gnu: glibc: Fix replacement on i686.

This is followup to 665d6a59161769e10b52ffcbcd5cd2db22f32681.
Fixes <https://bugs.gnu.org/27489>.

* gnu/packages/base.scm (glibc-2.25-patched, glibc-2.24, glibc-2.23)
(glibc-2.22): Add glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch to patches.
Move a comment where it belongs.
* gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch: Swap with ...
* gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch: ... this.
* gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch: New file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.  Fix formatting.

4 files changed, 304 insertions, 277 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/base.scm b/gnu/packages/base.scm
index 2767909805..979d657957 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/base.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/base.scm
@@ -902,9 +902,6 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
 (define-syntax glibc
   (identifier-syntax (glibc-for-target)))
 
-;; Below are old libc versions, which we use mostly to build locale data in
-;; the old format (which the new libc cannot cope with.)
-
 (define glibc-2.25-patched
   (package
     (inherit glibc)
@@ -914,10 +911,14 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
               (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
                                        "glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
                                        "glibc-o-largefile.patch"
+                                       "glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))))
 
+;; Below are old libc versions, which we use mostly to build locale data in
+;; the old format (which the new libc cannot cope with.)
+
 (define-public glibc-2.24
   (package
     (inherit glibc)
@@ -933,6 +934,7 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
               (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
                                        "glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
                                        "glibc-o-largefile.patch"
+                                       "glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))))
@@ -952,6 +954,7 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
               (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
                                        "glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
                                        "glibc-o-largefile.patch"
+                                       "glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))))
@@ -969,6 +972,7 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
                (base32
                 "0j49682pm2nh4qbdw35bas82p1pgfnz4d2l7iwfyzvrvj0318wzb"))
               (patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
+                                       "glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
                                        "glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch
index 3d8f6d2bf8..4b859c4bfd 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch
@@ -1,206 +1,124 @@
-From 81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:32:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
-
-Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
 
 patch from:
-https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=patch;h=6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8
 
 ---
- ChangeLog  |  11 +++++++
- elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+ ChangeLog  |  7 ++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
-index 86ae20c..65647fb 100644
+index 2269dbe..86ae20c 100644
 --- a/elf/rtld.c
 +++ b/elf/rtld.c
-@@ -129,13 +129,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
-   return *p != '\0';
- }
+@@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
+ strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
+ #endif
  
--/* List of auditing DSOs.  */
-+/* LD_AUDIT variable contents.  Must be processed before the
-+   audit_list below.  */
-+const char *audit_list_string;
++/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker,
++   particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active.  */
++#ifdef NAME_MAX
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255
++#endif
++#ifdef PATH_MAX
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024
++#endif
 +
-+/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs.  audit_list->next is the first
-+   element.  */
++/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
++   directories and is not overly long.  Reject empty names
++   unconditionally.  */
++static bool
++dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
++{
++  if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
++    {
++      /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
++	 programs, and also skip overlong names.  */
++      size_t len = strlen (p);
++      if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
++	return false;
++    }
++  return *p != '\0';
++}
+ 
+ /* List of auditing DSOs.  */
  static struct audit_list
- {
-   const char *name;
-   struct audit_list *next;
- } *audit_list;
+@@ -718,6 +747,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
+ /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed.  */
+ static int version_info attribute_relro;
  
