diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/local.mk | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch | 33 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch | 33 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch | 158 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/spice.scm | 12 |
6 files changed, 4 insertions, 274 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index 36bee31d83..856ade412c 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -1071,10 +1071,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/slim-login.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/slurm-configure-remove-nonfree-contribs.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/sooperlooper-build-with-wx-30.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/steghide-fixes.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/superlu-dist-scotchmetis.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/swish-e-search.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a2cb558cd3..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -Prevent buffer overflow when reading large messages. - -https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1401603 -https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9577 -https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9577 -https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9577 - -Patch copied from upstream source repository: - -https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3 - -From 5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 16:46:56 +0000 -Subject: main-channel: Prevent overflow reading messages from client - -diff --git a/server/main_channel.c b/server/main_channel.c -index 0ecc9df..1fc3915 100644 ---- a/server/main_channel.c -+++ b/server/main_channel.c -@@ -1026,6 +1026,9 @@ static uint8_t *main_channel_alloc_msg_rcv_buf(RedChannelClient *rcc, - - if (type == SPICE_MSGC_MAIN_AGENT_DATA) { - return reds_get_agent_data_buffer(mcc, size); -+ } else if (size > sizeof(main_chan->recv_buf)) { -+ /* message too large, caller will log a message and close the connection */ -+ return NULL; - } else { - return main_chan->recv_buf; - } --- -cgit v0.10.2 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f86cdb4eb1..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -Prevent possible DoS during protocol handshake. - -https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1399566 -https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9578 -https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9578 -https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9578 - -Patch copied from upstream source repository: - -https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a - -From 1c6517973095a67c8cb57f3550fc1298404ab556 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:39:48 +0000 -Subject: Prevent possible DoS attempts during protocol handshake - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index f40b65c..86a33d5 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -2202,7 +2202,8 @@ static void reds_handle_read_header_done(void *opaque) - - reds->peer_minor_version = header->minor_version; - -- if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess)) { -+ /* the check for 4096 is to avoid clients to cause arbitrary big memory allocations */ -+ if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess) || header->size > 4096) { - reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA); - spice_warning("bad size %u", header->size); - reds_link_free(link); --- -cgit v0.10.2 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 76f7ec7ffb..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -Fixes a potential buffer overflow in the protocol handling. - -https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1399566 -https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9578 -https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9578 -https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9578 - -Patch copied from upstream source repository: - -https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a - -From f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> -Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:40:10 +0000 -Subject: Prevent integer overflows in capability checks - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index 86a33d5..9150454 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque) - link_mess->num_channel_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps); - link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps); - -+ /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities, -+ * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */ -+ if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 1024) { -+ reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA); -+ reds_link_free(link); -+ return; -+ } -+ - num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps; - caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset); - --- -cgit v0.10.2 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 37d8f02831..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,158 +0,0 @@ -Fix CVE-2017-7506: - -https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1452606 -https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7506 - -Patches copied from Debian spice package version -'spice_0.12.8-2.1+deb9u1.debian.tar.xz': -http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/s/spice/spice_0.12.8-2.1+deb9u1.debian.tar.xz - -The patches had to be adapted to apply to the latest spice tarball, and -are based on these upstream commits: - -https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=111ab38611cef5012f1565a65fa2d8a8a05cce37 -https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=571cec91e71c2aae0d5f439ea2d8439d0c3d75eb -https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=fbbcdad773e2791cfb988f4748faa41943551ca6 - -From 257f69d619fed407493156c8a7b952abc8a51314 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 -Subject: [spice-server 1/3] reds: Disconnect when receiving overly big - ClientMonitorsConfig - -Total message size received from the client was unlimited. There is -a 2kiB size check on individual agent messages, but the MonitorsConfig -message can be split in multiple chunks, and the size of the -non-chunked MonitorsConfig message was never checked. This could easily -lead to memory exhaustion on the host. - ---- - server/reds.