diff options
author | Mathieu Othacehe <othacehe@gnu.org> | 2021-12-10 21:49:25 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mathieu Othacehe <othacehe@gnu.org> | 2021-12-10 21:49:25 +0100 |
commit | 32750e8c3ed38df4cafb39cffa878c6851abc899 (patch) | |
tree | dcf40b321c3b492bd1d00244c78f72160e66a554 /gnu/packages/patches | |
parent | 6104071e483095f9fea9700e0317e84f64102ae2 (diff) | |
parent | e1e32303129c5aedc7236d5cc854d6b72ad35daf (diff) | |
download | guix-32750e8c3ed38df4cafb39cffa878c6851abc899.tar.gz |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'signed/master' into core-updates
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
7 files changed, 216 insertions, 359 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/bind-re-add-attr-constructor-priority.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/bind-re-add-attr-constructor-priority.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d6765dd92 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/bind-re-add-attr-constructor-priority.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From 6361de07a35f2e9dc1d7201d6b26ca31da93ee69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Geerinckx-Rice <me@tobias.gr> +Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 01:07:32 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Remove priority from attribute + constructor/destructor" + +This reverts commit 0340df46ec5897636dd071bc8b5c4272cfa7d7be. It works +around an irrelevant operating system and breaks compilation on Guix: + +mem.c:873: fatal error: RUNTIME_CHECK(((pthread_mutex_lock(((&contextslock))) == 0) ? 0 : 34) == 0) failed +/gnu/store/pwcp239kjf7lnj5i4lkdzcfcxwcfyk72-bash-minimal-5.0.16/bin/bash: line 1: 13768 Aborted ./${fuzzer} + +Let's simply revert it for now---there are securities at stake! +--- + lib/isc/include/isc/util.h | 8 ++++---- + lib/isc/lib.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/isc/include/isc/util.h b/lib/isc/include/isc/util.h +index f0f7f85fa4..64c26587ac 100644 +--- a/lib/isc/include/isc/util.h ++++ b/lib/isc/include/isc/util.h +@@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ + #endif /* __GNUC__ */ + + #if HAVE_FUNC_ATTRIBUTE_CONSTRUCTOR && HAVE_FUNC_ATTRIBUTE_DESTRUCTOR +-#define ISC_CONSTRUCTOR __attribute__((constructor)) +-#define ISC_DESTRUCTOR __attribute__((destructor)) ++#define ISC_CONSTRUCTOR(priority) __attribute__((constructor(priority))) ++#define ISC_DESTRUCTOR(priority) __attribute__((destructor(priority))) + #elif WIN32 +-#define ISC_CONSTRUCTOR +-#define ISC_DESTRUCTOR ++#define ISC_CONSTRUCTOR(priority) ++#define ISC_DESTRUCTOR(priority) + #endif + + /*% +diff --git a/lib/isc/lib.c b/lib/isc/lib.c +index f3576b2659..2a167fec21 100644 +--- a/lib/isc/lib.c ++++ b/lib/isc/lib.c +@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ isc_lib_register(void) { + } + + void +-isc__initialize(void) ISC_CONSTRUCTOR; ++isc__initialize(void) ISC_CONSTRUCTOR(101); + void +-isc__shutdown(void) ISC_DESTRUCTOR; ++isc__shutdown(void) ISC_DESTRUCTOR(101); + + void + isc__initialize(void) { +-- +2.34.0 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/go-github-com-golang-snappy-32bit-test.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/go-github-com-golang-snappy-32bit-test.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95b5819cdb --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/go-github-com-golang-snappy-32bit-test.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +https://salsa.debian.org/go-team/packages/golang-github-golang-snappy/-/raw/debian/0.0.2-2/debian/patches/0002-Skip-failed-test-on-32bit-system.patch + +From: Shengjing Zhu <zhsj@debian.org> +Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2021 22:41:42 +0800 +Subject: Skip failed test on 32bit system + +The test doesn't pass on old version too, not a regression. + +Bug: https://github.com/golang/snappy/issues/58 +--- + snappy_test.go | 20 +++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/snappy_test.go b/snappy_test.go +index d7c3ea6..c310ba1 100644 +--- a/snappy_test.go ++++ b/snappy_test.go +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import ( + "runtime" + "strings" + "testing" ++ "unsafe" + ) + + var ( +@@ -316,13 +317,22 @@ func TestDecode(t *testing.T) { + "\x06" + "\x0cabcd" + "\x07\x03\x00\x00\x00", + "abcdbc", + nil, +- }, { +- `decodedLen=0; tagCopy4, 4 extra length|offset bytes; with msb set (0x93); discovered by go-fuzz`, +- "\x00\xfc000\x93", +- "", +- ErrCorrupt, + }} + ++ if unsafe.Sizeof(int(0)) == 8 { ++ testCases = append(testCases, struct { ++ desc string ++ input string ++ want string ++ wantErr error ++ }{ ++ `decodedLen=0; tagCopy4, 4 extra length|offset bytes; with msb set (0x93); discovered by go-fuzz`, ++ "\x00\xfc000\x93", ++ "", ++ ErrCorrupt, ++ }) ++ } ++ + const ( + // notPresentXxx defines a range of byte values [0xa0, 0xc5) that are + // not present in either the input or the output. It is written to dBuf diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/icecat-CVE-2021-43527.