-+/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list.  */
-+struct audit_list_iter
-+{
-+  /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL.  */
-+  const char *audit_list_tail;
-+
-+  /* The list element returned in the previous iteration.  NULL before
-+     the first element.  */
-+  struct audit_list *previous;
-+
-+  /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
-+     audit_list_string.  */
-+  char fname[SECURE_NAME_LIMIT];
-+};
-+
-+/* Initialize an audit list iterator.  */
-+static void
-+audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
++   separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
++   executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
++   (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
++   ignored since it is insecure.)  Return the number of preloads
++   performed.  */
++unsigned int
++handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
 +{
-+  iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
-+  iter->previous = NULL;
-+}
++  unsigned int npreloads = 0;
++  const char *p = preloadlist;
++  char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];
 +
-+/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list.  */
-+static const char *
-+audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
-+{
-+  if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
++  while (*p != '\0')
 +    {
-+      /* First iterate over audit_list_string.  */
-+      while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
++      /* Split preload list at space/colon.  */
++      size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
++      if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))
 +	{
-+	  /* Split audit list at colon.  */
-+	  size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
-+	  if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (iter->fname))
-+	    {
-+	      memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
-+	      iter->fname[len] = '\0';
-+	    }
-+	  else
-+	    /* Do not return this name to the caller.  */
-+	    iter->fname[0] = '\0';
-+
-+	  /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter.  */
-+	  iter->audit_list_tail += len;
-+	  if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
-+	    ++iter->audit_list_tail;
-+
-+	  /* If the name is valid, return it.  */
-+	  if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
-+	    return iter->fname;
-+	  /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name.  */
++	  memcpy (fname, p, len);
++	  fname[len] = '\0';
 +	}
-+      /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list.  */
-+    }
++      else
++	fname[0] = '\0';
 +
-+  if (iter->previous == NULL)
-+    {
-+      if (audit_list == NULL)
-+	/* No pre-parsed audit list.  */
-+	return NULL;
-+      /* Start of audit list.  The first list element is at
-+	 audit_list->next (cyclic list).  */
-+      iter->previous = audit_list->next;
-+      return iter->previous->name;
++      /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter.  */
++      p += len;
++      if (*p != '\0')
++	++p;
++
++      if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
++	npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
 +    }
-+  if (iter->previous == audit_list)
-+    /* Cyclic list wrap-around.  */
-+    return NULL;
-+  iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
-+  return iter->previous->name;
++  return npreloads;
 +}
 +
- #ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
- /* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
-    libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs.  This
-@@ -1305,11 +1383,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
-     GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
+ static void
+ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
+ 	 ElfW(Word) phnum,
+@@ -1464,23 +1529,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
  
-   /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now.  */
--  if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
-+  bool need_security_init = true;
-+  if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
-+      || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
+   if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
      {
--      /* Iterate over all entries in the list.  The order is important.  */
-       struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
--      struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
-+      struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
-+      audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
- 
-       /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
- 	 initialize the data structures now.  */
-@@ -1320,9 +1400,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
- 	 use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
- 	 fail later on.  */
-       security_init ();
-+      need_security_init = false;
- 
--      do
-+      while (true)
- 	{
-+	  const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
-+	  if (name == NULL)
-+	    break;
-+
- 	  int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
- 
- 	  /* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
-@@ -1331,7 +1416,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
- 	     no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set.  The reason is that we know
- 	     glibc will use the static model.  */
- 	  struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
--	  dlmargs.fname = al->name;
-+	  dlmargs.fname = name;
- 	  dlmargs.map = NULL;
- 
- 	  const char *objname;
-@@ -1344,7 +1429,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
- 	    not_loaded:
- 	      _dl_error_printf ("\
- ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
--				al->name, err_str);
-+				name, err_str);
- 	      if (malloced)
- 		free ((char *) err_str);
- 	    }
-@@ -1448,10 +1533,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
- 		  goto not_loaded;
- 		}
- 	    }
+-      /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
+-	 separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
+-	 executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
+-	 list.  If the binary is running setuid all elements
+-	 containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure.  */
+-      char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
+-      char *p;
 -
--	  al = al->next;
- 	}
--      while (al != audit_list->next);
- 
-       /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
- 	 have two objects loaded.  */
-@@ -1715,7 +1797,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
-   if (tcbp == NULL)
-     tcbp = init_tls ();
- 
--  if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
-+  if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
-     /* Initialize security features.  But only if we have not done it
-        earlier.  */
-     security_init ();
-@@ -2346,9 +2428,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
-   char *p;
- 
-   while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
--    if (p[0] != '\0'
--	&& (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
--	    || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
-+    if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
-       {
- 	/* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc.  The
- 	   memory can never be freed.  */
-@@ -2412,7 +2492,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
- 	      break;
- 	    }
- 	  if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
--	    process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
-+	    audit_list_string = &envline[6];
- 	  break;
- 
- 	case 7:
+       HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
+-
+-      /* Prevent optimizing strsep.  Speed is not important here.  */
+-      while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
+-	if (p[0] != '\0'
+-	    && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+-		|| strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+-	  npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+-
++      npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
+       HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
+       HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
+       HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
 -- 
 2.9.3
 
