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author | Léo Le Bouter <lle-bout@zaclys.net> | 2021-04-02 19:22:33 +0200 |
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committer | Léo Le Bouter <lle-bout@zaclys.net> | 2021-04-02 19:22:33 +0200 |
commit | c18c8d3e9c2d3377f6109096dbf04b8668f324de (patch) | |
tree | 4f412c41050130af218e0e8418b0259b68db4c11 /gnu/packages | |
parent | 68ed5de405a3570aff099ff1fd5fd238b5576fcd (diff) | |
download | guix-c18c8d3e9c2d3377f6109096dbf04b8668f324de.tar.gz |
gnu: wpa-supplicant-minimal: Fix CVE-2021-30004.
* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch: New patch. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register it. * gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal): Apply patch.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages')
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/admin.scm | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch | 115 |
2 files changed, 117 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm index d5b4d34323..2b12b5d5e4 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm @@ -1658,7 +1658,8 @@ features of sudo with a fraction of the codebase.") (string-append "#" line))) #t)) (patches - (search-patches "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-27803.patch")))) + (search-patches "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-27803.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch")))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (arguments `(#:phases diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8c8ba93355 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +From a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 18:19:31 +0200 +Subject: ASN.1: Validate DigestAlgorithmIdentifier parameters + +The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters. +However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in +addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did +not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases, +but did not reject any other unexpected information. + +Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any +unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent +potential forging attacks. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/tls/pkcs1.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ + src/tls/x509v3.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +index bbdb0d7..5761dfe 100644 +--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c ++++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, + os_free(decrypted); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestInfo", ++ hdr.payload, hdr.length); + + pos = hdr.payload; + end = pos + hdr.length; +@@ -265,6 +267,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, + os_free(decrypted); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", ++ hdr.payload, hdr.length); + da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length; + + if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) { +@@ -273,6 +277,23 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, + os_free(decrypted); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: Digest algorithm parameters", ++ next, da_end - next); ++ ++ /* ++ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to ++ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these ++ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else. ++ */ ++ if (da_end > next && ++ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 || ++ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) || ++ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "PKCS #1: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters"); ++ os_free(decrypted); ++ return -1; ++ } + + if (!asn1_oid_equal(&oid, hash_alg)) { + char txt[100], txt2[100]; +diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c +index a8944dd..df337ec 100644 +--- a/src/tls/x509v3.c ++++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c +@@ -1964,6 +1964,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, + os_free(data); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestInfo", hdr.payload, hdr.length); + + pos = hdr.payload; + end = pos + hdr.length; +@@ -1985,6 +1986,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, + os_free(data); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", ++ hdr.payload, hdr.length); + da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length; + + if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) { +@@ -1992,6 +1995,23 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, + os_free(data); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: Digest algorithm parameters", ++ next, da_end - next); ++ ++ /* ++ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to ++ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these ++ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else. ++ */ ++ if (da_end > next && ++ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 || ++ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) || ++ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "X509: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters"); ++ os_free(data); ++ return -1; ++ } + + if (x509_sha1_oid(&oid)) { + if (signature->oid.oid[6] != 5 /* sha-1WithRSAEncryption */) { +-- +cgit v0.12 + |