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/icecat-CVE-2021-43527.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 66706ea5e0..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/icecat-CVE-2021-43527.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,354 +0,0 @@ -Fixes CVE-2021-43527. -Copied from <https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/dea71cbef9e03636f37c6cb120f8deccce6e17dd>, -but with the file names adjusted to allow easy use within GNU Guix. - -# HG changeset patch -# User Dennis Jackson <djackson@mozilla.com> -# Date 1637577642 0 -# Node ID dea71cbef9e03636f37c6cb120f8deccce6e17dd -# Parent da3d22d708c9cc0a32cff339658aeb627575e371 -Bug 1737470 - Ensure DER encoded signatures are within size limits. r=jschanck,mt,bbeurdouche,rrelyea - -Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D129514 - ---- a/security/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c -+++ b/security/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c -@@ -159,58 +159,89 @@ verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(const VFYContext * - SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo; - pkcs1DigestInfo.data = cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo; - pkcs1DigestInfo.len = cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen; - return _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo( - cx->hashAlg, digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo, - PR_FALSE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/); - } - -+static unsigned int -+checkedSignatureLen(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk) -+{ -+ unsigned int sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(pubk); -+ if (sigLen == 0) { -+ /* Error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */ -+ return sigLen; -+ } -+ unsigned int maxSigLen; -+ switch (pubk->keyType) { -+ case rsaKey: -+ case rsaPssKey: -+ maxSigLen = (RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8; -+ break; -+ case dsaKey: -+ maxSigLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN; -+ break; -+ case ecKey: -+ maxSigLen = 2 * MAX_ECKEY_LEN; -+ break; -+ default: -+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ if (sigLen > maxSigLen) { -+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ return sigLen; -+} -+ - /* - * decode the ECDSA or DSA signature from it's DER wrapping. - * The unwrapped/raw signature is placed in the buffer pointed - * to by dsig and has enough room for len bytes. - */ - static SECStatus - decodeECorDSASignature(SECOidTag algid, const SECItem *sig, unsigned char *dsig, - unsigned int len) - { - SECItem *dsasig = NULL; /* also used for ECDSA */ -- SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; - -- if ((algid != SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE) && -- (algid != SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY)) { -- if (sig->len != len) { -- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER); -- return SECFailure; -+ /* Safety: Ensure algId is as expected and that signature size is within maxmimums */ -+ if (algid == SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE) { -+ if (len > DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN) { -+ goto loser; - } -- -- PORT_Memcpy(dsig, sig->data, sig->len); -- return SECSuccess; -+ } else if (algid == SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) { -+ if (len > MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2) { -+ goto loser; -+ } -+ } else { -+ goto loser; - } - -- if (algid == SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) { -- if (len > MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2) { -- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER); -- return SECFailure; -- } -+ /* Decode and pad to length */ -+ dsasig = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen((SECItem *)sig, len); -+ if (dsasig == NULL) { -+ goto loser; - } -- dsasig = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen((SECItem *)sig, len); -- -- if ((dsasig == NULL) || (dsasig->len != len)) { -- rv = SECFailure; -- } else { -- PORT_Memcpy(dsig, dsasig->data, dsasig->len); -+ if (dsasig->len != len) { -+ SECITEM_FreeItem(dsasig, PR_TRUE); -+ goto loser; - } - -- if (dsasig != NULL) -- SECITEM_FreeItem(dsasig, PR_TRUE); -- if (rv == SECFailure) -- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER); -- return rv; -+ PORT_Memcpy(dsig, dsasig->data, len); -+ SECITEM_FreeItem(dsasig, PR_TRUE); -+ -+ return SECSuccess; -+ -+loser: -+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER); -+ return SECFailure; - } - - const SEC_ASN1Template hashParameterTemplate[] = - { - { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, NULL, sizeof(SECItem) }, - { SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, 0 }, - { SEC_ASN1_SKIP_REST }, - { 0 } -@@ -276,17 +307,17 @@ sec_GetEncAlgFromSigAlg(SECOidTag sigAlg - * - * Returns: SECSuccess if the algorithm was acceptable, SECFailure if the - * algorithm was not found or was not a signing algorithm. - */ - SECStatus - sec_DecodeSigAlg(const SECKEYPublicKey *key, SECOidTag sigAlg, - const SECItem *param, SECOidTag *encalgp, SECOidTag *hashalg) - { -- int len; -+ unsigned int len; - PLArenaPool *arena; - SECStatus rv; - SECItem oid; - SECOidTag encalg; - - PR_ASSERT(hashalg != NULL); - PR_ASSERT(encalgp != NULL); - -@@ -461,58 +492,62 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey - cx->wincx = wincx; - cx->hasSignature = (sig != NULL); - cx->encAlg = encAlg; - cx->hashAlg = hashAlg; - cx->key = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(key); - cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo = NULL; - rv = SECSuccess; - if (sig) { -- switch (type) { -- case rsaKey: -- rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(hashAlg, &cx->hashAlg, -- &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo, -- &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen, -- cx->key, -- sig, wincx); -- break; -- case rsaPssKey: -- sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(key); -- if (sigLen == 0) { -- /* error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */ -- rv = SECFailure; -+ rv = SECFailure; -+ if (type == rsaKey) { -+ rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(hashAlg, &cx->hashAlg, -+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo, -+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen, -+ cx->key, -+ sig, wincx); -+ } else { -+ sigLen = checkedSignatureLen(key); -+ /* Check signature length is within limits */ -+ if (sigLen == 0) { -+ /* error set by checkedSignatureLen */ -+ rv = SECFailure; -+ goto loser; -+ } -+ if (sigLen > sizeof(cx->u)) { -+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); -+ rv = SECFailure; -+ goto loser; -+ } -+ switch (type) { -+ case rsaPssKey: -+ if (sig->len != sigLen) { -+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); -+ rv = SECFailure; -+ goto loser; -+ } -+ PORT_Memcpy(cx->u.buffer, sig->data, sigLen); -+ rv = SECSuccess; - break; -- } -- if (sig->len != sigLen) { -- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); -+ case ecKey: -+ case dsaKey: -+ /* decodeECorDSASignature will check sigLen == sig->len after padding */ -+ rv = decodeECorDSASignature(encAlg, sig, cx->u.buffer, sigLen); -+ break; -+ default: -+ /* Unreachable */ - rv = SECFailure; -- break; -- } -- PORT_Memcpy(cx->u.buffer, sig->data, sigLen); -- break; -- case dsaKey: -- case ecKey: -- sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(key); -- if (sigLen == 0) { -- /* error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */ -- rv = SECFailure; -- break; -- } -- rv = decodeECorDSASignature(encAlg, sig, cx->u.buffer, sigLen); -- break; -- default: -- rv = SECFailure; -- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); -- break; -+ goto loser; -+ } -+ } -+ if (rv != SECSuccess) { -+ goto loser; - } - } - -- if (rv) -- goto loser; -- - /* check hash alg again, RSA may have changed it.