From e5da2f38c3ca8d4626c1b87e045d00d28c1bf4d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark H Weaver Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 14:46:21 -0500 Subject: gnu: unzip: Add fixes for CVE-2014-{8139,8140,8141}. * gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8139.patch, gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch, gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch: New files. * gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add them. * gnu/packages/zip.scm (unzip): Add patches. --- gnu-system.am | 3 + gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8139.patch | 49 +++++++++ gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch | 27 +++++ gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ gnu/packages/zip.scm | 5 +- 5 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8139.patch create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch diff --git a/gnu-system.am b/gnu-system.am index a91915051a..3d145b1387 100644 --- a/gnu-system.am +++ b/gnu-system.am @@ -461,6 +461,9 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ gnu/packages/patches/texi2html-document-encoding.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/texi2html-i18n.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/udev-gir-libtool.patch \ + gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8139.patch \ + gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch \ + gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/util-linux-perl.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/vpnc-script.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/vtk-mesa-10.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8139.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8139.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..433efd1aaf --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8139.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From: sms +Subject: Fix CVE-2014-8139: CRC32 verification heap-based overflow +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/773722 + +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ + #ifndef SFX + static ZCONST char Far InconsistEFlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ + EF block length (%u bytes) exceeds remaining EF data (%u bytes)\n"; ++ static ZCONST char Far TooSmallEFlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ ++ EF block length (%u bytes) invalid (< %d)\n"; + static ZCONST char Far InvalidComprDataEAs[] = + " invalid compressed data for EAs\n"; + # if (defined(WIN32) && defined(NTSD_EAS)) +@@ -2023,7 +2025,8 @@ + ebID = makeword(ef); + ebLen = (unsigned)makeword(ef+EB_LEN); + +- if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { ++ if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { + /* Discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ + if (uO.qflag) + Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ", +@@ -2032,6 +2035,16 @@ + ebLen, (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE))); + return PK_ERR; + } ++ else if (ebLen < EB_HEADSIZE) ++ { ++ /* Extra block length smaller than header length. */ ++ if (uO.qflag) ++ Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ", ++ FnFilter1(G.filename))); ++ Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(TooSmallEFlength), ++ ebLen, EB_HEADSIZE)); ++ return PK_ERR; ++ } + + switch (ebID) { + case EF_OS2: diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..595d8d5bcd --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From: sms +Subject: Fix CVE-2014-8140: out-of-bounds write issue in test_compr_eb() +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/773722 + +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2234,10 +2234,17 @@ + if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ + return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ + ++ /* Return no/bad-data error status if any problem is found: ++ * 1. eb_size is too small to hold the uncompressed size ++ * (eb_ucsize). (Else extract eb_ucsize.) ++ * 2. eb_ucsize is zero (invalid). 2014-12-04 SMS. ++ * 3. eb_ucsize is positive, but eb_size is too small to hold ++ * the compressed data header. ++ */ + if ((eb_size < (EB_UCSIZE_P + 4)) || +- ((eb_ucsize = makelong(eb+(EB_HEADSIZE+EB_UCSIZE_P))) > 0L && +- eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) +- return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ ++ ((eb_ucsize = makelong( eb+ (EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_UCSIZE_P))) == 0L) || ++ ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))) ++ return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */ + + if ( + #ifdef INT_16BIT diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..283925fc34 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +From: sms +Subject: Fix CVE-2014-8141: out-of-bounds read issues in getZip64Data() +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/773722 + +--- a/fileio.c ++++ b/fileio.c +@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ + #endif + static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] = + "warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n"; ++static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldCorrupt[] = ++ "warning: extra field (type: 0x%04x) corrupt. Continuing...\n"; + + #ifdef WINDLL + static ZCONST char Far DiskFullQuery[] = +@@ -2295,7 +2297,12 @@ + if (readbuf(__G__ (char *)G.extra_field, length) == 0) + return PK_EOF; + /* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */ +- getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length); ++ if (getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length) != PK_COOL) ++ { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString( ExtraFieldCorrupt), EF_PKSZ64)); ++ error = PK_WARN; ++ } + #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT + G.unipath_filename = NULL; + if (G.UzO.U_flag < 2) { +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -1901,48 +1901,82 @@ + and a 4-byte version of disk start number. + Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever, + but it means that this procedure is only called in one place. ++ ++ 2014-12-05 SMS. ++ Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling ++ makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with ++ simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend ++ on our variable sizes.) Error handling is crude, but we should now ++ stay within the buffer. + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + ++#define Z64FLGS 0xffff ++#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff ++ + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL) + return PK_COOL; + + Trace((stderr,"\ngetZip64Data: scanning extra field of length %u\n", + ef_len)); + +- while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) { ++ while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) ++ { + eb_id = makeword(EB_ID + ef_buf); + eb_len = makeword(EB_LEN + ef_buf); + +- if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { +- /* discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ ++ if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { ++ /* Extra block length exceeds remaining extra field length. */ + Trace((stderr, + "getZip64Data: block length %u > rest ef_size %u\n", eb_len, + ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)); + break; + } +- if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) { +- ++ if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) ++ { + int offset = EB_HEADSIZE; + +- if (G.crec.ucsize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.ucsize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.lrec.ucsize = G.crec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.ucsize); ++ if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.crec.ucsize = G.lrec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.csize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.csize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.csize = G.lrec.csize = G.crec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.csize); ++ ++ if ((G.crec.csize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.csize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.csize = G.crec.csize = G.lrec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == 0xffffffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == Z64FLGL) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.relative_offset_local_header = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.relative_offset_local_header); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.disk_number_start == 0xffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.disk_number_start == Z64FLGS) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 4 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.disk_number_start); ++ offset += 4; + } ++#if 0 ++ break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */ ++#endif /* 0 */ + } + +- /* Skip this extra field block */ ++ /* Skip this extra field block. */ + ef_buf += (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + ef_len -= (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + } diff --git a/gnu/packages/zip.scm b/gnu/packages/zip.scm index 29ab555ae4..230907becb 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/zip.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/zip.scm @@ -79,7 +79,10 @@ Compression ratios of 2:1 to 3:1 are common for text files.") (uri (string-append "mirror://sourceforge/infozip/UnZip%206.x%20%28latest%29/UnZip%206.0/unzip60.tar.gz")) (sha256 (base32 - "0dxx11knh3nk95p2gg2ak777dd11pr7jx5das2g49l262scrcv83")))) + "0dxx11knh3nk95p2gg2ak777dd11pr7jx5das2g49l262scrcv83")) + (patches (list (search-patch "unzip-CVE-2014-8139.patch") + (search-patch "unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch") + (search-patch "unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch"))))) (build-system gnu-build-system) ;; no inputs; bzip2 is not supported, since not compiled with BZ_NO_STDIO (arguments -- cgit 1.4.1