info-zip.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=450
-+     */
-+    eb_compr_method = makeword( eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
-+    if ((eb_compr_method == STORED) && (eb_size - compr_offset != eb_ucsize))
-+        return PK_ERR;
++    method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
++    if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size != compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN + eb_ucsize))
++        return PK_ERR;            /* compressed & uncompressed
++                                   * should match in STORED
++                                   * method */
 +
      if (
  #ifdef INT_16BIT
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a24c31bb10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-attribs-overflow.patch?id=d18f821e
+
+diff -up unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow unzip60/zipinfo.c
+--- unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow	2009-11-30 09:55:39.000000000 +0100
++++ unzip60/zipinfo.c	2009-11-30 09:56:42.844263244 +0100
+@@ -1881,7 +1881,7 @@ static int zi_short(__G)   /* return PK-
+ #endif
+     int         k, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
+     unsigned    hostnum, hostver, methid, methnum, xattr;
+-    char        *p, workspace[12], attribs[16];
++    char        *p, workspace[12], attribs[17];
+     char        methbuf[5];
+     static ZCONST char dtype[5]="NXFS"; /* normal, maximum, fast, superfast */
+     static ZCONST char Far os[NUM_HOSTS+1][4] = {
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..33498db95e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/tree/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch?id=d18f821e
+
+From bdd4a0cecd745cb4825e4508b5bdf2579731086a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] upstream fix for heap overflow
+
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002
+---
+ crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c
+index 784e411..a8975f2 100644
+--- a/crypt.c
++++ b/crypt.c
+@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@ int decrypt(__G__ passwrd)
+     GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE;
+     defer_leftover_input(__G);
+     for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) {
+-        b = NEXTBYTE;
++        /* 2012-11-23 SMS.  (OUSPG report.)
++         * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN.  The resulting
++         * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved,
++         * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and
++         * then continuing with a negative G.csize.  (See
++         * fileio.c:readbyte()).
++         */
++        if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF)
++        {
++            return PK_ERR;
++        }
+         h[n] = (uch)b;
+         Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n]));
+     }
+-- 
+2.4.6
+
+
+From 4b48844661ff9569f2ecf582a387d46a5775b5d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
+
+Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/patches/23/
+---
+ extract.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 7134bfe..29db027 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -2733,6 +2733,12 @@ __GDEF
+     int repeated_buf_err;
+     bz_stream bstrm;
+ 
++    if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) {
++        /* avoid an infinite loop */
++        Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n"));
++        return 2;
++    }
++
+ #if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR))
+     if (G.redirect_slide)
+         wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer;
+-- 
+2.4.6
+
+
+From bd150334fb4084f5555a6be26b015a0671cb5b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input
+
+Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius
+---
+ extract.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 29db027..b9ae667 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
+         if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) {
+             zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize;
+ 
+-            if (G.pInfo->encrypted)
++            if (G.pInfo->encrypted) {
++                if (csiz_decrypted <= 12) {
++                    /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */
++                    Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++                      LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile),
++                      LoadFarString(InvalidComprData),
++                      LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate)));
++                    return PK_ERR;
++                }
+                 csiz_decrypted -= 12;
++            }
+             if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) {
+                 Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+                   LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff),
+-- 
+2.5.2
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a5f274b86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-format-secure.patch?id=d18f821e
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index eeb2f57..a0a4929 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -472,8 +472,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+                      */
+                     Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+                       LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j + blknum*DIR_BLKSIZ + 1));
+-                    Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+-                      LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++                    Info(slide, 0x401,
++                         ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+                     error_in_archive = PK_BADERR;
+                 }
+                 reached_end = TRUE;     /* ...so no more left to do */
+@@ -752,8 +752,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+ 
+ #ifndef SFX
+     if (no_endsig_found) {                      /* just to make sure */
+-        Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+-        Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++        Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
++        Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+         if (!error_in_archive)       /* don't overwrite stronger error */
+             error_in_archive = PK_WARN;
+     }
+diff --git a/list.c b/list.c
+index 15e0011..f7359c3 100644
+--- a/list.c
++++ b/list.c
+@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int list_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+                 Info(slide, 0x401,
+                      ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j));
+                 Info(slide, 0x401,
+-                     ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++                     ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+                 return PK_BADERR;   /* sig not found */
+             }
+         }
+@@ -507,7 +507,8 @@ int list_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+             && (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive)