*/ - if (HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag(cx->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) { - /* error set by HASH_GetHashTypeByOidTag */ - goto loser; - } - /* check the policy on the hash algorithm. Do this after - * the rsa decode because some uses of this function get hash implicitly - * from the RSA signature itself. */ -@@ -645,21 +680,26 @@ VFY_EndWithSignature(VFYContext *cx, SEC - if (cx->hashcx == NULL) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); - return SECFailure; - } - (*cx->hashobj->end)(cx->hashcx, final, &part, sizeof(final)); - switch (cx->key->keyType) { - case ecKey: - case dsaKey: -- dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer; -- dsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key); -+ dsasig.len = checkedSignatureLen(cx->key); - if (dsasig.len == 0) { - return SECFailure; - } -+ if (dsasig.len > sizeof(cx->u)) { -+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); -+ return SECFailure; -+ } -+ dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer; -+ - if (sig) { - rv = decodeECorDSASignature(cx->encAlg, sig, dsasig.data, - dsasig.len); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); - return SECFailure; - } - } -@@ -681,18 +721,23 @@ VFY_EndWithSignature(VFYContext *cx, SEC - cx->params, - &mech); - PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&tmpArena); - if (rv != SECSuccess) { - return SECFailure; - } - - rsasig.data = cx->u.buffer; -- rsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key); -+ rsasig.len = checkedSignatureLen(cx->key); - if (rsasig.len == 0) { -+ /* Error set by checkedSignatureLen */ -+ return SECFailure; -+ } -+ if (rsasig.len > sizeof(cx->u)) { -+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); - return SECFailure; - } - if (sig) { - if (sig->len != rsasig.len) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); - return SECFailure; - } - PORT_Memcpy(rsasig.data, sig->data, rsasig.len); -@@ -744,37 +789,42 @@ VFY_End(VFYContext *cx) - static SECStatus - vfy_VerifyDigest(const SECItem *digest, const SECKEYPublicKey *key, - const SECItem *sig, SECOidTag encAlg, SECOidTag hashAlg, - void *wincx) - { - SECStatus rv; - VFYContext *cx; - SECItem dsasig; /* also used for ECDSA */ -- - rv = SECFailure; - - cx = vfy_CreateContext(key, sig, encAlg, hashAlg, NULL, wincx); - if (cx != NULL) { - switch (key->keyType) { - case rsaKey: - rv = verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(cx, digest); -+ /* Error (if any) set by verifyPKCS1DigestInfo */ - break; -- case dsaKey: - case ecKey: -+ case dsaKey: - dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer; -- dsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key); -+ dsasig.len = checkedSignatureLen(cx->key); - if (dsasig.len == 0) { -+ /* Error set by checkedSignatureLen */ -+ rv = SECFailure; - break; - } -- if (PK11_Verify(cx->key, &dsasig, (SECItem *)digest, cx->wincx) != -- SECSuccess) { -+ if (dsasig.len > sizeof(cx->u)) { - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); -- } else { -- rv = SECSuccess; -+ rv = SECFailure; -+ break; -+ } -+ rv = PK11_Verify(cx->key, &dsasig, (SECItem *)digest, cx->wincx); -+ if (rv != SECSuccess) { -+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); - } - break; - default: - break; - } - VFY_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE); - } - return rv; - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/monero-use-system-miniupnpc.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/monero-use-system-miniupnpc.patch index c5d376d793..2bd179946f 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/monero-use-system-miniupnpc.patch +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/monero-use-system-miniupnpc.patch @@ -1,14 +1,16 @@ diff --git a/external/CMakeLists.txt b/external/CMakeLists.txt -index 7553f87e..8e865c6c 100644 +index 5b7f69a56..3a353a0f3 100644 --- a/external/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/external/CMakeLists.txt -@@ -37,19 +37,7 @@ +@@ -37,21 +37,7 @@ find_package(Miniupnpc REQUIRED) -message(STATUS "Using in-tree miniupnpc") +-set(UPNPC_NO_INSTALL TRUE CACHE BOOL "Disable miniupnp installation" FORCE) -add_subdirectory(miniupnp/miniupnpc) -set_property(TARGET libminiupnpc-static PROPERTY FOLDER "external") +-set_property(TARGET libminiupnpc-static PROPERTY POSITION_INDEPENDENT_CODE ON) -if(MSVC) - set_property(TARGET libminiupnpc-static APPEND_STRING PROPERTY COMPILE_FLAGS " -wd4244 -wd4267") -elseif(NOT MSVC) @@ -24,12 +26,12 @@ index 7553f87e..8e865c6c 100644 find_package(Unbound) diff --git a/src/p2p/net_node.inl b/src/p2p/net_node.inl -index 74924e4f..3554dd0d 100644 +index d4b39869c..13071d898 100644 --- a/src/p2p/net_node.inl +++ b/src/p2p/net_node.inl -@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ - #include "storages/levin_abstract_invoke2.h" +@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ #include "cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.h" + #include "net/parse.h" -#include <miniupnp/miniupnpc/miniupnpc.h> -#include <miniupnp/miniupnpc/upnpcommands.h> diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/rust-wl-clipboard-rs-newer-wl.