diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch | 64 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 64 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 496c68ff8e..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -Original patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/ -and then backported to wpa-supplicant-2.4. - -From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser - -It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up -wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload -length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to -2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large -payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20 -bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process. -This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of -heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the -same length which would most likely result in the process termination. -In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there -would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an -infinite loop in ndef_parse_records(). - -Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service -attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or -sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing -the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the -received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack -that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing, -hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included -here. - -Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that -detects integer overflow. (CID 122668) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c -index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644 ---- a/src/wps/ndef.c -+++ b/src/wps/ndef.c -@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, - if (size < 6) - return -1; - record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos); -+ if (record->payload_length > size - 6) -+ return -1; - pos += sizeof(u32); - } - -@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, - pos += record->payload_length; - - record->total_length = pos - data; -- if (record->total_length > size) -+ if (record->total_length > size || -+ record->total_length < record->payload_length) - return -1; - return 0; - } --- -1.9.1 - |