+             && (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0)
+            ) {          /* just to make sure again */
+-            Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
++            Info(slide, 0x401, 
++                 ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+             error_in_archive = PK_WARN;   /* didn't find sig */
+         }
+ 
+@@ -591,7 +592,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember)  /* return PK-type error code */
+                 Info(slide, 0x401,
+                      ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j));
+                 Info(slide, 0x401,
+-                     ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++                     ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+                 return PK_BADERR;   /* sig not found */
+             }
+         }
+@@ -674,7 +675,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember)  /* return PK-type error code */
+   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+ 
+     if (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4)) {    /* just to make sure again */
+-        Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
++        Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+         error_in_archive = PK_WARN;
+     }
+     if (*nmember == 0L && error_in_archive <= PK_WARN)
+diff --git a/zipinfo.c b/zipinfo.c
+index 6e22cc8..ac5c61b 100644
+--- a/zipinfo.c
++++ b/zipinfo.c
+@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ int zipinfo(__G)   /* return PK-type error code */
+                 Info(slide, 0x401,
+                      ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j));
+                 Info(slide, 0x401,
+-                     ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++                     ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+                 error_in_archive = PK_BADERR;   /* sig not found */
+                 break;
+             }
+@@ -960,7 +960,8 @@ int zipinfo(__G)   /* return PK-type error code */
+             && (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive)
+             && (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0)
+            ) {          /* just to make sure again */
+-            Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
++            Info(slide, 0x401, 
++                 ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+             error_in_archive = PK_WARN;   /* didn't find sig */
+         }
+ 
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3417ad873d..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-Copied from Debian.
-
-From: sms
-Subject: Increase size of cfactorstr array to avoid buffer overflow
-Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/741384
-X-Debian-version: 6.0-11
-
---- a/list.c
-+++ b/list.c
-@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
- {
-     int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
- #ifndef WINDLL
--    char sgn, cfactorstr[10];
-+    char sgn, cfactorstr[12];
-     int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1);
- #endif
-     int date_format;
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..76963480d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-overflow-long-fsize.patch?id=d18f821e
+
+diff --git a/list.c b/list.c
+index f7359c3..4c3d703 100644
+--- a/list.c
++++ b/list.c
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int list_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+ {
+     int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
+ #ifndef WINDLL
+-    char sgn, cfactorstr[10];
++    char sgn, cfactorstr[13];
+     int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1);
+ #endif
+     int date_format;
+@@ -339,7 +339,19 @@ int list_files(__G)    /* return PK-type error code */
+                 G.crec.compression_method == ENHDEFLATED) {
+                 methbuf[5] = dtype[(G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3];
+             } else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) {
+-                sprintf(&methbuf[4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
++                /* 2013-02-26 SMS.
++                 * http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail
++                 *  &aid=2861648&group_id=118012&atid=679786
++                 * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow
++                 * &methbuf[].  Use the old, three-digit decimal format
++                 * for values which fit.  Otherwise, sacrifice the
++                 * colon, and use four-digit hexadecimal.
++                 */
++                if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) {
++                    sprintf( &methbuf[ 4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
++                } else {
++                    sprintf( &methbuf[ 3], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method);
++                }
+             }
+ 
+ #if 0       /* GRR/Euro:  add this? */
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cd097006d2..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/
-
-From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
-
-strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
-resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
-result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
-argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
-
-This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
-has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
-would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
-upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
-(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
-
-Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
-rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
-larger than the maximum configured body length.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
-index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
---- a/src/wps/httpread.c
-+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
-@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
- 					if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
- 						goto bad;
- 					h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
-+					if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
-+					    h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
-+						wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+							   "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
-+							   h->chunk_size);
-+						goto bad;
-+					}
- 					/* throw away chunk header
- 					 * so we have only real data
- 					 */
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index de042f0c49..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/
-
-From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
-
-The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
-length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
-negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
-buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
-so, resulting in segmentation fault.
