diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/local.mk | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch | 31 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch | 114 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch | 111 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch | 60 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/ssh.scm | 8 |
6 files changed, 2 insertions, 326 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index fdc45e10dc..dcdea86645 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -694,10 +694,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/openexr-missing-samples.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openjpeg-CVE-2015-6581.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openjpeg-use-after-free-fix.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-runpath.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-c-rehash-in.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8063e64ea7..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -From 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> -Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2016 10:39:57 +1000 -Subject: ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes - -If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables -and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may -attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables -set via PAM. - -CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh, via Colin Watson ---- - session.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/session.c b/session.c -index 4859245..4653b09 100644 ---- a/session.c -+++ b/session.c -@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) - * Pull in any environment variables that may have - * been set by PAM. - */ -- if (options.use_pam) { -+ if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) { - char **p; - - p = fetch_pam_child_environment(); --- -cgit v0.11.2 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9b46ec12a9..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -From e5ef9d3942cebda819a6fd81647b51c8d87d23df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 13:32:45 +1000 -Subject: Determine appropriate salt for invalid users. - -When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses -the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the -password supplied by the client. That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on -systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid -salt, and even on those that do it may have significantly different timing -from the hash methods used for real accounts (eg sha512). This allows -user enumeration by, eg, sending large password strings. This was noted -by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com (CVE-2016-6210). - -To mitigate, use the same hash algorithm that root uses for hashing -passwords for users that do not exist on the system. ok djm@ - -Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc -Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902 -Last-Update: 2016-07-22 - -Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-1.patch ---- - auth-passwd.c | 12 ++++++++---- - openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/auth-passwd.c b/auth-passwd.c -index 63ccf3c..530b5d4 100644 ---- a/auth-passwd.c -+++ b/auth-passwd.c -@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int - sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) - { - struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; -- char *encrypted_password; -+ char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL; - - /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */ - char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd; -@@ -202,9 +202,13 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) - if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0) - return (1); - -- /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */ -- encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, -- (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx"); -+ /* -+ * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a -+ * NULL and let xcrypt pick one. -+ */ -+ if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) -+ salt = pw_password; -+ encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt); - - /* - * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords -diff --git a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c -index 8577cbd..8913bb8 100644 ---- a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c -+++ b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c -@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ - #include "includes.h" - - #include <sys/types.h> -+#include <string.h> - #include <unistd.h> - #include <pwd.h> - -@@ -62,11 +63,44 @@ - # define crypt DES_crypt - # endif - -+/* -+ * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running -+ * system. -+ */ -+static const char * -+pick_salt(void) -+{ -+ struct passwd *pw; -+ char *passwd, *p; -+ size_t typelen; -+ static char salt[32]; -+ -+ if (salt[0] != '\0') -+ return salt; -+ strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt)); -+ if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL) -+ return salt; -+ passwd = shadow_pw(pw); -+ if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL) -+ return salt; /* no $, DES */ -+ typelen = p - passwd + 1; -+ strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt))); -+ explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); -+ return salt; -+} -+ - char * - xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt) - { - char *crypted; - -+ /* -+ * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for -+ * for timing purposes. Pick an appropriate salt. -+ */ -+ if (salt == NULL) -+ salt = pick_salt(); -+ - # ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS - if (is_md5_salt(salt)) - crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt); diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1c580f90b9..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -From dde63f7f998ac3812a26bbb2c1b2947f24fcd060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 13:49:44 +1000 -Subject: Mitigate timing of disallowed users PAM logins. - -When sshd decides to not allow a login (eg PermitRootLogin=no) and -it's using PAM, it sends a fake password to PAM so that the timing for -the failure is not noticeably different whether or not the password -is correct. This behaviour can be detected by sending a very long -password string which is slower to hash than the fake password. - -Mitigate by constructing an invalid password that is the same length -as the one from the client and thus takes the same time to hash. -Diff from djm@ - -Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=283b97ff33ea2c641161950849931bd578de6946 -Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902 -Last-Update: 2016-07-22 - -Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-2.patch ---- - auth-pam.