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authorLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2016-11-26 15:03:06 -0500
committerLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2016-11-26 16:21:02 -0500
commitcd65d600ac6e8701ef9c54f5d09a45cd6c149949 (patch)
tree374c6864001b035e9e49203156544109089690e1 /gnu/packages
parent439a2f62ceba61b6148df85af952662e1a0a2f33 (diff)
downloadguix-cd65d600ac6e8701ef9c54f5d09a45cd6c149949.tar.gz
gnu: cyrus-sasl: Fix CVE-2013-4122.
* gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch: New file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
* gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm (cyrus-sasl)[replacement]: New field.
(cyrus-sasl/fixed): New variable.
[source]: Use patch.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm9
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch130
2 files changed, 139 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm b/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm
index 99ff1e228e..89a4a49797 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/cyrus-sasl.scm
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 ;;; GNU Guix --- Functional package management for GNU
 ;;; Copyright © 2013, 2014, 2015 Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>
 ;;; Copyright © 2013 Andreas Enge <andreas@enge.fr>
+;;; Copyright © 2016 Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>
 ;;;
 ;;; This file is part of GNU Guix.
 ;;;
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@
 (define-public cyrus-sasl
   (package
    (name "cyrus-sasl")
+   (replacement cyrus-sasl/fixed)
    (version "2.1.26")
    (source (origin
             (method url-fetch)
@@ -64,3 +66,10 @@ server writers.")
    (license (license:non-copyleft "file://COPYING"
                                   "See COPYING in the distribution."))
    (home-page "http://cyrusimap.web.cmu.edu")))
+
+(define cyrus-sasl/fixed
+  (package
+    (inherit cyrus-sasl)
+    (source (origin
+              (inherit (package-source cyrus-sasl))
+              (patches (search-patches "cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch"))))))
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc72e42e03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+Fix CVE-2013-4122.
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-4122
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-sasl/commit/dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d
+
+From dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 10:08:07 +0100
+Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt()
+
+Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL
+(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally,
+on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords
+passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return).
+
+When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible
+NULL pointer dereference.
+
+Patch by mancha1@hush.com.
+---
+ pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c | 3 ++-
+ pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c | 4 +++-
+ saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c  | 4 +++-
+ saslauthd/auth_shadow.c    | 8 +++-----
+ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
+index 4b34222..400289c 100644
+--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ char *userid;
+ char *password;
+ {
+     char* r;
++    char* crpt_passwd;
+     struct passwd *pwd;
+ 
+     pwd = getpwnam(userid);
+@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password;
+     else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') {
+ 	r = "Account disabled";
+     }
+-    else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {
++    else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ 	r = "Incorrect password";
+     }
+     else {
+diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
+index 2b11286..6d607bb 100644
+--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c
+@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ char *userid;
+ char *password;
+ {
+     struct spwd *pwd;
++    char *crpt_passwd;
+ 
+     pwd = getspnam(userid);
+     if (!pwd) {
+ 	return "Userid not found";
+     }
+     
+-    if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) {
++    crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp);
++    if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) {
+ 	return "Incorrect password";
+     }
+     else {
+diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
+index fc8029d..d4ebe54 100644
+--- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
++++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ {
+     /* VARIABLES */
+     struct passwd *pw;			/* pointer to passwd file entry */
++    char *crpt_passwd;			/* encrypted password */
+     int errnum;
+     /* END VARIABLES */
+   
+@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ auth_getpwent (
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
+-    if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) {
++    crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd);
++    if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_getpwent: %s: invalid password", login);
+ 	}
+diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
+index 677131b..1988afd 100644
+--- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
++++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c
+@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	RETURN("NO Insufficient permission to access NIS authentication database (saslauthd)");
+     }
+ 
+-    cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp));
+-    if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) {
++    cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp);
++    if (!cpw || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    /*
+ 	     * This _should_ reveal the SHADOW_PW_LOCKED prefix to an
+@@ -221,10 +221,8 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'",
+ 		   sp->sp_pwdp, cpw);
+ 	}
+-	free(cpw);
+ 	RETURN("NO Incorrect password");
+     }
+-    free(cpw);
+ 
+     /*
+      * The following fields will be set to -1 if:
+@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ auth_shadow (
+ 	RETURN("NO Invalid username");
+     }
+   
+-    if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) {
++    if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) {
+ 	if (flags & VERBOSE) {
+ 	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s",
+ 		   password, upw->upw_passwd);
+-- 
+cgit v0.12
+