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index f439a3668..7be85fdfc 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -993,19 +993,34 @@ static void reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(void) - static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size) - { -+ const unsigned int MAX_MONITORS = 256; -+ const unsigned int MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE = -+ sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig) + MAX_MONITORS * sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig); -+ - VDAgentMessage *msg_header; - VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config; - RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config; - -+ // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through -+ // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows -+ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) + MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE - cmc->buffer_size < size) { -+ goto overflow; -+ } - cmc->buffer_size += size; - cmc->buffer = realloc(cmc->buffer, cmc->buffer_size); - spice_assert(cmc->buffer); - cmc->mcc = mcc; - memcpy(cmc->buffer + cmc->buffer_pos, message, size); - cmc->buffer_pos += size; -+ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size) { -+ spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size); -+ return; -+ } - msg_header = (VDAgentMessage *)cmc->buffer; -- if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size || -- msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) { -+ if (msg_header->size > MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE) { -+ goto overflow; -+ } -+ if (msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) { - spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size); - return; - } -@@ -1013,6 +1028,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); - red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); - reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); -+ return; -+ -+overflow: -+ spice_warning("received invalid MonitorsConfig request from client, disconnecting"); -+ red_channel_client_disconnect(main_channel_client_get_base(mcc)); -+ reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); - } - - void reds_on_main_agent_data(MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size) --- -2.13.0 -From ff2b4ef70181087d5abd50bad76d026ec5088a93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 -Subject: [spice-server 2/3] reds: Avoid integer overflows handling monitor - configuration - -Avoid VDAgentMessage::size integer overflows. - ---- - server/reds.c | 3 +++ - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index 7be85fdfc..e1c8c1086 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -1024,6 +1024,9 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size); - return; - } -+ if (msg_header->size < sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) { -+ goto overflow; -+ } - monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header)); - spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); - red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); --- -2.13.0 -From 8cc3d7df2792751939cc832f4110c57e2addfca5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 -Subject: [spice-server 3/3] reds: Avoid buffer overflows handling monitor - configuration - -It was also possible for a malicious client to set -VDAgentMonitorsConfig::num_of_monitors to a number larger -than the actual size of VDAgentMOnitorsConfig::monitors. -This would lead to buffer overflows, which could allow the guest to -read part of the host memory. This might cause write overflows in the -host as well, but controlling the content of such buffers seems -complicated. - ---- - server/reds.c | 7 +++++++ - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c -index e1c8c1086..3a42c3755 100644 ---- a/server/reds.c -+++ b/server/reds.c -@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - VDAgentMessage *msg_header; - VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config; - RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config; -+ uint32_t max_monitors; - - // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through - // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows -@@ -1028,6 +1029,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( - goto overflow; - } - monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header)); -+ // limit the monitor number to avoid buffer overflows -+ max_monitors = (msg_header->size - sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) / -+ sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig); -+ if (monitors_config->num_of_monitors > max_monitors) { -+ goto overflow; -+ } - spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); - red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); - reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); --- -2.13.0 diff --git a/gnu/packages/spice.scm b/gnu/packages/spice.scm index 7d49f90be9..10f7c6bc57 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/spice.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/spice.scm @@ -203,20 +203,15 @@ which allows users to view a desktop computing environment.") (define-public spice (package (name "spice") - (version "0.12.8") + (version "0.14.0") (source (origin (method url-fetch) (uri (string-append - "http://www.spice-space.org/download/releases/" + "https://www.spice-space.org/download/releases/" "spice-" version ".tar.bz2")) (sha256 (base32 - "0za03i77j8i3g5l2np2j7vy8cqsdbkm9wbv4hjnaqq9xhz2sa0gr")) - (patches - (search-patches "spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch" - "spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch" - "spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch" - "spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch")))) + "0j5q7cp5p95jk8fp48gz76rz96lifimdsx1wnpmfal0nnnar9nrs")))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (propagated-inputs `(("openssl" ,openssl) @@ -228,6 +223,7 @@ which allows users to view a desktop computing environment.") ("libjpeg-turbo" ,libjpeg-turbo) ("lz4" ,lz4) ("opus" ,opus) + ("orc" ,orc) ("zlib" ,zlib))) (native-inputs `(("pkg-config" ,pkg-config) |