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- - 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c -index 8425af1..abd6a5e 100644 ---- a/auth-pam.c -+++ b/auth-pam.c -@@ -232,7 +232,6 @@ static int sshpam_account_status = -1; - static char **sshpam_env = NULL; - static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL; - static const char *sshpam_password = NULL; --static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT"; - - /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */ - #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST -@@ -810,12 +809,35 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, - return (-1); - } - -+/* -+ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied. -+ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that -+ * vary processing time in proportion to password length. -+ */ -+static char * -+fake_password(const char *wire_password) -+{ -+ const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT"; -+ char *ret = NULL; -+ size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0; -+ -+ if (l >= INT_MAX) -+ fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l); -+ -+ ret = malloc(l + 1); -+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++) -+ ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)]; -+ ret[i] = '\0'; -+ return ret; -+} -+ - /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */ - static int - sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) - { - Buffer buffer; - struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; -+ char *fake; - - debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num); - switch (ctxt->pam_done) { -@@ -836,8 +858,11 @@ sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) - (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 || - options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) - buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp); -- else -- buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw); -+ else { -+ fake = fake_password(*resp); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, fake); -+ free(fake); -+ } - if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) { - buffer_free(&buffer); - return (-1); -@@ -1181,6 +1206,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) - { - int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? - PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); -+ char *fake = NULL; - - if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL) - fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to " -@@ -1196,7 +1222,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) - */ - if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && - options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) -- sshpam_password = badpw; -+ sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password); - - sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, - (const void *)&passwd_conv); -@@ -1206,6 +1232,7 @@ sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) - - sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); - sshpam_password = NULL; -+ free(fake); - if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) { - debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s", - authctxt->user); diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 303c34ee1b..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From abde8dda29c2db2405d6fbca2fe022430e2c1177 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> -Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2016 14:17:31 +1000 -Subject: Search users for one with a valid salt. - -If the root account is locked (eg password "!!" or "*LK*") keep looking -until we find a user with a valid salt to use for crypting passwords of -invalid users. ok djm@ - -Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=dbf788b4d9d9490a5fff08a7b09888272bb10fcc -Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902 -Last-Update: 2016-07-22 - -Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-3.patch ---- - openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- - 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c -index 8913bb8..cf6a9b9 100644 ---- a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c -+++ b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c -@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ - - /* - * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running -- * system. -+ * system by searching through accounts until we find one that has a valid -+ * salt. Usually this will be root unless the root account is locked out. -+ * If we don't find one we return a traditional DES-based salt. - */ - static const char * - pick_salt(void) -@@ -78,14 +80,18 @@ pick_salt(void) - if (salt[0] != '\0') - return salt; - strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt)); -- if ((pw = getpwuid(0)) == NULL) -- return salt; -- passwd = shadow_pw(pw); -- if (passwd[0] != '$' || (p = strrchr(passwd + 1, '$')) == NULL) -- return salt; /* no $, DES */ -- typelen = p - passwd + 1; -- strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt))); -- explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); -+ setpwent(); -+ while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) { -+ passwd = shadow_pw(pw); -+ if (passwd[0] == '$' && (p = strrchr(passwd+1, '$')) != NULL) { -+ typelen = p - passwd + 1; -+ strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt))); -+ explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ } -+ out: -+ endpwent(); - return salt; - } - diff --git a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm index 6953bad58a..bca443390d 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ a server that supports the SSH-2 protocol.") (define-public openssh (package (name "openssh") - (version "7.2p2") + (version "7.3p1") (source (origin (method url-fetch) (uri (let ((tail (string-append name "-" version ".tar.gz"))) @@ -135,11 +135,7 @@ a server that supports the SSH-2 protocol.") (string-append "http://ftp2.fr.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/" tail)))) (sha256 (base32 - "132lh9aanb0wkisji1d6cmsxi520m8nh7c7i9wi6m1s3l38q29x7")) - (patches (search-patches "openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch" - "openssh-CVE-2016-6210-1.patch" - "openssh-CVE-2016-6210-2.patch" - "openssh-CVE-2016-6210-3.patch")))) + "1k5y1wi29d47cgizbryxrhc1fbjsba2x8l5mqfa9b9nadnd9iyrz")))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (inputs `(("groff" ,groff) ("openssl" ,openssl) |