diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch | 40 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch | 108 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch | 94 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/zip.scm | 7 |
7 files changed, 275 insertions, 46 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch index a38c3da51c..03c1e3c068 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch @@ -1,40 +1,28 @@ -Copied from Debian. +Copied from Fedora. -From: mancha <mancha1 AT zoho DOT com> -Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014 -Subject: Info-ZIP UnZip buffer overflow -Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/776589 - -By carefully crafting a corrupt ZIP archive with "extra fields" that -purport to have compressed blocks larger than the corresponding -uncompressed blocks in STORED no-compression mode, an attacker can -trigger a heap overflow that can result in application crash or -possibly have other unspecified impact. - -This patch ensures that when extra fields use STORED mode, the -"compressed" and uncompressed block sizes match. +http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-overflow.patch?id=d18f821e +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index a0a4929..9ef80b3 100644 --- a/extract.c +++ b/extract.c -@@ -2228,6 +2228,7 @@ +@@ -2214,6 +2214,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata) ulg eb_ucsize; uch *eb_ucptr; int r; -+ ush eb_compr_method; ++ ush method; if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ -@@ -2244,6 +2245,14 @@ - ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))) - return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */ +@@ -2223,6 +2224,12 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata) + eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) + return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ -+ /* 2014-11-03 Michal Zalewski, SMS. -+ * For STORE method, compressed and uncompressed sizes must agree. -+ * http://www.info-zip.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=450 -+ */ -+ eb_compr_method = makeword( eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset)); -+ if ((eb_compr_method == STORED) && (eb_size - compr_offset != eb_ucsize)) -+ return PK_ERR; ++ method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset)); ++ if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size != compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN + eb_ucsize)) ++ return PK_ERR; /* compressed & uncompressed ++ * should match in STORED ++ * method */ + if ( #ifdef INT_16BIT diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a24c31bb10 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +Copied from Fedora. + +http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-attribs-overflow.patch?id=d18f821e + +diff -up unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow unzip60/zipinfo.c +--- unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow 2009-11-30 09:55:39.000000000 +0100 ++++ unzip60/zipinfo.c 2009-11-30 09:56:42.844263244 +0100 +@@ -1881,7 +1881,7 @@ static int zi_short(__G) /* return PK- + #endif + int k, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL; + unsigned hostnum, hostver, methid, methnum, xattr; +- char *p, workspace[12], attribs[16]; ++ char *p, workspace[12], attribs[17]; + char methbuf[5]; + static ZCONST char dtype[5]="NXFS"; /* normal, maximum, fast, superfast */ + static ZCONST char Far os[NUM_HOSTS+1][4] = { diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..33498db95e --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +Copied from Fedora. + +http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/tree/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch?id=d18f821e + +From bdd4a0cecd745cb4825e4508b5bdf2579731086a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] upstream fix for heap overflow + +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002 +--- + crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c +index 784e411..a8975f2 100644 +--- a/crypt.c ++++ b/crypt.c +@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@ int decrypt(__G__ passwrd) + GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE; + defer_leftover_input(__G); + for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) { +- b = NEXTBYTE; ++ /* 2012-11-23 SMS. (OUSPG report.) ++ * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN. The resulting ++ * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved, ++ * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and ++ * then continuing with a negative G.csize. (See ++ * fileio.c:readbyte()). ++ */ ++ if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF) ++ { ++ return PK_ERR; ++ } + h[n] = (uch)b; + Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n])); + } +-- +2.4.6 + + +From 4b48844661ff9569f2ecf582a387d46a5775b5d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data + +Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/patches/23/ +--- + extract.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 7134bfe..29db027 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2733,6 +2733,12 @@ __GDEF + int repeated_buf_err; + bz_stream bstrm; + ++ if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) { ++ /* avoid an infinite loop */ ++ Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n")); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ + #if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR)) + if (G.redirect_slide) + wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer; +-- +2.4.6 + + +From bd150334fb4084f5555a6be26b015a0671cb5b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input + +Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius +--- + extract.