diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/local.mk | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch | 215 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch | 50 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/tls.scm | 6 |
4 files changed, 2 insertions, 271 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index fbc9628227..ce1f8cc173 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -1010,8 +1010,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/openocd-nrf52.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/opensmtpd-fix-crash.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-runpath.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-c-rehash-in.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/orpheus-cast-errors-and-includes.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2d54ed03b9..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,215 +0,0 @@ -Fix CVE-2018-0495: - -https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0495 -https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/technical-advisory-return-of-the-hidden-number-problem/ - -Patch copied from upstream source repository: - -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/949ff36623eafc3523a9f91784992965018ffb05 - -From 949ff36623eafc3523a9f91784992965018ffb05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 12:10:13 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Add blinding to an ECDSA signature - -Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an -ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates: - -s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order - -The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a -flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature -operations. - -As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to -the operation so that: - -s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order - -Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned. - -Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> ---- - CHANGES | 4 ++ - crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c | 9 ++++- - crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- - 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c -index 0f301f86d9..a130fc9117 100644 ---- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c -+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c -@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int restore_rand(void) - return 1; - } - --static int fbytes_counter = 0; -+static int fbytes_counter = 0, use_fake = 0; - static const char *numbers[8] = { - "651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659", - "6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654", -@@ -158,6 +158,11 @@ int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) - int ret; - BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; - -+ if (use_fake == 0) -+ return old_rand->bytes(buf, num); -+ -+ use_fake = 0; -+ - if (fbytes_counter >= 8) - return 0; - tmp = BN_new(); -@@ -199,11 +204,13 @@ int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in) - /* create the key */ - if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) - goto x962_int_err; -+ use_fake = 1; - if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key)) - goto x962_int_err; - BIO_printf(out, "."); - (void)BIO_flush(out); - /* create the signature */ -+ use_fake = 1; - signature = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, key); - if (signature == NULL) - goto x962_int_err; -diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c -index 16d4f59b9b..1d37551803 100644 ---- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c -+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c -@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, - { - int ok = 0, i; - BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *blind = NULL, *blindm = NULL; - const BIGNUM *ckinv; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - const EC_GROUP *group; -@@ -269,14 +270,25 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, - } - - ret = ECDSA_SIG_new(); -- if (!ret) { -+ if (ret == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } - s = ret->s; - -- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL || -- (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) { -+ ctx = BN_CTX_new(); -+ if (ctx == NULL) { -+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ BN_CTX_start(ctx); -+ order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ if (blindm == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } -@@ -315,26 +327,70 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, - } - } - -- if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) { -+ /* -+ * The normal signature calculation is: -+ * -+ * s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order -+ * -+ * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks -+ * -+ * s := k^-1 * blind^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order -+ */ -+ -+ /* Generate a blinding value */ -+ do { -+ if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(order) - 1, -1, 0)) -+ goto err; -+ } while (BN_is_zero(blind)); -+ BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); -+ BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); -+ BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); -+ -+ /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod order */ -+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, priv_key, order, ctx)) { -+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, order, ctx)) { -+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* blindm := blind * m mod order */ -+ if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, order, ctx)) { -+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod order */ -+ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, order)) { -+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod order */ -+ if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, order, ctx) == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } -- if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) { -+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } -+ -+ /* s := s * k^-1 mod order */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } -+ - if (BN_is_zero(s)) { - /* - * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to - * generate new kinv and r values - */ - if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) { -- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, -- ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES); -+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES); - goto err; - } - } else -@@ -349,15 +405,11 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, - ECDSA_SIG_free(ret); - ret = NULL; - } -- if (ctx) -+ if (ctx != NULL) { -+ BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); -- if (m) -- BN_clear_free(m); -- if (tmp) -- BN_clear_free(tmp); -- if (order) -- BN_free(order); -- if (kinv) -+ } -+ if (kinv != NULL) - BN_clear_free(kinv); - return ret; - } --- -2.17.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 50b95306a5..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -Fix CVE-2018-0732: - -https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0732 - -Patch copied from upstream source repository: - -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/3984ef0b72831da8b3ece4745cac4f8575b19098 - -From 3984ef0b72831da8b3ece4745cac4f8575b19098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com> -Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:38:54 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Reject excessively large primes in DH key generation. - -CVE-2018-0732 - -Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com> - -(cherry picked from commit 91f7361f47b082ae61ffe1a7b17bb2adf213c7fe) - -Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6457) ---- - crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 7 ++++++- - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c -index 387558f146..f235e0d682 100644 ---- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c -+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c -@@ -130,10 +130,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh) - int ok = 0; - int generate_new_key = 0; - unsigned l; -- BN_CTX *ctx; -+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; - BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL; - -+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { -+ DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if (ctx == NULL) - goto err; --- -2.17.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/tls.scm b/gnu/packages/tls.scm index f638c6094c..6cb739eb1f 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/tls.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/tls.scm @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ required structures.") (define-public openssl (package (name "openssl") - (version "1.0.2o") + (version "1.0.2p") (source (origin (method url-fetch) (uri (list (string-append "https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-" @@ -274,10 +274,8 @@ required structures.") "/" name "-" version ".tar.gz"))) (sha256 (base32 - "0kcy13l701054nhpbd901mz32v1kn4g311z0nifd83xs2jbmqgzc")) + "003xh9f898i56344vpvpxxxzmikivxig4xwlm7vbi7m8n43qxaah")) (patches (search-patches "openssl-runpath.patch" - "openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch" - "openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch" "openssl-c-rehash-in.patch")))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (outputs '("out" |