-
-This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
-attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
-hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
-drivers).
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
-index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
---- a/src/ap/wmm.c
-+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
-@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (left < 0)
-+		return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
-+
- 	/* extract the tspec info element */
- 	if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
- 		hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7ebf5f4cc1..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
-
-From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index f2b0926..a629437 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- 	u16 offset;
- 	u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
-+	size_t prime_len, order_len;
-+
-+	if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
-+		ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
-+	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- 	int offset;
- 
-+	if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
-+		ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
- 	 *	prf
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c11e4175d9..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
-
-From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
- and Confirm
-
-The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
-checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
-overflow when processing an invalid message.
-
-Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
-processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
-make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
-message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
-
-Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
-reporting this issue.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- 	EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
- 	int res = 0;
-+	size_t prime_len, order_len;
- 
- 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
- 
-+	prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
-+	order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
-+
-+	if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len,
-+			   (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- 	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
- 	int offset;
- 
-+	if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+			   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
-+			   (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
-+		goto fin;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
- 	grp = htons(data->group_num);
- 	ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 963dac9270..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
-
-From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
- reassembly
-
-The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
-Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
-prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
-have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
-as a huge positive integer.
-
-In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
-before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
-potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index a629437..1d2079b 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	 * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
- 	 */
- 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+		if (len < 2) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+			ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
- 			   "total length = %d", tot_len);
- 		if (tot_len > 15000)
- 			return NULL;
-+		if (data->inbuf) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+			ret->ignore = TRUE;
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3d945382bc..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
-
-From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
- reassembly
-
-The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
-Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
-prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
-have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
-as a huge positive integer.
-
-In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
-before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
-potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 	 * the first fragment has a total length
- 	 */
- 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+		if (len < 2) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
-+			return;
-+		}
- 		tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
- 			   "length = %d", tot_len);
- 		if (tot_len > 15000)
- 			return;
-+		if (data->inbuf) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+				   "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
-+			return;
-+		}
- 		data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
- 		if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 30f71974ad..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/
-
-From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
-
-The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
-whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
-fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
-for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
-triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
-due to invalid buffer allocation.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	/*
- 	 * we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
- 	 */
-+	lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
- 	len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
- 	if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
- 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 496c68ff8e..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-Original patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/
-and then backported to wpa-supplicant-2.4.
-
-From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser
-
-It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
-wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
-length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
-2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
-payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
-bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
-This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
-heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
-same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
-In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
-would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
-infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
-
-Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
-attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
-sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
-the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
-received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
-that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
-hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
-here.
-
-Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
-detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
-index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644
---- a/src/wps/ndef.c
-+++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
- 		if (size < 6)
- 			return -1;
- 		record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
-+		if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
-+			return -1;
- 		pos += sizeof(u32);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
- 	pos += record->payload_length;
- 
- 	record->total_length = pos - data;
--	if (record->total_length > size)
-+	if (record->total_length > size ||
-+	    record->total_length < record->payload_length)
- 		return -1;
- 	return 0;
- }
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index de1964ca76..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
- (CVE-2015-1863)
-
-This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
-p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
-was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
-arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
-dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
-heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
-peer discovery purposes.
-
-This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
-behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
-due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
-and potentially arbitrary code execution.
-
-Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
-hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
---- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
-+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
-@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
- 	if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
- 		os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
- 	if (msg.ssid &&
-+	    msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
- 	    (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
- 	     os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
- 	     != 0)) {
--- 
-1.9.1
-