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch
index 4b859c4bfd..3d8f6d2bf8 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch
@@ -1,124 +1,206 @@
-From 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:32:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
+
+Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
 
 patch from:
-https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=patch;h=6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9
 
 ---
- ChangeLog  |  7 ++++++
- elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+ ChangeLog  |  11 +++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
-index 2269dbe..86ae20c 100644
+index 86ae20c..65647fb 100644
 --- a/elf/rtld.c
 +++ b/elf/rtld.c
-@@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
- strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
- #endif
+@@ -129,13 +129,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
+   return *p != '\0';
+ }
  
-+/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker,
-+   particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active.  */
-+#ifdef NAME_MAX
-+# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX
-+#else
-+# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255
-+#endif
-+#ifdef PATH_MAX
-+# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX
-+#else
-+# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024
-+#endif
+-/* List of auditing DSOs.  */
++/* LD_AUDIT variable contents.  Must be processed before the
++   audit_list below.  */
++const char *audit_list_string;
 +
-+/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
-+   directories and is not overly long.  Reject empty names
-+   unconditionally.  */
-+static bool
-+dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
-+{
-+  if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
-+    {
-+      /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
-+	 programs, and also skip overlong names.  */
-+      size_t len = strlen (p);
-+      if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
-+	return false;
-+    }
-+  return *p != '\0';
-+}
- 
- /* List of auditing DSOs.  */
++/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs.  audit_list->next is the first
++   element.  */
  static struct audit_list
-@@ -718,6 +747,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
- /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed.  */
- static int version_info attribute_relro;
+ {
+   const char *name;
+   struct audit_list *next;
+ } *audit_list;
  
-+/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
-+   separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
-+   executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
-+   (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
-+   ignored since it is insecure.)  Return the number of preloads
-+   performed.  */
-+unsigned int
-+handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
++/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list.  */
++struct audit_list_iter
++{
++  /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL.  */
++  const char *audit_list_tail;
++
++  /* The list element returned in the previous iteration.  NULL before
++     the first element.  */
++  struct audit_list *previous;
++
++  /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
++     audit_list_string.  */
++  char fname[SECURE_NAME_LIMIT];
++};
++
++/* Initialize an audit list iterator.  */
++static void
++audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
 +{
-+  unsigned int npreloads = 0;
-+  const char *p = preloadlist;
-+  char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];
++  iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
++  iter->previous = NULL;
++}
 +
-+  while (*p != '\0')
++/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list.  */
++static const char *
++audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++  if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
 +    {
-+      /* Split preload list at space/colon.  */
-+      size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
-+      if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))
++      /* First iterate over audit_list_string.  */
++      while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
 +	{
-+	  memcpy (fname, p, len);
-+	  fname[len] = '\0';
-+	}
-+      else
-+	fname[0] = '\0';
++	  /* Split audit list at colon.  */
++	  size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
++	  if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (iter->fname))
++	    {
++	      memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
++	      iter->fname[len] = '\0';
++	    }
++	  else
++	    /* Do not return this name to the caller.  */
++	    iter->fname[0] = '\0';
++
++	  /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter.  */
++	  iter->audit_list_tail += len;
++	  if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
++	    ++iter->audit_list_tail;
 +
-+      /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter.  */
-+      p += len;
-+      if (*p != '\0')
-+	++p;
++	  /* If the name is valid, return it.  */
++	  if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
++	    return iter->fname;
++	  /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name.  */
++	}
++      /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list.  */
++    }
 +
-+      if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
-+	npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
++  if (iter->previous == NULL)
++    {
++      if (audit_list == NULL)
++	/* No pre-parsed audit list.  */
++	return NULL;
++      /* Start of audit list.  The first list element is at
++	 audit_list->next (cyclic list).  */
++      iter->previous = audit_list->next;
++      return iter->previous->name;
 +    }
-+  return npreloads;
++  if (iter->previous == audit_list)
++    /* Cyclic list wrap-around.  */
++    return NULL;
++  iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
++  return iter->previous->name;
 +}
 +
- static void
- dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
- 	 ElfW(Word) phnum,
-@@ -1464,23 +1529,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ #ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
+ /* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
+    libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs.  This
+@@ -1305,11 +1383,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+     GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
  