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/rust-wl-clipboard-rs-newer-wl.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9fb692e9a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/rust-wl-clipboard-rs-newer-wl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml +index 7b975e0..313cb63 100644 +--- a/Cargo.toml ++++ b/Cargo.toml.new +@@ -75,17 +75,17 @@ version = "3" + version = "0.2" + + [dependencies.wayland-client] +-version = "0.27" ++version = "0.28" + + [dependencies.wayland-protocols] +-version = "0.27" ++version = "0.28" + features = ["client", "unstable_protocols"] + [dev-dependencies.wayland-protocols] +-version = "0.27" ++version = "0.28" + features = ["server", "unstable_protocols"] + + [dev-dependencies.wayland-server] +-version = "0.27" ++version = "0.28" + + [features] + dlopen = ["native_lib", "wayland-client/dlopen", "wayland-server/dlopen"] diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/sendgmail-accept-ignored-gsuite-flag.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/sendgmail-accept-ignored-gsuite-flag.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8405ff4e42 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/sendgmail-accept-ignored-gsuite-flag.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 854490dc4a8a6a661b4750730c3ff749519f6e36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Philip McGrath <philip@philipmcgrath.com> +Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2021 10:14:24 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] sendgmail: accept and ignore a "-gsuite" flag + +Accepting a "-gsuite" flag provides compatability with +https://github.com/Flameeyes/gmail-oauth2-tools/commit/eabb456 +so users do not have to change their scripts or config files. + +Full hash of original: eabb45608ff4ce04045ff4ea92d05450e789ac81 + +Related to https://github.com/google/gmail-oauth2-tools/pull/17 +--- + go/sendgmail/main.go | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/go/sendgmail/main.go b/go/sendgmail/main.go +index 405aa1b..5cfd0c1 100644 +--- a/go/sendgmail/main.go ++++ b/go/sendgmail/main.go +@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ var ( + setUp bool + dummyF string + dummyI bool ++ gsuite bool + ) + + func init() { +@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ func init() { + flag.BoolVar(&setUp, "setup", false, "If true, sendgmail sets up the sender's OAuth2 token and then exits.") + flag.StringVar(&dummyF, "f", "", "Dummy flag for compatibility with sendmail.") + flag.BoolVar(&dummyI, "i", true, "Dummy flag for compatibility with sendmail.") ++ flag.BoolVar(&gsuite, "gsuite", true, "Dummy flag for compatibility with other forks of sendgmail.") + } + + func main() { +-- +2.32.0 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/sendgmail-remove-domain-restriction.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/sendgmail-remove-domain-restriction.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d23af33375 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/sendgmail-remove-domain-restriction.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From a5ecd1b2302d0def2f6f8349747022a615a9f017 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com> +Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 13:27:50 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] Don't limit to email with @gmail.com + +--- + go/sendgmail/main.go | 4 ---- + 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/go/sendgmail/main.go b/go/sendgmail/main.go +index b35ef23..405aa1b 100644 +--- a/go/sendgmail/main.go ++++ b/go/sendgmail/main.go +@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ import ( + "log" + "net/smtp" + "os" +- "strings" + + "golang.org/x/oauth2" + googleOAuth2 "golang.org/x/oauth2/google" +@@ -52,9 +51,6 @@ func init() { + + func main() { + flag.Parse() +- if atDomain := "@gmail.com"; !strings.HasSuffix(sender, atDomain) { +- log.Fatalf("-sender must specify an %v email address.", atDomain) +- } + config := getConfig() + tokenPath := fmt.Sprintf("%v/.sendgmail.%v.json", os.Getenv("HOME"), sender) + if setUp { +-- +2.32.0 + |