1 files changed, 0 insertions, 86 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-active-entropy.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-active-entropy.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8f081f4a19..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-active-entropy.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-Try to actively add entropy instead of waiting forever.
-Fixes <https://bugs.gnu.org/37501>.
-
-Taken from upstream:
-https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/patch/?id=50ee7529ec4500c88f8664560770a7a1b65db72b
-
-diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
-index 5d5ea4ce1442..2fda6166c1dd 100644
---- a/drivers/char/random.c
-+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
-@@ -1731,6 +1731,56 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
- 
-+
-+/*
-+ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
-+ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
-+ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
-+ * generating entropy..
-+ *
-+ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
-+ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
-+ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
-+ * entropy loop is running.
-+ *
-+ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
-+ */
-+static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
-+{
-+	credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
-+ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
-+ */
-+static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
-+{
-+	struct {
-+		unsigned long now;
-+		struct timer_list timer;
-+	} stack;
-+
-+	stack.now = random_get_entropy();
-+
-+	/* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
-+	if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
-+		return;
-+
-+	timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
-+	while (!crng_ready()) {
-+		if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
-+			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
-+		mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
-+		schedule();
-+		stack.now = random_get_entropy();
-+	}
-+
-+	del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
-+	destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
-+	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
-  * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
-@@ -1745,7 +1795,17 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
- {
- 	if (likely(crng_ready()))
- 		return 0;
--	return wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
-+
-+	do {
-+		int ret;
-+		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
-+		if (ret)
-+			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
-+
-+		try_to_generate_entropy();
-+	} while (!crng_ready());
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
-