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Fix CVE-2017-6891:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-6891
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/libtasn1.git/commit/?id=5520704d075802df25ce4ffccc010ba1641bd484
From 5520704d075802df25ce4ffccc010ba1641bd484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 18 May 2017 18:03:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] asn1_find_node: added safety check on asn1_find_node()
This prevents a stack overflow in asn1_find_node() which
is triggered by too long variable names in the definitions
files. That means that applications have to deliberately
pass a too long 'name' constant to asn1_write_value()
and friends. Reported by Jakub Jirasek.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
---
lib/parser_aux.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/parser_aux.c b/lib/parser_aux.c
index b4a7370..976ab38 100644
--- a/lib/parser_aux.c
+++ b/lib/parser_aux.c
@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ asn1_find_node (asn1_node pointer, const char *name)
if (n_end)
{
nsize = n_end - n_start;
+ if (nsize >= sizeof(n))
+ return NULL;
+
memcpy (n, n_start, nsize);
n[nsize] = 0;
n_start = n_end;
@@ -158,6 +161,9 @@ asn1_find_node (asn1_node pointer, const char *name)
if (n_end)
{
nsize = n_end - n_start;
+ if (nsize >= sizeof(n))
+ return NULL;
+
memcpy (n, n_start, nsize);
n[nsize] = 0;
n_start = n_end;
--
2.13.0
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