diff options
| author | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-04-23 20:31:05 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-04-23 20:32:35 -0400 |
| commit | 23d00fb0ed96a6d913c47cf36e249523bcba88d1 (patch) | |
| tree | 92d7d968ef240b8e5c9d0fdf5a5394f51a31e8bf /gnu/packages | |
| parent | 3c43bcc68d4ad9caddbb64506b5c8f10fdb9c8f3 (diff) | |
| download | guix-23d00fb0ed96a6d913c47cf36e249523bcba88d1.tar.gz | |
gnu: wpa-supplicant: Add fix for CVE-2015-1863.
* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch: New file. * gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add it. * gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant): Add patch.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/admin.scm | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch | 42 |
2 files changed, 45 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm index 3a0361299e..ffaf6b4fc7 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm @@ -702,7 +702,9 @@ commands and their arguments.") ".tar.gz")) (sha256 (base32 - "0skvkl6c10ls4s48b2wmf47h9j1y40nlzxnzn8hyaw2j0prmpapa")))) + "0skvkl6c10ls4s48b2wmf47h9j1y40nlzxnzn8hyaw2j0prmpapa")) + (patches + (list (search-patch "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch"))))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (arguments '(#:phases (alist-replace diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..de1964ca76 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it + (CVE-2015-1863) + +This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in +p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes) +was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in +arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the +dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the +heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P +peer discovery purposes. + +This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program +behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service +due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation, +and potentially arbitrary code execution. + +Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart +hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c +index f584fae..a45fe73 100644 +--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c ++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c +@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq, + if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) + os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); + if (msg.ssid && ++ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) && + (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN || + os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN) + != 0)) { +-- +1.9.1 + |