-   if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
+   /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now.  */
+-  if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
++  bool need_security_init = true;
++  if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
++      || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
      {
--      /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
--	 separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
--	 executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
--	 list.  If the binary is running setuid all elements
--	 containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure.  */
--      char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
--      char *p;
--
-       HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
--
--      /* Prevent optimizing strsep.  Speed is not important here.  */
--      while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
--	if (p[0] != '\0'
--	    && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
--		|| strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
--	  npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+-      /* Iterate over all entries in the list.  The order is important.  */
+       struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
+-      struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
++      struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
++      audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
+ 
+       /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
+ 	 initialize the data structures now.  */
+@@ -1320,9 +1400,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+ 	 use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
+ 	 fail later on.  */
+       security_init ();
++      need_security_init = false;
+ 
+-      do
++      while (true)
+ 	{
++	  const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
++	  if (name == NULL)
++	    break;
++
+ 	  int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
+ 
+ 	  /* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
+@@ -1331,7 +1416,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+ 	     no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set.  The reason is that we know
+ 	     glibc will use the static model.  */
+ 	  struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
+-	  dlmargs.fname = al->name;
++	  dlmargs.fname = name;
+ 	  dlmargs.map = NULL;
+ 
+ 	  const char *objname;
+@@ -1344,7 +1429,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+ 	    not_loaded:
+ 	      _dl_error_printf ("\
+ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+-				al->name, err_str);
++				name, err_str);
+ 	      if (malloced)
+ 		free ((char *) err_str);
+ 	    }
+@@ -1448,10 +1533,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ 		  goto not_loaded;
+ 		}
+ 	    }
 -
-+      npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
-       HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
-       HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
-       HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
+-	  al = al->next;
+ 	}
+-      while (al != audit_list->next);
+ 
+       /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
+ 	 have two objects loaded.  */
+@@ -1715,7 +1797,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+   if (tcbp == NULL)
+     tcbp = init_tls ();
+ 
+-  if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
++  if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
+     /* Initialize security features.  But only if we have not done it
+        earlier.  */
+     security_init ();
+@@ -2346,9 +2428,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
+   char *p;
+ 
+   while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
+-    if (p[0] != '\0'
+-	&& (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+-	    || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
++    if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
+       {
+ 	/* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc.  The
+ 	   memory can never be freed.  */
+@@ -2412,7 +2492,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+ 	      break;
+ 	    }
+ 	  if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
+-	    process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
++	    audit_list_string = &envline[6];
+ 	  break;
+ 
+ 	case 7:
 -- 
 2.9.3
 
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3d6c7749d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+Copied from Debian.
+
+2017-06-14  Florian Weimer  <fweimer@redhat.com>
+
+	* sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c: Add IS_IN (libc) guard.
+	* sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c: Likewise.
+
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
+@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
+-#define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#endif
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
+@@ -1 +1,3 @@
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#endif