diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/local.mk | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/admin.scm | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch | 82 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch | 51 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch | 82 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch | 62 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch | 50 |
7 files changed, 338 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index 4a36bb5a36..a01efa9224 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -794,6 +794,11 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch \ + gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch \ + gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch \ + gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch \ + gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch \ + gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/xdotool-fix-makefile.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-ark-remove-mibstore.patch \ gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-ast-remove-mibstore.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm index 11a2d1622b..d815dfb8b5 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm @@ -874,7 +874,12 @@ commands and their arguments.") (search-patches "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch" "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch" "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch")))) + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch")))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (arguments '(#:phases (alist-replace diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..acad6be0a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase + +WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control +characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as +STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or +WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase. + +This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated +the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from +an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should +such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file +could become invalid and fail to be parsed. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + src/utils/common.h | 1 + + src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c +index 450e2c6..27b7c02 100644 +--- a/src/utils/common.c ++++ b/src/utils/common.c +@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len) + } + + ++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { ++ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) +diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h +index 701dbb2..a972240 100644 +--- a/src/utils/common.h ++++ b/src/utils/common.h +@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); + + char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); + int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); ++int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); +diff --git a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c +index eadb22f..e8c4579 100644 +--- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c ++++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c +@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred) + cred->key_len--; + #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */ + } ++ ++ ++ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) && ++ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase"); ++ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key", ++ cred->key, cred->key_len); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + return 0; + } + +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..507a96e47c --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase + character + +WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control +characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase +includes an invalid passphrase. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of +almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration +file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., +opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, +load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. +This would allow code from that library to be executed under the +wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index b1c7870..fdd9643 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data, + } + wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)", + (u8 *) value, len); ++ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character", ++ line); ++ return -1; ++ } + if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len && + os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) { + /* No change to the previously configured value */ +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..684d25de96 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> +Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network + output + +Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the +wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block +parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have +been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control +characters in the psk parameter. + +Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> +--- + src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ + src/utils/common.h | 1 + + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- + 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c +index 27b7c02..9856463 100644 +--- a/src/utils/common.c ++++ b/src/utils/common.c +@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) + } + + ++int has_newline(const char *str) ++{ ++ while (*str) { ++ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r') ++ return 1; ++ str++; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) +diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h +index a972240..d19927b 100644 +--- a/src/utils/common.h ++++ b/src/utils/common.h +@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); + char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); + int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); + int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); ++int has_newline(const char *str); + size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, + const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, + const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index fdd9643..eb97cd5 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var) + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) { + const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i]; +- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) +- return field->writer(field, ssid); ++ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) { ++ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid); ++ ++ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it", ++ var); ++ os_free(ret); ++ ret = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return ret; ++ } + } + + return NULL; +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2dd38fee31 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without +filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value, +unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the credential value before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index eb97cd5..69152ef 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + + if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 && + os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) { ++ if (has_newline(value)) ++ return -1; + str_clear_free(cred->password); + cred->password = os_strdup(value); + cred->ext_password = 1; +@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, + } + + val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len); +- if (val == NULL) { ++ if (val == NULL || ++ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 && ++ has_newline(val))) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string " + "value '%s'.", line, var, value); ++ os_free(val); + return -1; + } + +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5f42aa9219 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the + string values + +Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings +without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the +value, unexpected configuration file data might be written. + +This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the +configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control +interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be +accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that +an untrusted user has access to a management software component that +does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to +wpa_supplicant. + +This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data +into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in +wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, +pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user +controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that +library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> +--- + wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c +@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data, + return -1; + } + ++ if (has_newline(pos)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline", ++ line, data->name); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + tmp = os_strdup(pos); + if (tmp == NULL) + return -1; +-- +1.9.1 + |