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 29db027..b9ae667 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk, + if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) { + zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize; + +- if (G.pInfo->encrypted) ++ if (G.pInfo->encrypted) { ++ if (csiz_decrypted <= 12) { ++ /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */ ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile), ++ LoadFarString(InvalidComprData), ++ LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate))); ++ return PK_ERR; ++ } + csiz_decrypted -= 12; ++ } + if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, + LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff), +-- +2.5.2 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a5f274b86 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +Copied from Fedora. + +http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-format-secure.patch?id=d18f821e + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index eeb2f57..a0a4929 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -472,8 +472,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + */ + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, + LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j + blknum*DIR_BLKSIZ + 1)); +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_BADERR; + } + reached_end = TRUE; /* ...so no more left to do */ +@@ -752,8 +752,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + + #ifndef SFX + if (no_endsig_found) { /* just to make sure */ +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + if (!error_in_archive) /* don't overwrite stronger error */ + error_in_archive = PK_WARN; + } +diff --git a/list.c b/list.c +index 15e0011..f7359c3 100644 +--- a/list.c ++++ b/list.c +@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + Info(slide, 0x401, + ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j)); + Info(slide, 0x401, +- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + return PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */ + } + } +@@ -507,7 +507,8 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + && (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive) + && (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0) + ) { /* just to make sure again */ +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_WARN; /* didn't find sig */ + } + +@@ -591,7 +592,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember) /* return PK-type error code */ + Info(slide, 0x401, + ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j)); + Info(slide, 0x401, +- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + return PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */ + } + } +@@ -674,7 +675,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember) /* return PK-type error code */ + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + + if (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4)) { /* just to make sure again */ +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_WARN; + } + if (*nmember == 0L && error_in_archive <= PK_WARN) +diff --git a/zipinfo.c b/zipinfo.c +index 6e22cc8..ac5c61b 100644 +--- a/zipinfo.c ++++ b/zipinfo.c +@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ int zipinfo(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + Info(slide, 0x401, + ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j)); + Info(slide, 0x401, +- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */ + break; + } +@@ -960,7 +960,8 @@ int zipinfo(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + && (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive) + && (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0) + ) { /* just to make sure again */ +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_WARN; /* didn't find sig */ + } + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3417ad873d..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -Copied from Debian. - -From: sms -Subject: Increase size of cfactorstr array to avoid buffer overflow -Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/741384 -X-Debian-version: 6.0-11 - ---- a/list.c -+++ b/list.c -@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ - { - int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL; - #ifndef WINDLL -- char sgn, cfactorstr[10]; -+ char sgn, cfactorstr[12]; - int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1); - #endif - int date_format; diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..76963480d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +Copied from Fedora. + +http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-overflow-long-fsize.patch?id=d18f821e + +diff --git a/list.c b/list.c +index f7359c3..4c3d703 100644 +--- a/list.c ++++ b/list.c +@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + { + int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL; + #ifndef WINDLL +- char sgn, cfactorstr[10]; ++ char sgn, cfactorstr[13]; + int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1); + #endif + int date_format; +@@ -339,7 +339,19 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + G.crec.compression_method == ENHDEFLATED) { + methbuf[5] = dtype[(G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3]; + } else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) { +- sprintf(&methbuf[4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ /* 2013-02-26 SMS. ++ * http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail ++ * &aid=2861648&group_id=118012&atid=679786 ++ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow ++ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format ++ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the ++ * colon, and use four-digit hexadecimal. ++ */ ++ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } else { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 3], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } + } + + #if 0 /* GRR/Euro: add this? */ diff --git a/gnu/packages/zip.scm b/gnu/packages/zip.scm index f0f27ddfe2..83c452778c 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/zip.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/zip.scm @@ -86,9 +86,12 @@ Compression ratios of 2:1 to 3:1 are common for text files.") "unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch" "unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch" "unzip-allow-greater-hostver-values.patch" - "unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch" "unzip-initialize-symlink-flag.patch" - "unzip-remove-build-date.patch"))))) + "unzip-remove-build-date.patch" + "unzip-attribs-overflow.patch" + "unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch" + "unzip-format-secure.patch" + "unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch"))))) (build-system gnu-build-system) ;; no inputs; bzip2 is not supported, since not compiled with BZ_NO_STDIO (arguments |